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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the constitutional politics of international law, locating this as part of 
a wider debate over the nature of responsibility in conditions of uncertainty. Despite a 
general commitment to international legality operating in international society, 
international law’s claim to rule is limited by competing beliefs about the institutional 
practices generated and legitimated by this commitment. This thesis argues that there is a 
critical divide between “pragmatic” and “constitutionalist” ethics of legality. The account 
of legality developed here suggests that faith is itself a necessary and useful strategy for 
responding to social uncertainty and, to the extent that the institution of international law 
can generate this faith, a constitutional ethic cannot be dismissed as quickly or easily as 
pragmatists suppose. This claim is further developed through illustrating how this 
constitutional ethic of legality has begun to shape the politics surrounding the prohibition 
on torture, the governance of the global commons, the legitimacy of peacebuilding, and 
the regulation of the use of force.  
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8 
Introduction 
 
You dare your yes—and experience a meaning. 
You repeat your yes—and all things acquire a meaning. 
When everything has a meaning, how can you live anything but a yes.  
Dag Hammarskjöld1 
 
 
States are, as a general matter, committed to the idea of international legality, to the idea of the 
rule of international law. This is because international law is fundamentally useful: it provides 
states with a practical means to regulate and stabilize their international relations, a way to 
solidify expectations and manage global collective action, and a guide to the normative 
framework or ethic governing international society. States adopt a posture of legality because in 
circumscribing the authority to act, international law makes an ordered and stable international 
society possible allowing states to pursue more specific policy agendas.2  
 The challenge for international law is that international practice belies any one conception 
of the responsibilities entailed by this commitment to legality.3 This is a problem because 
international actors are continuously granted the responsibility of judging how to apply 
international law. When new issues arise, states use the existing rules of international law to 
guide their decisions on whether to intervene to stop a humanitarian catastrophe, or to craft 
counter-terrorism policy, or to frame a response to drug smuggling, piracy or immigration, or to 
define the circumstances in which new weapons like drones, blinding lasers or computer viruses 
can legitimately be used, or as a guide to legitimate action on any number of other issues, state 
practice implies both a commitment to international legality and an understanding of what this 
commitment entails in practice. Without a determinate sense of the requirements of legality both 
the motivation for using international law to guide decision-making and, ultimately, the capacity 
of international law to order international society must suffer.  
As this thesis argues, there are in fact two fundamentally competing normative practices 
or ethics of legality governing the use of international law: the pragmatic and the constitutional. 
The constitutional perspective claims that states and other actors are increasingly being guided 
                                                          
 
1 Dag Hammarskjöld, Markings (New York, Vintage: 2006),  p. 125. 
2 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Reimagining a global ethic’, Ethics & International Affairs, 26 (2) March 2012, p. 2 
3 See generally Anthony F. Lang, Jr. and Amanda Russell Beattie (eds.), War, Torture and Terrorism: rethinking the rules 
of international security, 2009; Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘“The Divided West”: International Lawyers in Europe and 
America’, European Journal of International Law 18 (3) July 2007; Chris Brown, ‘Conceptions of a Rule-Governed 
International Order: Europe vs. America?’, International Relations, 20(3) September 2006, pp. 309-14 
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by a constitutionalist mindset in their approach to international law, by a belief that the 
international legal order has the necessary coherence, objectivity, legitimacy and authority 
needed to specify what the commitment to legality entails in practice. On the pragmatic account, 
the uncertain structure, content and application of international law justifies an ad hoc and sui 
generis approach to legality. The rule of international law is something that is in the process of 
being constructed and, until it has an unambiguous foundation for its claim to authority, the 
most responsible posture is to define the commitment to international legality in light of extra-
legal moral and political concerns. Pretending that international law is able to generate an 
independent claim to authority is a dangerous and, potentially, highly irresponsible practice – a 
dereliction of genuine responsibility.4  
While almost all states almost all of the time espouse a deep commitment to act from 
legality, the tension between these two ethics of legality, these two conceptions of the sense of 
responsibility generated by legality, serves to condition, limit and, ultimately, has the potential to 
erode international law’s capacity to order international society in any meaningful way. The 
challenge to international law’s capacity to contribute to international society’s constitutional 
order comes from the belief that for the law to rule, in Friedrich Hayek’s classic statement, 
entails that ‘government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – 
rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive 
powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge’.5 Now this is not the only conception of what it means for the law to rule, but it 
does express the crucial idea that the legal order must be capable of claiming a degree of 
supremacy over the political order. This highlights the problem caused by ambiguity in the 
practice of legality: a degree of certainty about the terms of law’s rule is necessary in order to 
justify law’s continued capacity to limit and structure political decision-making. The question – 
and quest6 – for international law becomes whether it can prevent the ambiguity surrounding 
the practice of legality from undermining its claim to institutional authority, its claim to ‘rule’.   
Ambiguity about how to act out a commitment to legality is not an arid, abstract 
philosophical issue – these competing perspectives on the practices required by legality have 
been at the heart of some of the most hotly contested international politics issues of recent 
times. Issues which require states or the international community to act with authority triggers 
                                                          
 
4 Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security and International Law (Washington, D.C. Stanford, Calif.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford University Press: 2009);  David Kennedy, Of War and Law Princeton, 
Princeton University Press: 2006)   
5 Friedrich Hayek The Road to Serfdom (London, Routledge: 2001, first published 1944), p. 54 
6 see Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (Boston, Beacon Books: 1966).  
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the use of law to generate legitimacy, but the fact that international law can simultaneously be 
used to challenge legitimacy pushes the coherence of international legality to centre stage. As 
Christian Reus-Smit puts it, it is increasingly the ‘the complex entanglement of politics and law 
that stands out’ in understanding international practice.7 Take an example from the “war on 
terror”. One of the many worries surrounding US conduct over the last decade has been the 
presentation of a single-minded pursuit of security objectives as an ordinary and justifiable 
outgrowth of a commitment to international legality. The US has not only denied the 
applicability of specific rules on detention, fair trial standards, deportation, interrogation or 
torture in specific instances, but has called into question the very idea the international law as a 
whole could generate the objective, superior authority needed to “rule” in international society – 
and implied that the practice of international legality should be conceptualise accordingly. The 
US (and others) interpret their commitments to uphold and advance international law in light of 
the idea so bluntly expressed by John Bolton that ‘International law is not law; it is a series of 
political and moral arrangements that stand or fall on their own merits, and anything else is 
simply theology and superstition masquerading as law’.8 It is in this way that a pragmatic 
approach to international law embeds a scepticism about the range and depth of the ethic 
implied by the value of legality. It is this underlying scepticism that the constitutional approach 
must counter in order to justify international law’s constitutional authority.   
 This thesis is an attempt to explain how the constitutionalist approach functions to 
advance international legality in these ambiguous, contested circumstances. The central 
argument of this thesis is that it is the division between pragmatic and constitutionalist ethics of 
legality – the competing ideas about the nature of the responsibility triggered by the 
commitment to legality – which best explains the politics surrounding international law’s claim 
to govern international society. These two approaches embed fundamentally different visions of 
both the authority of international law in international society and, in an extension of this, of the 
responsibilities appropriate to advancing the rule of international law. In establishing the terms 
of the relationship – the terms of the battle – between these competing approaches to 
international law, the hope is to better understand how international law can both protect and 
project its claim to rule, its claim to define the terms of international society’s constitutional 
order.  
 
                                                          
 
7 Christian Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2004), p. 2 
8 John Bolton, ‘Is there really “law” in international affairs?’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 10 (2000), 
pp. 1-47 
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Discerning the Mystery: Constitutionalism as Mindset 
 
This project requires an immediate caveat, however: concepts are tricky, slippery things. More 
than anything, the coherence of a given concept relies on the assumption that there is a single 
object of analysis, something essential and fundamental that is captured by the range of 
conceptions; that those discussing a concept like sovereignty, or obligation, or legality are 
referring to the same thing, addressing similar questions, to similar ends. One danger, then, of 
conceptual analysis is that we end up not finding anything fundamental to capture, we end up 
finding ‘turtles all the way down’, as Chris Brown puts it.9 The alternative danger is that we end 
up finding that our conceptions are essentially contested; that we have no valid method for 
choosing between competing conceptions. In this case it is not the lack but the overabundance 
of plausible conceptual foundations that cause the problem. This is Martti Koskenniemi’s point, 
that our arguments about international law and politics end up being (post-)structurally stuck 
between apology and utopia, with no way out.10  
Those concepts used to endow a legal order with public, constitutional authority – the 
authority to limit and structure political decisions – have an even more pressing need for 
conceptual coherence because they get used to justify and inform wide-ranging and potentially 
coercive practices.11 The establishment of a constitutional order and political authority is 
insuperable from the idea of legality and the commitment to law’s authority, but that doesn’t 
mean that the terms of this relationship or the underlying conception of law are clear.12 This is 
to say that the practice of legality serves an important function in establishing the terms of 
constitutional order despite the fact that legality is ‘an exceedingly elusive notion’,13 an 
‘essentially contested concept’,14 or that it has the capacity to function as ‘a bit of ruling-class 
chatter’.15 In this regard legality functions as a constitutional concept because it structures 
                                                          
 
9 Chris Brown, ‘“Turtles all the way down”: Anti-foundationalism, critical theory and international relations’, 
Millennium 23 (2) 1994 
10 Martti Koskenniemi, Koskenniemi M, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 2006) 
11 See e.g. Ball, Farr and Hanson (eds.), Political innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 1989), p. 1[‘It is by virtue of possessing a common stock of concepts that we constitute the communities in 
which we live. And yet the common tie of language is apt to become worn and frayed. There is a real and recurrent 
fear that our conceptually constituted communities are, after all, among the most fragile and least durable of all 
human creations’.]  
12 See for example Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions, 1991, p. 4 [‘precisely because the concept of 
law is ambiguous, I propose to investigate the situation of rule and norms in choice-situations in general’] 
13 Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2004) 
14 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’, Law and Philosophy, 21 (2) 
2002, 137-64. 
15 Judith Shklar, ‘Political theory and the rule of law’, in J Shklar, Political Thought and Political thinkers, 1998, p. 21 
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constructive, “constitutional”, social ordering practices even in conditions of uncertainty about 
the nature of this principle. In a constitutional order, the governing institutions – particularly the 
legal order – endows a set of normative claims – particularly the legal rules – with the practical 
authority needed to justify political decisions about how best to act.  
This practical authority is connected, as Anthony F. Lang, Jr. puts it, to the central idea 
that ‘a constitutional order provides legitimacy by ensuring that law rules . . . and that the most 
powerful can be constrained by both the rules and structures of the system’.16 What this means 
is that understanding how legality functions to justify, establish or limit public authority is 
necessarily a question about the constitutional authority of the legal order. Legality and 
constitutionalism are fundamentally overlapping practices; working out how they are related is 
an essential part of the politics of constitutionalism.17 This is to say that constitutionality – and 
the specific idea of legality it advances – is both vital and ‘mysterious’.18 But where this 
mysteriousness might be managed at the domestic level, where the conceptual politics of 
constitutional rule are contained by the settled institutional form of the state, international 
society lacks this settled basis. It is international law’s practical authority that is in question. The 
task in establishing the terms of the battle between the competing approaches to international 
law’s constitutional authority is not simply to assess how international law does rule, but how it 
can protect and promote its normative claim to rule while recognizing the background 
uncertainty surrounding the operative conception of legality.  
As the inaugural editorial of Global Constitutionalism suggests, there are a number of cases 
and issues where core constitutional concepts like human rights, democracy and the rule of law 
drive international social practice. More pointedly, constitutionalism provides a language 
through which to engage ‘the coming challenges to fundamental norms that are held as central 
constitutional principles in most contemporary societies around the globe. Constitutionalism as 
an idea sits precisely at the intersection of law and politics, and it is for this reason that when 
issues emerge at a global level in the interstices of law and politics, the idea of global 
                                                          
 
16 Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Punishment, Justice and International Relations: Ethics and Order after the Cold War, 2008 p. 23; see 
also Jeffrey Jowell, ‘The rule of law and its underlying values’, in Jowell and Oliver (eds.), The Changing Constitution,  
2011, p. 2 
17 J Jowell, ibid.; see however Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 2004, p. 209 [Clark argues that defining 
constitutionality in terms of legality is nonsensical because it makes the idea of constitutionality redundant; he 
suggests that constitutionality instead identifies an inherently political process of constructing social – rather than 
legal – norms.]    
18 David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Constitutionalism’, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtmann (eds.), 
Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, 2009 
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constitutionalism becomes relevant.’19 In practical terms, the fact that the terms of this 
relationship between law and politics is a core and open-ended question for legal and political 
theory merits the emphasis on the type of mindset that typifies constitutional practice in the 
international order. As Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein argue, constitutionalism 
‘signifies not so much a social or political process, but rather an attitude, a frame of mind. 
Constitutionalism is the philosophy of striving towards some form of political legitimacy, 
typified by respect for, well, a constitution’.20 There is another more pressing need to focus on 
the constitutionalist mindset rather than hypothesizing, at least in the first instance, about the 
constitutional form of the institutional orders – for example the UN Charter.21 As Andreas 
Paulus puts it, ‘rather than asking whether the constitutional structure of the Charter organs are 
sufficiently similar to that of the state, we [must] reflect on whether and how the international 
legal order fulfils the background principles for a constitutional order worthy of that name in 
the constitutional tradition. If not, the resistance to international regulation will likely – and 
justifiably – grow, and the accommodation needed for international order will not be 
forthcoming’.22  
At the core of this state of mind is the idea that there are rules and principles which have 
the potential to claim a constitutional-type authority – and generate a constitutional effect – 
even if the rules were not originally conceived in this way or do not presently function this way. 
Understanding the claim to constitutional authority propagated by various actors in international 
society – including claims that institutions like the UN establish a constitution for international 
society23 – requires, first, understanding how the ambiguous ideas, concepts and beliefs driving 
and sustaining the constitutionalist mindset function in practice.24 These beliefs might be 
                                                          
 
19 Antje Wiener, Anthony F. Lang, Jr., James Tully, Miguel Poiares Maduro and Mattias Kumm, ‘Editorial: Global 
constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law’, Global Constitutionalism 1 (1) March 2012, p. 3  
20 Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’, in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of 
International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2009), p. 10 
21 See for example Michael Doyle, ‘The UN Charter – a global constitution?’ in Dunoff and Trachtmann (eds.), 
Ruling the World? 2009; this fits into the broader functional approach favoured by Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel 
Trachtmann, ‘A functional approach to international constitutionalization’ in Dunoff and Trachtmann (eds.), Ruling 
the World?, 2009 
22 Andreas L. Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’,  in Dunoff and Trachtmann (eds.), Ruling 
the World?, 2009, p. 71 
23 See especially Bardo Fassbender, ‘Rediscovering a Forgotten Constitution: Notes on the place of the UN Charter 
in the international legal order’, in Dunoff and Trachtmann (eds.), Ruling the World?, 2009  
24 See especially Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, OUP: 1996; Freeden nicely 
captures the wider rationale for focusing on the mindset of constitutionalism. As he argues, the fact that contested 
concepts structure political practice means that ideology is an inescapable feature of conceptual analysis. He argues 
that the analytic frameworks operating in political theory have traditionally tended to want to depoliticize what is an 
inherently political practice of decontesting essentially contested concepts – and in the process inflates the 
expectations for theory. As he puts it, ‘the nature of political thinking is such that any of its instances invokes, 
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reinforced and reified by existing institutional structures, but the fact a given set of rules – such 
as the UN Charter – can be understood as a constitution is because those acting on the rules 
regard it as appropriate to fight for the constitutional status of these rules.25 The nature of the 
global constitutional order is not something that is waiting to be discovered, but an idea, an 
ideology, that can motivate constructive, constitutional practice in international society.26 But it 
is also, as Paulus implies, something that can trigger a backlash against the existing rules of law.27 
The red thread running through this thesis is that justifying constitutionalism as a 
mindset with practical relevance in international society requires specifying how 
constitutionalism can respond to attempts to undermine the validity of constitutional practice. 
The problem that needs to be confronted in this regard is as much a consequence of treating 
constitutionalism as a mindset; constitutionalism as a practice presents an idea of legality as a 
virtuous practice and this has the capacity to entrench an ideological opposition to 
constitutionalism on the part of those who reject or question this normative standing of legality 
in the ambiguous circumstances of international society. From a conceptual point of view, it is 
necessary to accept that constitutional practices are necessarily located ‘somewhere in-between 
the strictly normative (“this is what things should be like”) and the strictly descriptive (“this is 
what things are like”)’.28 But this middle-ground perspective also carries the danger of 
institutionalising conflict about the core practical values of international society.29 This is to say 
that constitutionalism requires a strategy for avoiding or managing the backlash to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
intentionally or otherwise, a very large number of the most common political concepts. Thus configurations of 
necessarily decontested concepts are the sine qua non of thinking rationally about politics—that is, in a minimally 
organized and purposive way—with a view to political action.’ (p. 5), What this gives us, however, is not a platform 
from which to claim objective knowledge, but an ideology, a political point of view. Freeden’s point isn’t to 
diminish the purpose or endeavour of theory, simply to humble it. Packaging up essentially contested concepts into 
a theoretical tradition is a useful, and necessary, part of ordering and justifying our normative commitments. But 
this doesn’t strip away the political nature of this process.  
25 See e.g. Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making, 1989 [arguing that how the rules are treated will determine their 
capacity to structure society; the capacity to “rule” is not an inherent characteristic of rules, but something rules are 
endowed with in and through social practice.] 
26 For a related argument see especially Shirley V. Scott, ‘International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship 
between International Law and International Politics, 5 European Journal of International Law, 313-325 (1994); Susan 
Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology, OUP: 2003; Beate Jahn, 
‘Liberal internationalism: from ideology to empirical theory – and back again’, International Theory, 1(3) November 
2009, 409-438 
27 Andreas Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’, in Dunoff and Trachtmann (eds.), Ruling the 
World?, 2009 
28 Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, 2009, p. 4; see also Martti Koskenniemi, 
‘Constitutionalism as mindset: Reflections on Kantian themes about international law and globalization’, Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 8 (1) January 2007.  
29 On the wider nature of middle-ground theorising in international society, see Molly Cochran, ‘Charting the Ethics 
of the English School: What ‘Good’ is there in a Middle-Ground Ethics?’, International Studies Quarterly 53 
(2009), 204; Terry Nardin, ‘Middle-Ground Ethics: Can One Be Politically Realistic Without Being a Political 
Realist?’, Ethics & International Affairs 25 (1) Spring 2011 
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conceptions of international law’s rule in international society, of the nature of international law 
and politics, and of the relationship between law and politics which it embeds as part of the 
constitutionalist mindset.30 Constitutionalism might be both ‘mysterious’ to its core,31 but this 
has an effect on the capacity for constitutionalism to establish concrete practices – including the 
respect for legality as the core principle of global constitutionalism. 
 
Deepening the Mystery: Method and Methodology 
 
What does this mean in practical terms for the scope of this thesis? How do you discern a 
mindset? One way to illustrate the challenge this presents to the academic study of 
constitutionalism is to look at the form that the backlash to ‘traditionalism’ as a frame of 
reference in International Relations.32 The relevance of this is that these were the debates which 
helped sustain the disciplinary divide between international law and international relations, a 
divide which both threatens to engulf global constitutionalism and politicizes the choice of 
method.33  
The central claim that Hedley Bull and others in favour of a traditional approach 
advanced was that understanding international politics demanded a methodology able to capture 
what was a messy, ideologically charged reality – like any other political domain.34 To do justice 
to this, the best approach was to develop a rounded sense for the ‘play of international politics’, 
drawing from philosophy, history and law, understanding the practices and personalities taking 
part and only then offering an observation about the meaning behind a particular action or a 
normative judgement about the action which should have been taken.35 Explaining social action 
was grounded in a process of ‘penetrating the minds of the key actors and uncovering not only 
their motives but also the common premises and presuppositions that prevail among them 
                                                          
 
30 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Introduction’, in Christian Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law, p. 4 
31 See especially David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, in Dunoff and Trachtmann (eds.), Ruling the 
World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, CUP: 2009; and Gerry Simpson, ‘Duelling Agendas: 
International Law and International Relations (Again)’, 1 Journal of International Law and International Relations 61, 
2004-2005, p. 72. 
32 See Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the “Second” Great Debate and Assessing its 
Importance for Social Theory’, EJIR 2006; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 
2011 
33 For an excellent analysis of this see Oliver Jütersonke, Morgenthau, Law and Realism, 2010  
34 Hedley Bull, ‘International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach’, World Politics 3 (1966), 361-377; see also 
Andrew Hurrell, ‘Keeping history, law and political philosophy firmly within the English school’, Review of 
International Studies, 27 (3) 2001, 489-94. 
35 Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 33 
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about the nature of the game they are supposed to be playing’36 – the same process that grounds 
the constitutionalist approach today. This places the onus on the scholar’s capacity to judge, 
their expertise, their experience of the field of practice. Understanding international politics, in 
other words, required first appreciating that the outcome of an analysis was, essentially, an 
interpretation about the normative practices governing a social order. Challenging this claim was 
‘an attempt to secure the supposed objectivity of the natural sciences’ by importing their 
methodological tools.37 By testing assumptions against the available evidence, the theorist could 
move beyond simply offering an interpretation about the world, into the realm of scientific fact. 
Armed with scientific methods, the scholar’s classical judgment derived from a knowledge of 
law, political theory and history, was largely redundant; understanding international politics 
became a matter of mastering the technical apparatus of the field.38  
 Bull didn’t do himself any favours by failing to elaborate on what the traditional 
approach entailed, beyond blandishments about the importance of scholarly judgement and 
detachment.39 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson has recently suggested that one of the effects of failing 
to refine the nature of the claim – and the type of knowledge the traditional approach was 
concerned with – was that it allowed critics of this approach to shift the burden of proof onto 
the traditionalists, allowing those favouring a scientific approach to demand a type of evidence 
(about causality in particular) which the traditionalist couldn’t provide and, more to the point, 
didn’t believe to be the best route to knowledge about the political domain.40 This, in a rather 
neat way, echoes the challenge facing a dispositional account of global constitutionalism, 
                                                          
 
36 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, p. 33 
37 Simon Curtis and Marjo Koivisto, ‘Towards a Second “Second Debate”? Rethinking the Relationship between 
Science and History in International Theory’, International Relations, 2010 24 (4) 433-455, p. 434 
38 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus 106 (1977), p 54. 
[characterizing this as a battle between ‘the literates’ and ‘the numerates’].  
39 Hedley Bull, ‘New Directions in the Theory of International Relations’, International Studies, 14 (1975), 280-290 
[As he enigmatically explains, ‘The tradition of detached and disinterested study of politics is, I believe, a very 
delicate plant . . . Its survival depends on a form of commitment that is not political, but intellectual and academic: 
a commitment to inquiry as a distinct human activity, with its own morality and its own hierarchy of priorities, that 
is necessarily brought into conflict with the prevailing values in any society’]; for a useful recent effort to refine this 
traditional approach, however, see Robert Jackson ‘International Relations as a Craft Discipline’, in Cornelia Navari 
(ed.), Theorising International Society: English School Methods, Routledge: 2009 
40 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 2011 [Jackson’s wider project is to share 
the burden of proof more equitably, arguing that if a claim is going to be labelled as “scientific”, there had better be 
a sense of what the nature of “science” as a distinct endeavour entails. Certainly if the claim to scientific knowledge 
is going to be used to evaluate – and discredit – competing types of knowledge and practices, including political or 
normative practices. As he suggests, the eventual impact is that in producing genuine knowledge, ‘The trick is to set 
up hard conversations, and not to paper over significant differences’ (p. 191). In this regard he draws an analogy 
with an ecumenical theology, which tries to cultivate a dialogue between adherents of different faiths in a way that 
respects ‘differences without seeking to dissolve them in some kind of nebulous synthesis, but that simultaneously 
refuses to let the differences between them overwhelm the discussion to the point where the interlocutors go their 
separate ways’ (p. 190).] 
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because these same power-dynamics are echoed, without any great refinement, in the 
interdisciplinary debates between international law and international relations. Global 
constitutionalism does not easily allow for an “ecumenical approach” because developing the 
normative commitments needed to make global constitutionalism a viable institutional project 
requires a mindset that appreciates law is a superior source for knowledge about the constitutional 
rules of international society.  
The reason carving out a common ground was so tricky was because international 
lawyers were so reluctant to leave behind their normative presumption – their disciplinary mindset 
– that regarded international law as having an independent normative standing in international 
society, regardless of the evidence arraigned against this belief. International lawyers were taken 
to task for operating under a wholly unscientific belief in international law, for refusing to 
evaluate international law’s normative standing in light of some appreciation of how the rules 
actually affected state behaviour.41 The problem with this demand was that it refused to 
recognise how positivist international lawyers conceived of law’s normativity: legal obligations 
established a claim protected from the need to continuously “prove” the normative validity of a 
rule by engaging in causal analysis.42 What the attempt by international relations theorists to 
generate a better standard of evidence for the authority of international law did was to 
superimpose the methodological commitments of the international relations theorist over and 
above those of the positivist international lawyer. This had three effects. First, it privileged those 
conceptions of international law which found themselves able to take part in this 
interdisciplinary conversation, on these onerous terms, in particular the process school, which 
regarded law’s authority as an outgrowth of public policy concerns.43 Second, however, was that 
it undermined the debate within international law about the nature of international law; it asked 
– told – the international lawyer to ‘accept the self-image of an under-labourer to the policy-
agendas of international relations orthodoxy’.44 There was a third problem here which was that 
                                                          
 
41 Robert Keohane, ‘International Relations and International Law: Two Optics’, (1997) 38 Harvard International Law 
Journal 487 
42 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Positivism as normative politics Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International 
Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive International Law’, European Journal of International Law, 
13 (2) 2002: 401-437. 
43 For a comprehensive account, see Harold Koh, ‘Why do nations obey international law?’, Yale Law Journal 106(8) 
1997, pp. 2599–659 
44 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau and the Image of Law in International Relations’, in 
Michael Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 33  
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acquiescing to this helped establish the dominant preconception in international relations that, 
in the international domain, international law was subservient to the political ordering process.45 
Constructivism helped provide a détente of sorts which allowed a more civilized 
conversation about the terms of the divide between international law and politics to emerge, and 
has to a certain extent protected global constitutionalism from this kind of methodological 
divisiveness. This reconciliation between these two ‘bickering spouses in a paradigmatic 
dysfunctional family’,46 was characterized by the idea that disciplinary bickering was itself a 
natural and interesting part of the politics of international law.47 The challenge was not to 
resolve the disciplinary contest but to study it, to catalogue it, because these scholarly debates – 
and the very real political conflict they helped sustain – reflected deeper debates about how the 
relationship between law and politics functioned to construct the international social order.48 
This constructivist approach, however, has its own limits including, crucially, the inability to 
make sense of international law’s authority when presented with a ‘hard case’, where there is no 
conventional or customary way to resolve the competition between the legal and political 
domains.49 The impulse for constructivism is, again, to catalogue the various actors in the battle, 
to give an account of, for instance, how the existing rules on the use of force have structured 
the debates on the legitimacy of drone warfare. What this perspective struggles to account for is 
the underlying normative question that follows from privileging the authority of the legal order: 
how should the rules on the use of force be applied to the debates on drone warfare. The 
difference here is a fine one, but an important one, because it is the difference between 
accepting international law’s capacity to guide action as an institutional fact and continuing to 
regard this capacity as a site for legitimate political contest.  
 This is where the constitutionalist project to ‘make visible how one could reasonably 
think about the various elements of a global constitutional order’50 re-centres the debate 
surrounding international law’s authority from the question of whether international law has such 
                                                          
 
45 Jan Klabbers, ‘The bridge crack’d: a critical look at interdisciplinary relations’, International Relations 23 (1) 2009, 
120-121 [argues that the international relations theorists ‘smugly [took] this in their stride without bothering to 
figure out whether the international lawyers should be doing so’]; see also Martha Finnemore, ‘New Directions, new 
collaborations for IR and IL’, in Bierstaker, Spiro, Sririam and Raffo (eds.), International Law and International 
Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (London, Routledge: 2007)  
46 J. David Bederman, ‘Constructivism, Positivism and Empiricism in International Law’, 89 Georgia L. J 2000-
2001, p. 469  
47 Christian Reus-Smit ‘The politics of international law’, in Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law, 2004  
48 Robert H. Jackson, Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations: From Anarchy to Cosmopolis (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan: 2005), 101-122 [characterises the problem as one of making sense of ‘the knots and tangles of 
international obligation’]  
49 Adriana Sinclair, International Relations Theory and International Law: A Critical Approach, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 2010) [arguing that these limitations are built into the structure of constructivist approaches] 
50 Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, 2010, p 4-5 
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authority to a question about how international law both expresses and justifies the expansion of 
this constitutional authority. But in order to understand this it is also necessary to understand 
how this constitutionalist mindset, how a ‘reasonable’ account of constitutionalism could be 
drawn back in to the unproductive kind of interdisciplinary debates it aims to displace. 
Explaining international law’s constitutional authority requires making space for a set of 
normative presumptions, and explaining why the constitutional mindset protected and advanced 
from within the legal order should be allowed to dictate the terms of social order and social 
practice. At some point the practical effects of contested assumptions about the normative 
authority embedded in international law become impossible to ignore or to bookend because it 
is in this normative conversation, in the constitutional mindset justified by the commitment to 
legality, that determines the practical, constitutive effect of international legality. What effect 
does this have, in concrete terms, on the approach taken in this thesis? It means that 
understanding the nature of the evidence appropriate to establishing the “fact” of constitutional 
authority is itself a central part of the challenge, part of international law’s constitutional politics.  
 
Structure 
 
This thesis has two parts. Part I develops an understanding of the conceptual problems facing 
attempts to justify constitutionalist accounts of international law. Chapter 1 puts the debate 
about international law’s constitutional authority in the context of wider debates about the 
constitutional rules of international society. This centres the politics of constitutional authority 
around the conditions required for constitutional rule in international society and this in turn 
generates the tension over the appropriate ethic to adopt in these circumstances of institutional 
uncertainty. This begins to establish the terms of the battle between pragmatic and 
constitutional ethics of legality. For the pragmatist, international law is too uncertain to be able 
to generate any strong, independent, or coherent sense of responsibility. Responsibility is 
located outside of the legal order. For the constitutionalist, international law is able to generate a 
distinctive set of commitments, a sense of responsibility able to remedy uncertainty about both 
the legal order and the practice of legality. Chapter 2 argues that the perception of international 
legality as an institutional commitment defined by ambiguity and uncertainty powers the 
pragmatic account, feeding the perception that the inability of international law to resolve hard 
cases decisively undermines the possibility for constitutionalism to function as a responsible 
ethic in the ambiguous circumstances of international society. Chapter 3 argues that making 
sense of the constitutionalist mindset as an ethic appropriate to conditions of uncertainty 
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requires engaging with the role of faith in protecting and privileging the function of legality in a 
constitutional order. I argue an Augustinian tradition of republican thought can help to make 
sense of law’s constitutional authority as justified through and protected by a sense of actor’s 
sense of faith that comes from their public responsibilities.  
Part II attempts to show where and how these different conceptions of the 
constitutional responsibilities appropriate to international law structure more specific debates 
about the international law’s capacity to respond to challenges to the practices of enforcement, 
rule of law promotion, interpretation and coherence, all of which to one degree or another 
challenge the justification for locating constitutional responsibility as internal to the legal order. 
These issues set up hard cases that the pragmatist is able to use as evidence for their position. In 
each case, however, I argue that international law is better able to remedy threats or challenges 
to its constitutional authority than the pragmatist has been willing to admit because it embeds a 
sense of trusteeship over international legality.  
I flesh out both the constitutional politics of international law and the potential 
justification for constitutionalism through four domains where these conceptual issues have 
gone “live”, shaping the nature of political debate. Chapter 4 uses the law of the sea – a domain 
where enforcement has traditionally been lacking – as a way to show that international law 
generates and protects constitutional authority not through police action but by attributing 
responsibilities. Chapter 5 uses debates about peacebuilding and rule of law promotion as a way 
to answer the pragmatic claim that international law lacks the democratic legitimacy needed to 
claim supremacy over states. On the contrary, I argue, international law functions as a trustee of 
the international order; in this sense the commitment to international law is part of a more 
general commitment to the public, constitutional rules. Chapter 6 uses the torture debates – in 
which the constitutional prohibition against torture was presented as uncertain and open to 
interpretation – as a way to show that international law was able to defend the constitutional 
rule because it has an implicit conception of responsible interpretive practice. Finally, chapter 7 
challenges the claim that the rules on the use of force are too inchoate to guide state practice, 
arguing that although the rules have become uncertain, this uncertainty has not touched the 
clear idea practitioners have of what an ethic of legality requires in this arena.  
The rationale for dividing the thesis up in this way is that it helps to both show how the 
conceptual issues surrounding international law’s constitutional politics are deepened through 
the practice of legality, and how the ambiguity of international legality might be resolved 
through adopting a constitutionalist mindset. To this end, chapters 4 – 7 should not be thought 
of as traditional case studies, in which I test the theoretical hypotheses developed in earlier 
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chapters. Rather, they provide a way to deepen our understanding of how the contrasting 
practices of legality function to generate the constitutional politics of international law. The 
competing ethic or mindsets of pragmatism and constitutionalism are both theoretical and 
practical; the terms of the divide here on conceptual issues like the role of enforcement in 
international law, or the democratic legitimacy of international law, or the status of the 
prohibition on torture, or the effect of uncertainty in the rule on the use of force, is both 
reflected and reinforced through the resolution of practical problems.  
What I hope will come out of this analysis is that that constitutionalism does provide a 
viable avenue for countering the pragmatic ethic of legality. The institutional development of 
international law – and the constitutionalist practice which this gives rise to – offers a partial 
route to countering the existing scepticism surrounding the capacity of international law to 
generate a distinctive claim to authority. What is needed to make the best use of this, however, is 
a better sense, or sensibility, of the nature of the constitutional disposition as a responsible practice. 
In all of these cases, in all of these arenas – the global commons, peacebuilding, torture, and 
intervention – a claim to constitutional authority emerges through a practical ethic of 
constitutional responsibility.  
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Part I 
 
The Politics of Constitutional Authority 
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Chapter 1 
The politics of constitutional authority: legalism at the limits 
 
 
This chapter provides an account of the politics of constitutional authority. I argue that the 
value of legality, or the belief that international society should be guided by the rules of 
international law, is at the core of international law’s constitutional politics. In contrast to 
existing conceptions of the constitutional rules – conceptions which collapse into an 
unproductive battle between pluralist and solidarist descriptions of international society’s 
institutional order – I argue that the issue driving these debates in practice is the competing 
normative perspectives on the nature of the responsibilities appropriate to institutional 
uncertainty in international society. Understanding the tensions here generates a much 
clearer picture of why international law’s attempt to develop the constitutional rules of 
international society has struggled to resolve questions about international law’s 
constitutional authority. Rather than resolving questions about how to act in international 
society, the elaboration of constitutional rules through international law has given rise to a 
politics of constitutional authority, a contest over how – and where – to locate constitutional 
authority in the uncertain circumstances of international society. This chapter concludes 
that, at its core, international law’s constitutional politics presents a question about the ethic, 
the conception of responsibility, appropriate to conditions of institutional uncertainty.  
 
Constitutional rules in international society 
 
Constitutional rules are a society’s standards for the exercise of public authority. These are 
the rules or principles which have a special significance in ordering international society. 
Constitutional rules set the limits for expressions of public authority and, because of this, 
they function as the medium through which the idea of constitutional order – the existence 
of a governing framework – is conveyed. Another way to put this is to say that 
constitutional rules are centrally concerned with setting the terms of institutional authority, 
both empowering and limiting the capacity of governing institutions to act.1  
                                                          
 
1 See especially Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2009), p. 9; see also Anthony F. Lang, Jr., ‘Introduction: Rules and 
International Security: Dilemmas of a New World Order’, in Lang and Beattie (eds.), War, Torture and Terrorism: 
Rethinking the Rules of International Security (London, Routledge: 2009)  
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Constitutional rules have two core features. First they are both principled and 
practical; they need to be conceptually coherent, and they need to be capable of guiding 
action in the real world. These are often called the requirements of integrity and fit.2 Second 
they are both backwards and forward looking; constitutional rules at once describe an 
existing state of affairs – a society’s existing normative order – and proscribe the rules 
governing future actions, issues and policy problems. The result of this feature is that to 
attempt to describe the constitutional rules is always also a normative exercise and to 
establish the normative force of constitutional rules is always also a descriptive exercise. In 
this regard, constitutional rules do not only reflect the state of an existing social order but 
also must be seen to have the authority to determine social order by teasing out the 
implications of constitutional rules. Constitutional rules in this sense establish a particular 
form of constructive international authority, providing an institutionalised means ‘whereby 
international society moves from vague perception of a common interest to a clear 
conception of the kind of conduct it requires’.3 This is to say, constitutional rules establish 
constitutional order.    
Although the explicit focus on global constitutionalism is relatively recent, the idea 
that international society is governed by constitutional rules is not.4 International lawyers – 
and the institution of international law – establish a distinct perspective on the constitutional 
rules governing international society, although in its basic features can be seen to reflect 
both the English School’s ‘institutionalism’ and liberal internationalist bias.5 Hedley Bull 
                                                          
 
2 See especially Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford, Hart Publishing: 1986), p. 76  
3 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, Palgrave Macmillan; 3rd edition 
2002), p. 68 
4 For one comprehensive survey of the recent literature global constitutionalism, see Antje Wiener, ‘Global 
Constitutionalism: Mapping an Emerging field’. See also the bibliography of the Global Administrative Law 
Project, available at: http://www.iilj.org/GAL/   
5 Hidemi Suganami and Andrew Linklater, The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2006), p. 36; Tim Dunne and Marjo Koivisto, ‘Crisis, What Crisis? 
Liberal Order Building and World Order Conventions’, Millennium 38 (3) May 2010, 615-640; It should be 
noted that there are other perspectives on the nature of international society’s constitutional rules besides the 
English School account. The fact that constitutional rules establish which core commitments have the power 
to structure international society means that all IR theories have at least an implied account of the 
constitutional rules. For example, realists tend to understand the rational calculation of state interest as the 
“rule” constituting international society, with the balances and imbalances of power setting the standards of 
legitimate authority. Liberals also emphasise the pre-eminence of sovereignty but suggest that sovereign power 
is mediated by the facts of global interdependence. Constitutional rules are those that have authority by virtue 
of this interdependence and all the threats, challenges and possibilities which follow. These are the rules 
necessary to “tame” interdependence. Both constructivists and the English School argue that constitutional 
rules are to be discovered in the normative dynamics of social practice. The contrast between the two is a 
matter of emphasis: for the constructivist the emphasis is on answering the question ‘how are rules formed?’, 
while for the ES the emphasis is on the question, ‘how do rules work?’. For constructivists, constitutional rules 
are the normative conventions and processes which end up structuring argument and practice. There are no 
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captures the basic idea in observing that states ‘form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
share in the working of common institutions’.6 This perspective suggests that constitutional 
rules are those arising as a result of a special category of practices, namely international 
society’s institutional practices. International society is defined by a relatively limited set of 
social practices – such as diplomacy, law, war, and trade. Constitutional rules are those 
essential to establishing defining and maintaining the existence of these larger bundles of 
customary practices and processes which ‘provide the means whereby international society 
moves from vague perception of a common interest to a clear conception of the kind of 
conduct it requires’.7  
For international lawyers the result of thinking that the commitment to the rule of 
law is fundamental to the existence of international society is that the authoritative account 
of the constitutional rules of international society must be derived through the institution of 
international law.8 This connection between international society and the existence of 
international law serves a crucial purpose in responding to the more extreme sceptical 
arguments that seek to deny the existence of international law as law. But it also establishes a 
problem for the attempt to justify international law as a constitutional authority, it sets the 
context for international law’s constitutional politics.  
The nature of international law’s claim to define the constitutional rules of 
international society is embedded in the contest between pluralist and solidarist accounts of 
international society. This highlights the fact that the existence of an institution – the 
existence of a bundle of commitments – is only the start of the attempt, as Will Bain puts it, 
to ‘make sense of obligation in international life’, to make sense of the nature of the rules of 
governing international society, and of the sense of responsibility which follows.9 As Robert 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
rules here, not really, only the game. In contrast to this, the English School is focused on the effect of already 
well-established norms, contained in the idea of an institution of international society. To engage in any 
protracted discussion about these different accounts, or the relative merits of the ES account, would turn this 
thesis into a debate about IR theory, which I don’t want. Having said that, the ES’ “methodological pluralism” 
does suggest a more developed capacity to mediate between these different accounts. But this is not the place 
to develop this argument.  
6 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13 
7 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 68; see also Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, 1999 [arguing that 
international society is shaped by constitutional structures, by which he means basic institutional practices, 
particularly those associated with sovereignty] 
8 See for example Terry Nardin, ‘Rule of Law Positivism’, in Mapel and Nardin, International Society: Diverse 
Ethical Perspectives, 1999; Peter Wilson, ‘The English school's approach to international law’, in  Navari (ed.), 
Theorising International Society: English School Methods, 2009 
9 Bain, ‘One order, two laws: Recovering the “normative” in English School theory’. Review of International 
Studies 2007, p. 575.   
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Jackson argues, claims about international obligation are always accompanied by ‘knots and 
tangles’, because the practice of obliging states to do anything is at the heart of efforts to 
change international society.10 This is to say that the debate over the nature of the 
constitutional rules is an extension of a debate over the institutional character of international 
society, in particular the extent to which the institutions of international society have the 
normative capacity to determine social practice in any independent sense.  
In this conversation about the terms of the institutional order governing 
international society, pluralists maintain that there are essential limits on what the society of 
states can hope to achieve; so long as international society is ordered around and through 
the authority of the sovereign state there will be hard limits on institutional progress. Given 
this, if international rules are to be practically useful, they need to be created and maintained 
with a view to these limitations. For rules to be authoritative in this context means that they 
need to maintain their effectiveness as a guide to state action. Rules that fail to reflect or 
enact the norms which states are in fact willing to obey creates only the appearance of 
authority, an appearance at odds with the underlying structures of authority. More 
importantly, it minimizes the normative justification for a world ordered around a respect 
for state sovereignty.11 The danger that pluralists flag is that by exaggerating a claim to 
binding authority the broader possibilities for institutional, constitutional order through the 
respect for sovereignty can be undermined. Those rules that are able to claim genuine 
authority and which function to provide international peace and stability, such as norms of 
territorial integrity, are unsettled in the attempt to import opaque standards of authority 
based on natural right or humanity. As Alex Bellamy summarizes it, the guiding concern for 
pluralists is that ‘policy programmes based on misplaced ideas about universal ethics only 
serve to undermine international society’s unwritten constitution, leading to higher levels of 
disorder in world politics’.12 
The solidarist counter to this is twofold. First, pluralists are said to start from an 
inaccurate and overly conservative characterization of the background, unwritten rules of 
international society. There is a descriptive failure to account for how international society’s 
unwritten constitution has developed to encompass rules which protect universalist ideals 
which challenge the pre-eminence of the state as the determinant of international order. To 
                                                          
 
10 Robert Jackson, Classical and Modern Thought, 2005, Ch. 7; see also Bain, Ibid.  
11 Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘A Normative Case for Pluralism: reassessing Vincent’s views on humanitarian 
intervention’, International Affairs 87 (5) September 2011, 1193–1204  
12  Alex J. Bellamy (ed.), International Society and Its Critics (Oxford, OUP: 2005), p. 10 
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the extent that international society has bought into the language and practice of human 
rights, for example, there is no reason to suppose that these rules don’t or can’t displace the 
sovereign state as the locus for constitutional or foundational authority in international 
society.13 The second claim that solidarists make is that pluralists fail to understand the 
process through which progress happens, in which an initially vague or uncertain norm 
provides the basis for solidarist practices. Nicholas Wheeler, for example, uses the history 
and practice of humanitarian intervention to suggest that the limitations implied by a norm 
of state sovereignty are not as entrenched or insurmountable as pluralists assume.14 Judging 
by the historical legitimacy that has been given to humanitarian intervention, he argues, 
practitioners must be operating within a more substantive ethical framework than they have 
previously been willing to admit. They have been guided by an understanding of the rules 
that goes beyond the conservative assumption that constitutional rules of international 
society must be based on a conservative ethic of co-existence and non-intervention. In his 
view, the consistency of state practice provides a basis for thinking that a norm of 
humanitarian intervention can claim the constitutional-type authority needed to guide future 
state actions.  
To put this another way, the divide between solidarism and pluralism emerged as 
part of an attempt to make sense of the principles which could realistically be taken as 
generating constitutional commitments, commitments which could generate the legitimate 
authority needed to direct inform states’ judgement about the appropriate constitutional, 
world-ordering practice. This suggests that, at base, these two images of international society 
posit different views about whether the existing framework can sustain public, 
constitutional-type responsibilities or whether the institution is too ‘deformed’ to justify this 
type of practice.15 As Bain argues, the idea that these two perspectives are incommensurable 
misses the fact that competing solidarist and pluralist characterisations of world order are 
part of the background of constructing international society’s normative order. These are 
images of international order that are fundamentally in conversation with one another and 
                                                          
 
13 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, CUP: 1987; see however Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral 
Purpose of the State, 1999 [arguing that it is the idea of the state that has changed to encompass the pursuit of 
human rights, rather than it being the pre-eminent position of the state in international society that has 
changed] 
14  Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press: 2000), p. 309-10 
15 Posing a similar question, see Dunne and Koivisto, ‘Crisis, What Crisis?’, p. 615-617 
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which, as part of this conversation, continue to refine the nature of the international order. 16 
At one level this is exactly right: these categories are important because they establish two 
fundamentally competing ideas about the sense of responsibility appropriate to international 
society’s institutional normative order. These categories function to define competing ideas 
about the responsible posture, two competing images of the responsibilities appropriate to 
the international order. There will always be both solidarist and pluralist elements in 
international society for the simple reason that these categories reflect competing 
dispositions on how best to react to the uncertainties of the international institutional 
order.17  
In another sense, however, the problem represented by these competing ethics is 
that there is no immediate resolution to their conversation, to the constitutional politics they 
suggests. The danger for international law is that in the clash between these competing ethics 
the prospects for international law to determine the constitutional rules of international 
society – its capacity to project its claim to constitutional authority – must battle not only 
against contingent state interests but against a pluralist disposition which regards the 
responsibility to advance international law as a question of political motivation rather than 
institutional necessity. The problem, in other words, is the ease with which a pluralist 
approach is able to co-opt and undermine the solidarist ethic of legality, the idea of legality 
as the constitutional practice of international society. This is the problem that international 
law faces in claiming the authority to generate, to define, the constitutional rules of 
international society.  
 
Constitutional Rules in International Law   
 
Before getting to the point, however, where it is possible to see the depth of the challenge 
posed to constitutionalist accounts of international law, is important to understand how the 
underlying solidarist ethic of legality has inserted itself into international society. The use of 
international law as the authoritative guide to the constitutional rules of international society 
was, perhaps unsurprisingly, spearheaded by international lawyers anxious to make sense of 
their role in international affairs. Constitutionalism in this sense emerges as a response 
specific to international law’s attempt to respond to the international obligation problem, 
                                                          
 
16 See also John Williams, ‘Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in English School 
Theory’, International Relations 19 (1) 2005, 19-38. 
17 Bain, ‘One order, two laws’, 2007, 567. 
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the common stomping ground, in one guise or another, for attempts to establish the “really 
existing” capacity of international law to bind states. As J.L. Brierly classically put it, the 
crucial challenge for anyone appealing to or practicing international law is a belief ‘that many 
of the postulates which traditionally pass for international law are unrealities, from which 
their system must be freed, if it is to be kept in touch with the facts of international life.’18 
The central fact of international life for Brierly was the concentration of international 
authority in sovereign hands: how could international law realistically bind states if states 
ultimately had the power to determine the limits of international law’s authority? This sense 
of international law’s “unreality” gets its foothold due to the perception that states, in 
addition to being the authors of international law, are also its ultimate subjects and arbiters. 
The fact that states hold all of the roles that are determinative of the practical binding force 
of international law means that the inevitable answer to the question of why international 
law rules is: because states allow it.   
International law’s constitutional project emerged as a solidarist response to this 
perception of sovereign state “ownership” of international law, as an attempt to establish 
international law as a ‘unifying element amidst the perplexing social reality of the relations of 
states’.19 There is a danger of essentializing both international law and the constitutional 
project here, but in many respects this is precisely the point: for international law’s 
practitioners, there is no escape from the progressive politics of international law. So long as 
the nature and extent of international law’s “rule” is unsettled and contested, the politics of 
international law will always be centred on how competing stakeholders attempt to settle 
these questions in one way or another, in line with competing sets of assumptions and 
values. The attempt to establish international law as a constitutive force in international 
society is necessarily a progressive project, because it challenges prevailing presumptions 
about the authority of the state in setting the terms of international society’s constitutional 
order. The question this poses is: how has international law managed to establish this 
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progressive, constitutionalist narrative as a necessary part of the responsible practice of 
international law?  
For one influential band of international lawyers, it was the conceptual uncertainty 
of the international legal order combined with a more certain sense of what a good legal 
order should look like – law should be able to claim supremacy, it should be capable of both 
protecting and restraining sovereign authority, treat its subjects equally, applied to all 
subjects equally, be clear, capable of being followed, coherent in itself and able to resolve 
disputes – that determined the scope of their responsibilities towards the legal order. In a 
narrow sense it was the uncertainty that seemed to proliferate around how to apply 
international law that threatened the rule of international law and, in turn, justified the scope 
of the response. But underlying this narrow motivation was also a wider belief that that 
international legality was the driver (or, at least, marker) of social progress. This ‘neo-
Victorian sensibility’, as Martti Koskenniemi terms it, advances a belief in the virtue of social 
progress through law.20 This is to say that the practice of legality becomes a constitutional 
practice in the attempt to institutionalise the belief that states were both burdened by the 
anarchical nature of the international system and that the rule of law could allow a more 
progressive, peaceful and stable international order to emerge. In this way constituting 
international order became necessarily tied to advancing both the value and the institution of 
the rule of law because this was seen as the best hope for limiting states’ capacity to act on 
their subjective desires.  
The reason this mattered in practice – the reason this couldn’t be dismissed as a 
utopian wish – was that this band of progressively minded lawyers were in a position to 
embed this view in the international order, as part of a professional commitment to 
strengthening the rule of international law.21 In contrast to earlier accounts of international 
law that could be bracketed as advancing a “view from nowhere”, this approach understood 
the justifying international law’s authority to be not merely as a philosophical problem to be 
pondered during the professional off-hours, but a practical challenge to be addressed as part 
of the institutional practice of international law. Oscar Schachter would later use the idea of 
an invisible college of international lawyers to express this source of international legal 
authority; David Bederman would amend this to the ‘visible college of lawyers’, pointing to 
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the public consensus to emerge.22 What is important is that these early constitutionalists 
advancing this ‘progressive account’ of international law took seriously the idea that the legal 
order could represent ‘the juridical conscience of the world’, and viewed their professional, 
personal responsibilities towards constructing international law through this lens.23 It was 
through the focus on the fundamental and essential principles that emerged from this more 
basic commitment to legality that international law began to establish its claim to 
constitutional authority, a claim based on community values rather than state interest.  
The first issue that needed to be confronted in justifying this constitutionalist 
mindset was that the international legal order itself was complicit in capitulating to state 
interest, limiting its own authority by artificially restricting the range of “justiciable” issues. 
As Hersch Lauterpacht argued, the problem of state-subjectivity wasn’t only that states 
would abuse their overlapping roles, failing to comply with international law when it served 
their interests, it was that international lawyers accepted this as a structural fact of life, as 
part of the essential difference between international and domestic law. The limits on 
international law’s authority were set, he argued, ‘by international lawyers anxious to give 
legal expression to the State’s claim to be independent of law’.24 From his perspective, this 
meant that international law’s limits were being artificially set as a result of a misconceived 
mindset, a misconstrued conservatism about the place of international law in international 
society. To guard against the false glorification of state sovereignty as intrinsic to 
international law, Lauterpacht argues that international law’s authority needs to be 
approached, above all else, in light of the requirements of conceptual integrity. Whatever 
international law is or does, it needs to exhibit the basic characteristics of the rule of law 
including, crucially, establishing a claim to supreme authority within the legal order. His 
reasoning is that ‘From the rule that obligations of international law owe their origin to the 
will of States, it follows that new obligations cannot be imposed upon an unwilling State by 
an international legislature. But from the principle that a State is objectively bound by an 
obligation once undertaken there follows, with inescapable logic, the juridical postulate of 
the obligatory rule of law.’25 International lawyers, he argued, should be motivated not by the 
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sovereigntist agenda of states but by the social need for the sort of progressive judgement 
promoted by international law against the ‘irrational, egoistic, short-sighted and certainly 
“unscientific”’ nature of politics.26 The important thing for the emergence of a constitutional 
project is that this approach was neither a utopian progressivism or a status quo 
conservatism. It was instead an institutional conservatism which aimed at preserving and 
promoting the integrity of a fundamentally progressive international legal order. On the 
surface, this was simply a project to unknot international legal authority from sovereign 
authority, not to remake the world order. The constitutional project comes out of the fact 
that to conceptually untangle international obligation is to remake the world order.     
Before this grand constitutional project could fully take hold, however, outstanding 
questions about the structure of international legal obligations needed to be addressed. For 
constitutional authority to make sense, there needed to be an understanding of international 
law as public law, rather than a private, contractual exchange between independent states. 
The problem was that this was exactly the model that most of the international lawyers 
assumed was appropriate to the internal structure of international legal obligations. Within 
treaty law at least, the binding force of international legal obligations looked to be based on 
the ‘mutual and reciprocal exchange of benefits or concessions between the parties’.27 The 
emphasis on reciprocity bolstered the perception that in determining the scope of state 
responsibilities under international law the crucial consideration was the level and extent of 
state consent in their bilateral (or bilateralizable) dealings, rather than as common members 
of international society. In this sense the sceptical claim is one of anachronism; the idea that 
international law could “discover” an alternative model hidden within the existing 
institutional structure was based on the unrealistic premise that there was a viable alternative 
to sovereign ownership of international law, to the privileged role given to state consent as 
the source of international legal authority. If the binding force of a rule was necessarily 
discovered by reference to the consensual sources of international law, then how could the 
basis of obligation be anything other than state consent? But Gerald Fitzmaurice pointed 
out the obvious gap in this reasoning: treaties are not the only source of international law; 
custom and general principles matter too, and the nature of consent in these sources is 
rather different. Customary international law emerges from a judgement that existing state 
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practice together with evidence of a widespread belief in the legal bindingness of a norm - 
opinio juris – defines the threshold at which a customary social norm attains the added feature 
of legal bindingness. The conception of consent here is not that of contract or treaty making 
but the public commitment of the social contract tradition. Customary international law 
suggests that it is the existence of a social practice of legality that matters for determining 
consent, rather than consent which matters for determining the practice of legality.  
More than that, Fitzmaurice pointed out that the reason treaties – and acts of state 
consent – have any traction at all as a source of law is because of the non-reciprocal structure 
of the underlying customary obligations. These are obligations have force because they are 
held by states as members of the international community, rather than because of their 
bilateral relationships with one another. Finally, looking at the structure of treaty obligations 
to discover the binding force of international law makes the most basic of category errors, 
because treaties do not themselves define the law. The problem isn’t the analogy with 
private law per se but that the analogy is incomplete. The obligations created by contract are 
not definitive of the law – an agreement to sell 250 pallets of bananas in exchange for 
market value does not create a law that 250 pallets of bananas ought to be sold for fair 
market value. Instead it creates a precedent that may or may not become part of law. 
Moreover, the bilateral relationship here has no direct bearing on the relevant law. As 
Fitzmaurice writes, ‘The only “law” that enters into these [treaty obligations] is derived, not 
from the treaty creating them – or from any treaty – but from the principle pacta sunt servanda 
– an antecedent general principle of law. The law is that the obligation must be carried out, 
but the obligation is not, in itself, law’.28 The implication which follows is that while a treaty 
might inspire the content of the law it does not itself give binding force to the rule.  
The relevance of this thought to the development of constitutional authority in 
international society is that it begins to break down the hold that ‘reciprocity’ has as an 
explanation for the contingent force of international law.29 Rather than having to explain 
international law as an exchange of rights and responsibilities between states, the emphasis 
on the binding force of these obligations in customary international law suggests that the 
crucial relationship is not between individually contracting states, but between states in their 
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shared role as members of international society, as common stakeholders in the fundamental 
principles of international law. Membership of the international community superseded 
reciprocity as an explanation for international law’s public authority. This is not to say that 
reciprocity has no place in a constitutional order. Reciprocity itself is a principle of 
customary international law. As Mark Osiel argues, it serves an important function in the 
laws of war, helping to create a sense of shared ownership of the legal framework.30 
Kenneth Anderson similarly argues that reciprocity is an important remedial mechanism; the 
principle allows states to ‘hold each other hostage, as it were, to their compliance with 
international law. The failure of one side to hold to the law of war releases the other to 
respond in kind’.31 But he also suggests that the far more fundamental function of 
reciprocity is that, particularly for the soldiers engaged in war fighting, it provides a socially 
authoritative reason for adopting a posture of legality, accepting international law’s rules as 
binding beyond a narrow bilateral calculus. This is the sense in which Fitzmaurice’s 
arguments bolster the constitutional project. It’s not reciprocity per se that provided the 
obstacle to the emergence of constitutional authority. It was the elevation of the contractual, 
bilateral appearance of international legal obligations into a principled, hence socially 
authoritative, reason for the limits of international legality. In other words, the fact that most 
international legal rules were directed at regulating bilateral, private, contractual-type 
relationships between states didn’t preclude either the need for or presence of rules with a 
more sweeping public function.   
With this in mind, international lawyers could begin to think seriously about the 
constitutional character of public international law, particularly the manner in which 
international law spoke for the international community at large, as opposed to merely 
protecting states’ privileged, private domain.32 The practical challenge facing international 
lawyers in this context was to bring together the agglomerated customary legal rules with the 
aim of bringing coherence and determinacy to the institution of international law as an 
independent entity: to build international law’s institutional capacity to deliver on the 
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conceptual claim to objectivity.33 As Humphrey Waldock puts the challenge: ‘International 
law bears a certain resemblance to the common law legal system in that many of its most 
fundamental traits are “unwritten”, deriving their authority from custom or general concepts 
of law rather than from a written code . . . the great difference between them is that, whereas 
centuries of judicial action have crystallized the common law into a body of well-defined 
principles, the judicial process is so recent a process in international law and its operation so 
intermittent that the unwritten element in the international legal system is still, much of it 
undefined’.34 By bringing together these unwritten elements, international law could begin, 
finally, to claim the same essential powers as a domestic legal order.  
The story up to this point has centred on how principled responses to the 
conceptual challenges of international legality framed the constitutionalist process. But this 
narrative could equally be framed as one in which Brierly, Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice and 
Waldock were trying to make sense of their own shared roles in international law, as the 
International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteurs on treaty interpretation. Theirs’ was 
no idle philosophizing about the nature of international law’s authority. The international 
community expected determinate, actionable answers on how to interpret international 
treaty law, and that required both establishing a conceptually rigorous and socially 
authoritative understanding of the existing nature of international legal obligations,  if only 
to make clear the mechanics of international legal interpretation for the future lawyers. It 
was in response to the need to specify the categories of international legal obligation that we 
get international law’s first direct claim to establish a category of constitutional rules in 
international society, legal rules claiming authority as an objective and non-reciprocal 
standard of community interest.  
By the time the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is adopted in 1969 the 
conceptual debates about the authority of international law had been sufficiently developed 
to allow the inclusion of the category of jus cogens norms, a category of legal obligations 
that claimed authority entirely independently of acts of state. More than that, jus cogens 
norms further institutionalized the customary international law claim to bind states even 
where the process of state consent might have suggested otherwise. For example, where 
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states had traditionally enjoyed an absolute right to attach reservations to treaties, limiting 
their obligations, jus cogens norms established limits to this right – the fact these are non-
derogable norms entails that no reservations are permitted to rules of this sort.35 The effect 
of this is that peremptory norms functioned as a direct, albeit not extensive, strategy for 
responding to the state’s ownership of international law, a strategy for developing the idea 
that international law rules in international society. They created a distinctive category of 
absolute obligations with the capacity to claim the independent, ‘higher’ authority that had 
previously limited the constitutional horizons of international law.36  
If the absence of any practical means of enacting these rights in international society 
– of using jus cogens norms to justify constitutional practice – heralded call of a new 
utopianism, there wasn’t long to wait for such measures. Jus cogens norms, as Maurizio 
Ragazzi argues, led directly to the articulation of the broader, and more explicitly 
constitutional category of obligations erga omnes.37 Whereas jus cogens norms are essentially 
cosmopolitan standards appealing to the international community’s universal values, erga 
omnes obligations develop the constitutional standard in bringing out the distinctive 
responsibilities that attach to states’ constitutional role, namely their common membership 
of and trusteeship for international society. In the Barcelona Traction case of 1970, the 
International Court of Justice included a now notorious two paragraphs – largely unrelated 
to the case they were supposed to be deciding – detailing the distinction between ordinary 
obligations and another higher category of obligations held towards the international 
community as a whole. As they reasoned:  
‘an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards 
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in 
the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of 
all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to 
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such 
obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the 
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and 
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from 
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection 
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have entered into the body of general international law . . . others are conferred by 
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.’38    
 
This category of obligations can be understood as part of international law’s natural law 
tradition, with legality a function of a ‘belief in higher things’ that the practice of 
international law has always implied.39 But this doesn’t quite capture the full effect of 
institutionalising erga omnes obligations. The important thing for the genesis of international 
law’s claim to constitutional authority was that whatever the rules might say about universal 
values, they also established a protected communal standard for the exercise of state 
responsibility, which is to say a public, constitutional standard.40 As Michael Byers argues, 
jus cogens and erga omnes rules together consolidate a shift to the ‘common interests of 
states’ as an authoritative standard to be employed in the development, defence and change 
of the international legal order. Because of this these should be understood as ‘constitutional 
rules which help define the fundamental characteristics of the system’.41 Byers is primarily 
concerned with the internal constitution of the legal system, its ability to function effectively 
as a closed order, rather than how this category of obligations develops international law’s 
broader claim to constitute international society. Anne Peters is more explicit about the fact 
that ‘the constitutionalist paradigm explains the existence of erga omnes norms’ because these 
rules develop international law’s claim to function as the locus for constitutional 
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development in international society.42 It is in this light that Bardo Fassbender argues that: 
‘In principle every constitutional rule has an erga omnes effect in the sense that it is directed 
towards, and binding on, all members of the community. But the specific obligations that 
are currently recognized as obligations erga omnes represent a subset of international 
constitutional law’.43 Obligations erga omnes open the door to international law’s claim to 
constitutional authority, heralding a shift to a public, world order building concern with the 
interests of the international community over and above the more limited concern with state 
(or “systemic”) consent. This doesn’t only define international law’s constitutional rules – it 
establishes international law as an institution of constitutional rule, as the locus of 
constitutional authority in international society.  
The crucial point is that the effect of this category of obligations was not only to 
consolidate existing international law but, by establishing a “higher” category of obligations, 
to institutionalise international law’s essentially constitutional claim to order international 
society. This higher category of obligations was marked out by an entirely different 
constitutional structure, where states responsibilities were held towards the international 
community as a whole.44  
 
Constitutionalism, not legalism 
 
This lawyerly story about constitutional rules can seem rather devious, however, and this 
sets the terms for the present challenge facing attempts to use the rules and roles of 
international law as a basis for the constitutional rules of international society. The problem 
with using this internal logic, this culture of formalism, as the basis for international law’s 
institutional authority is, as Kenneth Anderson notes, that it is based on a circular process of 
self-legitimation which ‘lies in adopting an important preference for listening to oneself as a 
source of authority – and discovering, pleasantly, that over time screening out other 
contending voices of authority actually works to confirm one’s legal authority’.45 The charge 
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laid against the image of international legality as the locus of constitutional authority in 
international society is that of “interiority”. International lawyers might be able to use their 
privileged position to progressively develop international law into a coherent and 
comprehensive legal order, but this doesn’t have any necessary impact on international law’s 
constitutional authority, its capacity to establish the terms of international society’s normative 
order. It’s no good using what E.H. Carr called ‘intellectual trickery’ to smuggle in an 
account of the operative constitutional rules; any law based on such empty promises will 
struggle to generate a culture of legality in political practice.46 There needs to be a clear 
acceptance by the international community that the formal rules arising under the auspices 
of international law – including the commitment to legality itself – represents a valid 
representation of the ‘deeper, truer’ constitutional rules of international society. 
International law only rules to the extent that it reflects the unwritten customary norms of 
international society. As a result of this the commitment to legality plays at most a 
supplementary role in generating or identifying the authority embedded in constitutional 
rules.  
This marginalization of international law’s constitutional role is connected to the 
idea that there needs to be what Carr called a ‘harmony of interests’ operating in 
international society before international law could genuinely function as an independent, 
objectively valid social institution. That is to say, there needed to be a discernible sense 
among states that international law does in fact have a legitimate claim to embody the 
public, communal standards. There needed to be a widespread understanding that a 
commitment to legality was in fact more than a belief in the procedural, functional 
usefulness of international law in international affairs. In this view, so long as power and 
self-interest were the currency of international relations, the independent authority of 
international law, its capacity to rule with all the supremacy this implied, was a necessarily 
utopian idea. Taking the world as it is, the responsible statesman should recognize the 
supremacy of politics and diplomacy, rather than getting miring their strategic decisions in a 
wrong-headed, unrealistic assessment of the practice required by a commitment to legality.47  
Carr’s realism provides the background for Hedley Bull’s caution about the 
independent constitutive effect of international law and the dangers of acting on a solidarist 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
Anderson, ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences’, EJIL 20 (2009) 
pp. 349-353. 
46 E H Carr, Michael Cox ed., The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, 2001 
47 Ibid., p. xxv 
 
 
40 
ethic in an essentially pluralistic institutional order. He argues that the authority of 
international law is determined, and hence limited, by the pluralist circumstances of 
international society. Taking aim at Lauterpacht’s use of legality to ground his liberal 
internationalism, Bull argues that the progressive picture of international law undercuts the 
attempt to establish a realistic basis for international legal authority, including establishing a 
genuine role for international law in ordering international society. The major difficulty is 
that international law lacks the determinacy, the clarity, needed to resolve conflicts on its 
own terms, as a matter of law. The attempt to regulate aggression through the rules on the 
use of force, for instance, rests on the idea that one or another of the belligerent parties can 
claim to have had ‘just cause’ in using force. Bull argues that the fact that there might be 
‘deep disagreement among states as to which side represents the community and which the 
law breakers’ or, alternatively, a ‘general concurrence in treating war as purely political in 
nature’, undermines the claim that international law has an independent authority to regulate 
or mediate social practice.48 
The progressive vision of legality Lauterpacht imagines, Bull argued, suffers because 
it posits a solidarist world order where none exists. Where Lauterpacht thought that 
international lawyers could resolve law’s indeterminacy by promoting the integrity of the 
rules, refining the terms of the relationship between various rules – for example, introducing 
hierarchy into the rules so that in case of a conflict of obligations, at least there is an 
understanding that protecting jus cogens norms takes priority – Bull argues that the 
indeterminacy isn’t a result of some gap in the rules, but a deeper reflection of the limits on 
international legality as an ordering principle in international society. This isn’t so much a 
question of indeterminacy as it is the open structure of legal rules allowing states to act as if 
international law is fundamentally indeterminate.49 That states take this option, and that the 
institution of international doesn’t have the material capacity to respond to this (for 
example, by establishing responsibility for breaches of international law), highlights a more 
general unwillingness to cede constitutional authority to international law. Bull suggests that 
states may accept international law for four core reasons: out of habit or inertia, a 
coincidental alignment of state preferences and legal obligations, if coerced by more 
powerful states, or as a result of reciprocity.50 Crucially, however, he did not think that 
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simply because there was a commitment to the practice of legality among the members of 
international society provided sufficient evidence for thinking that international law was in 
itself capable of commanding authority in international society. As he puts it, ‘the 
denigrators of international law . . . while they are wrong when they claim that international 
law is without efficacy, are right to insist that respect for the law is not in itself the principle 
motive that accounts for conformity to law. International law is a social reality to the extent 
that there is a very substantial degree of conformity to its rules; but it does not follow from 
this that international law is a powerful agent or motive force in world politics’.51  
This is Bull’s point in suggesting that there needs to be a degree of moral unanimity 
among the various members of international society in order for international law to be able 
to deliver on its constitutional claims. The threshold for international legal authority here 
isn’t that there is some essential and far reaching harmony of interests, but that states have a 
common disposition towards international law’s capacity to ‘resolve the moral dilemmas of 
international politics’.52 The problem, Bull argues, is the evidence arraigned against such a 
common disposition. The practice of legality doesn’t reflect Lauterpacht’s expectations, or 
aspirations, for international law. Bull’s narrow argument at this point centres on the 
descriptive claim about the nature of international society. He argues that there is a role to 
be played by international law, but this role is to uphold, to strengthen and to solidify those 
background political structures – such as the balance of power and sovereignty – which 
enable international law to have any ordering function at all. International law can rule to the 
extent that it protects and promotes the sovereign state’s central role in international 
society’s constitutional order.53  
The wider argument, and the argument on which the justification of international 
law’s constitutional authority centres, is that generating a legitimate claim to constitutional 
authority requires a degree of certainty about the capacity of international law to accurately 
reflect international society’s sense of the constitutional rules. International law can claim 
constitutional authority, but only if it emphasises the correct, socially sticky customary 
norms – the norms that states are already predisposed to obey as part their membership of 
international society. This premises international law’s authority on its practical capacity to, 
as Brunnée and Toope have recently expressed it, ‘inspire legality’ among its subjects by 
reflecting the existing constitutional sensibility – not by seeking to impose its own 
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conception of the constitutional rules. The problem is that if the capacity to inspire is found 
in the capacity to accurately reflect the constitutional norms, where the rules codified by and 
advanced within international law fail to genuinely reflect the norms of international society, 
this suggests that it is entirely reasonable to  reject international law’s authority.  
In fact Bull goes even further than this; he regards it as not only inherently 
reasonable to reject the international law’s binding authority but irresponsible not to. If 
international law fails to reflect a really existing background consensus, it becomes part of ‘a 
system which it may be dangerous even to try to put into practice’.54 International law’s 
institutional weaknesses – its contingent, uncertain authority – undermines the justification 
for giving priority, supremacy to international law’s image of the constitutional rules of 
international society.  What Bull does in advocating a pluralist framework for judging the 
action appropriate to the circumstances of international society – and this mindset feeds 
“pragmatic” accounts of international law – is to acknowledge that international law has a 
central role to play in understanding the constitution of international society, but at the very 
same time to express scepticism about the capacity of international law to function as a 
constitutional authority in its own right. In practice this amounts to a rejection of the idea 
that international law has an independent constitutional role in the international normative 
order. As Terry Nardin expressed this, the legitimacy of international law – its capacity to 
rule – is based on international law’s expression of a procedural rather than purposive 
conception of international order; international law reflects international order, but it does 
not have the power to generate its own vision of that order.55 This serves to establish a 
particular perspective on constitutionalism as divorced from legalism, a perspective which 
directly clashes with the lawyerly practice of constitutionalism. Constitutionality, as Ian Clark 
argues, ‘is not to be construed in a narrow sense as the legal foundations of the political 
order, as this would simply return us to legality by another route. Instead it refers to the 
mutual political expectations on which international society is from time to time founded, 
and which are not fixed in legal rules’.56   
 
From pluralism to pragmatism 
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This scepticism regarding the constitutional authority of international law has been 
expressed most baldly by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner in The Limits of International Law. 
Whatever this book’s demerits – Kratochwil captures the tenor of the many criticisms in his  
acerbic suggestion that their argument is ‘only noteworthy for giving the concept of 
‘‘shallowness’’ a new depth’57 – they did define a perspective that has significant traction 
both among scholars and policy-makers, and helps define the contours of international law’s 
constitutional politics. The basic premise of their argument reflects the pluralist worry: 
international law claims too much. International legal rules do not on their own represent ‘true’ 
obligations, but only a reflection of the contingent interests of cooperating states. The 
motivating idea is that the limits of international law are set by the circumstances of 
international politics, namely the willingness of states to cooperate with one another, for 
specific purposes. The problem with their account is that, in contrast to the pluralist, they 
end up limiting international law out of existence, on the dubious and outdated premise that 
the only source for international authority is coercive authority. Their more interesting – and 
potentially problematic – line of attack is as regards the practice of legality. They warn that 
‘stricter international law could lead to greater international lawlessness’ if creating law is 
used as a shortcut for greater international cooperation.58  Although the idea that a logic of 
state interest and state power wholly defines the terms of state cooperation doesn’t offer 
much of a challenge to international law, it is more difficult to dismiss the more general 
warning that ‘states cannot bootstrap cooperation by creating rules and calling them “law”’.59 
This gets to back to Bull’s charge that international law is in danger of over-claiming, of 
representing an unrealistic picture of international society and as a result weakening its 
ability to demand legality.60  
Goldsmith and Posner explore this idea separately in subsequent work, which tends 
to grant international law a far greater potential capacity for authority than their arguments in 
Limits would suggest. Goldsmith (writing with Daryl Levinson) is led to accept that 
international law does have a legitimate claim to public authority, a claim to authority of the 
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same order generated by domestic constitutional law.61 Customary international law provides 
evidence that international law creates and sustains certain claims about the public interest 
of states as members of the international community, claims that can’t be accounted for 
purely in terms of states’ essentially private interests in the gains from cooperation. But the 
result of the analogy between constitutional law and international law – under the umbrella 
of public law – is a denial of the authority of all public law, international and domestic. 
International law suffers from the unreality of all public law, namely the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism and a necessary reliance on the willingness of the executive to act 
within the public law rules.  
Eric Posner’s tack is less circumspect, more directly in line with the position in 
Limits. He warns against ‘the perils of global legalism’, which he defines as ‘an excessive faith 
in the efficacy of international law’.62 This efficacy is drawn from a familiarly narrow view of 
the function of international law, defined as an ability to ‘keep order and solve policy 
disputes’.63 His underlying argument is that the practice of legality is premised on the general 
viability of international law to provide order, to make good on its promises. The conclusion 
he reaches is that if international law can’t back up its legal rules with the same coercive 
government institutions that grant domestic legal orders practical authority, the only possible 
conclusion to draw is that international law possesses no such thing as binding authority. 
Crucially, these circumstances create the conditions where for a state or statesperson to 
continue to act as if international law does have binding authority is to act irresponsibly, to 
fail to act realistically, with the prudence expected of political leaders. Legalism isn’t some 
benign liberal practice; it is an actively harmful practice, hamstringing the willingness and 
capacity of those in power to act from a realistic judgement of necessity.  
 What emerges from these sceptical accounts is the essentially pluralist claim that the 
problem with international law’s claim to constitutional-type authority is not that it aims to 
limit state practice, but that it underplays the weaknesses of the international legal order and 
creates an illegitimate and unsustainable expectation that international law should limit state 
practice. This isn’t to say that international law doesn’t matter, that the commitment to 
international legality doesn’t serve an essential function in regulating the international order 
or enabling state’s pursuit of strategic aims. But it does mean that believing in the capacity of 
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international law to rule, to set the terms of international society’s constitutional order, is a 
fundamentally irresponsible practice.  
It is this idea – that legality is a valuable but ambiguous commitment – which 
motivates the ‘pragmatic’ approach to international law. This is an attempt to square a 
practice of belief in the authority of international rules with scepticism about the institutional 
authority of international law, with the perception that international law is at base a defective 
institution of constitutional order. Michael Glennon’s erudite arguments for adopting a 
pragmatic approach goes furthest both in arguing for pragmatism as a principled response to 
international law’s tendency to overpromise and the strategic implications of a pragmatic 
ethic for the practice of legality. He draws on a number of diverse sources but at its core 
pragmatism is conceptualized as a belief that as long as international legal rules inhabit a ‘fog 
of uncertainty’, as long as international law is in the process of being constructed, there is a 
principled reason to define the commitment to legality on a case-by-case basis. National 
interest can provide one of these pragmatic reasons, but, crucially, so does respect for the 
rule of international law. For Glennon, one of the detrimental effects of over-exaggerating 
the independent authority of international law is that this feeds the perception that legalizing 
a norm is sufficient to create an obligation. The proliferation of international rules which 
exaggerate their capacity to actually bind states, and state’s inevitable decision to disregard 
these rules, threatens the commitment to the rule of law. International law has invited 
uncertainty as a result of endowing its rules with a constitutional authority they don’t 
possess. This gap between the obedience law claims and the obedience it can actually inspire 
has the potential to undermine the entire edifice, to eat away at those more conservative and 
limited legal rules that are actually able to claim authority. Because of this, he argues, the 
responsible posture for states is a willingness to obey international law when there is a 
determinate obligation with a clear basis in social practice, and a right to disregard 
international law where there is not. It is this sceptical position – scepticism about the 
capacity of international law to generate a claim to authority independent from states’ 
political, policy preferences  – that is the hallmark of the pragmatic approach.  
 It is important to stress that this pragmatic approach to international law is not 
necessarily conservative about the scope of the norms established under the auspices of  
international law. Moral action, such as humanitarian intervention, can be justified on a 
pragmatic account where international society has either developed a clear and unambiguous 
sense of the legal rules governing humanitarian action or where competing prudential 
reasons justify acting outside of international law. This is the argument that understanding 
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the appropriate practice of responsibility in international society is not something that can 
be found purely through knowledge of the legal rules. For example, as part of calling for an 
ethic of ‘practical judgement’ in international decision-making Chris Brown argues that the 
best way of dealing with morally and politically complex situations is to use ‘a form of moral 
reasoning that involves a judgement that takes into account the totality of the circumstances, 
rather than seeks for a rule to apply.’64 Legalism, rule-following, on this account restricts the 
consideration of the full range of options, and where a too narrow, too limited or too 
ideological a frame of judgment is adopted, bad choices get made. We may hope that 
international law could guide judgement in a virtuous way but this ignores law’s capacity to 
armour, as David Kennedy puts it, ‘the most heinous human suffering in legal privilege’.65 
International law can and should guide decision-making, but it should not be allowed to rule 
decision-making. The responsibilities of political leadership require those in power to be 
capable of knitting together a sense of their fundamental moral commitments with 
prudential, political judgement, with a realistic appreciation of both the risks and rewards of 
pursuing a particular course of action. In the same way, fostering a prudential ethic will not 
emerge through either a slavish obedience to the law or from a law that demands slavish 
obedience. The point is that in understanding the responsibilities appropriate to 
international law, legalism, the belief in the rule of law, is not an adequate guide in the 
uncertainty circumstances of international society.       
 
Conclusion 
 
Pragmatists can in theory admit that at its core international law expresses legal 
authority – for instance in codifying the rules on the use of force, the rules protecting state’s 
territorial integrity and right to self-determination, or in establishing norms prohibiting, for 
example, piracy, genocide and slavery. But at the same time this acceptance of the legal form 
taken by some of international society’s constitutional rules is not the same thing as an 
acceptance of international law’s constitutional authority, its capacity to dictate the terms of 
international society’s normative order. The idea that the constitutional rules must accurately 
reflect deeper social and political norms governing international society – including changes 
in these customary norms – and the prudential concerns of political leaders and policy-
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makers generates, from the pragmatic perspective, a fixed obstacle to regarding the uncertain 
and ambiguous practice of international legality as a necessary part of a responsible 
constitutional practice. On the one hand this hold out the possibility that international law 
can in theory claim constitutional authority, but denies this as a practical possibility given the 
reliance on state’s judgement in order to decide whether international law is accurately 
representing the constitutional rules of international society and effectively guiding decision-
makers.  
This is a strange state of affairs for those international lawyers who had thought this 
authority was a core part of the commitment to legality: what is customary international law 
if not a method for determining which social and political practices have reached the 
threshold necessary to authoritatively determine the scope of state practice? What is the 
constitutional role of international law if legality is only a guiding, but not a binding, ‘global 
ethic’? The straightforward answer generated by the pragmatist’s scepticism about the rule 
of international law is that international law is only a guide. This is not to reject international 
law’s authority, but to assert the conditionality of that authority, especially in shaping 
international society’s constitutional order. In this respect pragmatism is not an argument 
against the commitment to legality as such, but against the capacity for this commitment to 
generate constitutional order without additional input from the political or moral domains. 
This positions the pragmatic approach to international law as, at base, an argument against 
using states’ general commitment to international law as a justification for attributing the 
deeper and more expansive range of constitutional commitments and responsibilities to 
states that constitutionalism has tended to rely on in order to justify international law’s 
constitutional function.  
International law’s claim to constitutional authority centres on whether the 
international legal order is developed enough to justify a practice of constitutional legalism, 
which is to say a policy of treating international law’s fundamental rules as the authoritative 
guide to international society’s constitutional rules. While constitutionalism treats the 
prospect of lawlessness, together with the conceptual uncertainty of the legal order, as 
generating the practical authority necessary to advance the constitutional authority of 
international law, pragmatic accounts do the opposite. Pragmatic accounts use the prospect 
of lawlessness and the uncertainties of international law as a practical reason for rejecting 
constitutionalism. In the following chapter I show how these competing ethics embed 
competing practices of legality in international society, and how this structures international 
law’s constitutional politics in a way that institutionalises disagreement about the 
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responsibilities appropriate to the institutional “facts” of international society. The challenge 
for constitutionalism is, ultimately, to elaborate a strategy for using the commitment to 
international legality as a way to overcome the entrenched nature of the pragmatic challenge.  
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Chapter 2 
Uncertainty and the ethics of legality  
 
The previous chapter showed how background assumptions regarding the nature of 
international society foster competing conceptions of the role of legality in establishing the 
terms of international society’s constitutional rules. This chapter looks in more detail at how 
the competing practices of legality have institutionalised the competition between pragmatic 
and constitutional ethics of legality, and how the resulting picture of international law’s 
constitutional politics as essentially contested serves to ‘lock in’ the pragmatic account. 
Crucially, this chapter argues that international law’s constitutional politics resolve around 
different ideas about the responsibilities appropriate to responding to the ambiguities 
surrounding law’s role in a constitutional order, particularly where that order is seen as “in 
crisis”. The challenge is about the capacity for legality to structure a response uncertainty 
where the legal order itself can be regarded as itself a source of uncertainty. 
 In order to develop this argument I use the idea of a ‘hard case’. A legal order faces a 
potential crisis – or a ‘crisis of legitimacy’1 – every time it attempts to resolve a hard case. A 
hard case tests a legal order’s capacity to set the constitutional rules, because resolving a hard 
case requires either showing how the existing rules of law can be applied to judge the 
appropriate action in a complex case where legality clashes with other frames of moral and 
political judgement, or it requires a positive admission that the existing rules of law are 
unable to guide action in a comprehensive way and so judgement outside of the legal 
domain is justified and not in tension with the rule of law. It is in this sense that resolving hard 
cases require not only appealing to knowledge of the existing practice of legality but 
elaborating on the underlying ethic of legality governing a constitutional order. This chapter 
uses the practice of lawfare as a way to show that the problem facing constitutionalist 
accounts of international law is that rather than a hard case functioning as an invitation to 
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remedy uncertainty, the pragmatist used the very existence of a hard case as evidence against 
international law’s capacity to resolve questions about the nature of legality. A hard case 
functions as evidence of an essential uncertainty, rather than as an invitation to remedy 
uncertainty. 
 This frames the debate over the responsibilities required by a commitment to 
international legality. Any legal order has a degree of uncertainty surrounding its rule and the 
essential – and absolute – nature of the responsibility to protect the constitutional order will 
always come under pressure as a result of attempting to impose order on a hard case. The 
relevant question for international law is whether it can effectively respond to a hard case, or 
whether it should be regarded as an institution “in crisis”, unable to respond to challenges to 
its authority. As John Gardner has characterised it this is ‘the $64,000 question about every 
constitution’: when constitutional authority is challenged, ‘whose loyalties will lie where (and 
who has the weapons and who has the numbers on their side)?’2 And yet constitutionalism 
at the domestic level can rely on an expectation that crisis is both an exceptional state of 
affairs, and that the value of legality will reassert itself as part of resolving a constitutional 
crisis or, if not then, after the crisis has passed. The problem facing international law is that 
the exceptional problems created by crisis for the domestic constitutional order generate, as 
Ian Hurd argues, ‘the normal condition of international law’ because ‘the strategic 
manipulation of law is inherent in international law’.3 By focusing on the hard case of 
“lawfare” this chapter aims to reveal why it is so difficult for the constitutionalist ethic to get 
traction against the pragmatist, in the contested circumstances of international society.  
 
Lawfare and legalities  
 
There are a number of international practices which challenge a constitutional ethic, 
practices which the pragmatist is able to exploit as evidence for the weakness of 
international law’s claim to constitutional authority, practices which can and are used to 
advocate for the inherently political nature of the responsibilities arising from a commitment 
to  international legality. “Lawfare” is one such practice. Lawfare has emerged, relatively 
recently, as part of a concerted attempt to circumscribe the authority of international law, 
and to interpose political limits – or at least conditions – on the practice of legality. As Jens 
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Meierhenrich puts it, lawfare ‘has become a fighting term, deployed to discredit the 
expanding reach of international law into domestic politics’.4 At the core of lawfare is a 
move to redefine the responsibilities that follow from international legality in pragmatic 
terms. As such, it provides a useful way to understand why debates about international law’s 
constitutional role are so difficult to resolve in practice. In the attempt to justify ‘law as a 
weapon, law as a tactical ally, law as a strategic asset, an instrument of war’,  lawfare is but 
one salvo in the larger attempt to institutionalise a pragmatic ethic of legality in international 
society.5  
How does lawfare, the idea that international law can, should and has been 
weaponized, institutionalise a pragmatic ethic of legality? The first step is that law is 
presented as both a battleground for security concerns and a tool for advancing national 
security, and should be treated as such. The point that proponents of lawfare make is that 
“enemies”, of one kind or another, are able to use a state’s commitment to the laws of war 
and to human rights obligations as a way to stymie necessary and legitimate efforts to 
advance national and international security. To refuse to respond in kind, to refuse to get 
into the trenches and adopt the same tactics with respect to international law is a failure 
both of the state’s political responsibility to make borders and citizens secure, of a legal 
responsibility to end impunity for international crimes, including terrorism, and of a broader 
constitutional responsibility to protect and preserve the rule of law – to defend the legal 
order from misuse.  
This negative conception of lawfare – as something to be guarded against – reflects 
the suspicion that the rights and protection afforded under international law provide the 
tools for a form of asymmetric warfare. Lacking traditional means to fight (and win) their 
battles, terrorists and insurgents were using the individual rights and state responsibilities 
established in international law – such as the right to a fair trial, or the prohibition on 
indefinite detention, or the principle of non-refoulement – as a way ‘to threaten, manipulate and 
disrupt’ counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency efforts.6 This initial focus on terrorist 
organisations, however, quickly expanded to include NGOs engaged in similar efforts. This, 
at any rate, was the conclusion of the US Supreme Court in Holder vs. Humanitarian Law 
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Project. The Court held in this case that training a terrorist designated organisation in their 
international legal rights and obligations was akin to providing material support to terrorism, 
because the terrorist organisation could go on to use their new information about the 
structures of international law against the US and her allies.7 In a similar vein, the conclusion 
from a Council on Foreign Relations roundtable on the concept notes that ‘lawfare is often 
conducted during peacetime by international groups and service organizations . . . to restrict 
the use of certain types of weapons, many of which are used by the U.S. military. Examples 
include efforts to ban landmines, cluster munitions, space weapons, blinding lasers, testing 
of nuclear weapons, and even certain types of ammunition. These campaigns impose 
increased costs on the American military and can affect its wartime performance’.8 This 
broadening out of the concept of lawfare leads Anne Herzberg – to take one particularly 
extreme perspective – to opine the rise of ‘NGO lawfare’ and arguing that ‘legal actions, 
ostensibly [taken] to provide “justice” to “victims”, are a form of “lawfare” . . . intended to 
punish Israel for anti-terror operations, as well as to block future actions.’9 Lawfare in this 
sense is seen as any action that undermines or challenges national security.10   
Such an application of the term is relatively easy to dismiss, or at least to bookend as 
bad legal scholarship. Any understanding that reduces law purely to the practical demands of 
national security or strategic necessity misses the point that law is there, inter alia, to protect 
against the excesses of the state, including – especially – in security practices.11 Given this 
function, it is strange indeed to take evidence that the law has successfully restricted the 
state’s capacity to act in a particular way – for example, by banning landmines, or protecting 
detention and fair trial standards – as evidence of law’s failure, rather than law’s success. 
More than this, it ignores the fact that lawfare has been used in much the same way, to 
disrupt and block international action, by those with preponderant military power. This 
leads Charles Dunlap to argue that in order to make sense, in order to be able to guide 
decision-makers in their use of international law, lawfare must be understood as ‘a strategy 
of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an 
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operational objective.’12 In order to craft lawfare into an objectively useful concept, a 
concept that can guide decision-makers, Dunlap attempts to distinguish between legitimate 
and illegitimate applications of lawfare, on the premise that in order for law to be used 
legitimately to advance military objectives there has to be something recognizable as law 
involved. To legitimately practice lawfare involves at least a prima facie commitment to 
legality. It follows from this idea that lawfare can be both a responsible and irresponsible 
practice that ‘lawfare is more than just something adversaries seek to use against law-abiding 
societies; it is a resource that democratic militaries can—and should—employ affirmatively.’13 
In this way lawfare becomes more than a critique of practice, it becomes a positive strategy, 
a responsible strategy for states committed to legality to deploy.  
What is crucial for understanding lawfare’s impact on international law is that in 
order to justify lawfare as a responsible practice one first needs to accept that the 
commitment to legality is itself a battleground, both endangered by and structured around 
competing perceptions of the nature of legality. Lawfare is simply a strategy, an attempt to 
hold the high ground, in this larger battle over the what Kenneth Anderson has called the 
‘ownership’ of international law.14 The problem with a state’s enemies practicing lawfare – or 
being given the tools by well-meaning NGOs to practice lawfare – is that they can’t be 
trusted to engage with the rules in a way that doesn’t undermine the broader purpose of 
legality which, for proponents of lawfare as a legitimate practice, must reflect considerations 
of order and security. The claim implied by the practice of lawfare is that there is first a 
conception of the responsible practice implied by the commitment of legality in operation 
and, more fundamentally, that there is a settled idea of the responsible agents of 
international legality, or the trustees of the international legal order. In a reflection of the 
confusion this generates, some commentators have begun to talk about ‘ICC lawfare’, in 
order to refer to the idea that the International Criminal Court must engage in this battle 
explicitly against states aiming to define legality in terms of the pursuit of order rather than 
considerations of justice.15 It is in the act of presenting lawfare as a potentially responsible 
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practice that Dunlap raises the causal importance of the underlying ethic of legality, and of 
who has ultimate responsibility for determining the content of this ethic.  
In this regard, lawfare is not a special case. It is not even an ‘exceptional’ use of law, 
a heightened form of ‘adversarial legalism’ aimed at the defeat of enemies rather than the 
resolution of disputes.16 Lawfare is, instead, a “hard case”, in the sense that it marks out on 
the one hand, as David Kennedy puts it, ‘the experience of irresolvable debate, or of debate 
that can only be resolved by reference outside law to the political or ethical’, and on the 
other hand, the contrary belief that international law can and should be able to use the 
principles of legality to resolve the uncertainty that allows lawfare to seem like a necessary 
and responsible practice.17 Lawfare marks out an increasingly common feature of the 
institutional life of international law; lawfare attempts to institutionalise a pragmatic ethic of 
legality in international society.  
 
Pragmatism and the hard cases of international law 
 
A hard case arises against three defining features. First, no single rule or obligation is able to 
claim overriding authority; there is a lack of normative hierarchy in the rules. Second, there 
is no consensus about how to resolve the resulting indeterminacy. Third, action is necessary; 
a hard case is always both a practical and a conceptual dilemma, there is no hiding away from 
the need to make a judgement about the appropriate course of action. This third feature is 
most critical.18 A hard case is not “tragic” because there is hope for – even an expectation of 
– a practical resolution.19 It is hard because it demands a judgement, a resolution, a 
‘decontesting’ of an essentially contested conceptual terrain.20 This is to say that a hard case 
emerges from the challenge of resolving and reconciling fundamentally different but equally 
                                                          
 
16 In this vein Meierhenrich conceives of lawfare as ‘a revolutionary strategy that centrally revolves around the 
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each other, but there is a resolution at the end. It may not be a resolution accepted by all parties, but it is good 
enough. Resolving a hard case puts a plaster over moral indeterminacy; those concerned with a tragic choice 
wallow in the gory details.    
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legitimate ideas about the appropriate course of action; in a legal order, a hard case presents 
itself as a problem about the actions required by the commitment to “legality”. A hard case 
in this regard presents a way to see the terms of the crisis facing international law because it 
shows how competing perspectives and values can make resolving a had case impossible. This 
is to say that to arrive at a resolution of a hard case requires an assertion of superior 
legitimate authority, of constitutional authority, and that the failure to resolve a hard case 
can be taken as evidence of the lack of constitutional authority. What I want to show is how 
a hard case of international law can become tragic where the assumption that the institutional 
order is uncertain is allowed to guide the decision-making process, and that this can justify 
locating the responsibilities which arise from legality outside of the legal order.  
 It is in this sense that lawfare represents a test for international law’s capacity to 
resolve the type of hard cases legality is supposed to be able to resolve in a constitutional 
order, at least if legalism is to be regarded as a justified expectation. Gerry Simpson 
characterisation of international law as ‘the victim of a community without a leader’ helps 
to show why lawfare represents a hard case.21 The traditional image of international legality 
is that those constitutional rules which ‘concretise community operate largely in the sphere 
of the everyday and not the realm of the exceptional’.22 International law might make 
international postage possible, but this is hardly to govern war and peace. In order to upset 
this limited picture of international law, there needs to be an acceptance not just of the 
complex entanglement between law and politics, but of the fact that ‘international law 
works in mysterious ways’, and in modest ways, to reconstruct the terms of this 
relationship in a way that makes operating in the realm of the exceptional – or, in other 
words, ruling on hard cases – possible.23 International law’s rules establish formal claim to 
regulate war and peace, but in practice states have either regarded international law as an 
irrelevance in resolving these high political questions, or more critically as an obstacle to 
resolving disputes, because the ambiguity of the rules allows both parties to a dispute to 
claim the mantle of legality. Putting law on a firmer footing therefore requires 
understanding how international law is able to empower certain actors over others. This 
might be ‘mysterious’, but it is real.  
                                                          
 
21 Gerry Simpson, ‘Duelling Agendas: International Relations and International Law (Again)’, 1 J. Int'l L & Int'l 
Rel. 61 2004-2005, p. 61 
22 Ibid, p. 62 
23 Ibid, p. 72; see also David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, in Dunoff and Trachtmann (eds.), 
Ruling the World, 2009.  
 
 
56 
 The problem with this, however, isn’t only that international law has tended to 
function badly in resolving hard cases – for example, collapsing into essentially contested 
apologetic or utopian registers – but that this process of trying and failing to resolve hard 
cases has shaped the dominant perceptions about the function that can be attributed to 
international legality. This is to say that the very recognition that international law works in 
mysterious ways can institutionalise the pragmatic ethic of legality: the worry is that in the 
mysterious reconstruction of the relationship between law and politics, legality loses out. As 
Hilary Charlesworth puts this point, crisis has tended to function as the ‘engine of 
progressive development’ in international law, to the extent that international law often 
appears to be, by its very nature, a discipline and practice in crisis.24 This doesn’t necessarily 
mean that there is no scope for a progressive, constitutionalist narrative, but the more 
firmly this belief is institutionalised the more likely it is that any progressive narrative will 
be co-opted, hijacked by both the narrative of crisis and the pragmatic ethic this justifies. 
The challenge, to quote Charlesworth again, is that ‘a concern with crisis skews the 
discipline of international law. Through regarding “crisis” as its bread and butter and the 
engine of progressive development of international law, international law becomes simply a 
source of justification for the status quo.’25 The problem that needs to be confronted here 
is that the narrative of crisis comes both to define the perception of the responsibilities 
appropriate to the institution of international law and to undermine the scope for a 
constitutionalist response. 
  The practice of lawfare attacks this idea that international law – more specifically 
the rules on the use of force, human rights and humanitarian law – have the capacity to 
govern the hard cases represented by terrorism. Lawfare in this respect is about reasserting 
the political, policy domain into an already settled sphere of legal practice. There will be 
occasions where law “runs out” and where the political domain can legitimately assert itself. 
Lawfare represents an assertion of the legitimacy of political authority or trusteeship for the 
legal order, a practice based around the claim to responsibility to protect the ideal of 
legality.26 For proponents of lawfare, recognizing that international law’s authority is 
connected to its capacity to advance political or military values and judgement merits 
responsible states using their political power to protect the idea of law from being 
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corrupted. For lawfare’s critics, to apply the rules of law in this way is to reject the essential 
elements of the rule of law, to institutionalise a mistaken belief that international law lacks, 
crucially, the superior authority needed to check political power.  
In order to understand how pragmatism entrenches a scepticism about the capacity 
of international law to rule in the uncertain circumstances of international society, consider 
Judith Shklar’s critique of rule-following as a responsible practice. As she argues, legalism is 
‘the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral 
relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules’.27 Her point of attack is that 
legal positivism has the tendency to elevate obedience to the legal rules into the only 
legitimate course of action. The danger of this is that where a legal subject is being asked by 
the law to do something contradictory to their ordinary moral intuitions – or political 
judgment – they unthinkingly oblige the law at the expense of these broader considerations. 
As a result of the legalist mindset,  politics is denigrated, ‘regarded not only as something 
apart from the law, but as inferior to law. Law aims at justice, while politics looks only to 
expediency. The former is neutral and objective, the latter the uncontrolled child of 
competing interests and ideologies’.28 This denigration of politics is especially problematic 
for Shklar because, she argues, it is the political sphere that endows formally enacted legal 
rules with meaning, and ensures the possibility of change when the rules come to reflect 
immoral or unjust or merely unsuitable ends.29 For the rule of law to mean something there 
needs to be some palpable sense of what the legal order stands for. In this way acting from a 
concern for legality, without any consideration for the substance or purpose behind a 
practice of legality, endangers the entire constitutional order because it pushes forward a 
technocratic idea of political responsibility. Shklar’s point is that, far from providing a 
challenge to legality, the political domain provides the space where the obligations of legality 
can be reconciled with the range of competing moral and political obligations.  
This basic idea motivates the pragmatist account of legality. Pragmatism is rooted in 
the belief that the ideal of law is, at its core, essentially indeterminate, and therefore in need of 
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elaboration or ‘filling out’ in and through social and political practice. For some pragmatists, 
the impossibility of decontesting the law resolved into an argument that legal rules were 
simply ‘pretty playthings’ that could help predict how a judge would rule, but not define in 
absolute terms how a judge – or indeed, political official – would act.30 For the pragmatist, 
the point of a hard case is that its effective resolution requires elaborating on and adding to 
the action suggested by the rules, with reference to the wider social and political context in 
which the law functions. In a constitutional order a judge is empowered to do this, within 
clearly defined limits. Even a constitutional court judge cannot claim absolute authority in 
this regard; their imperfect knowledge about the proper terms of political rule is why Shklar 
regards a degree of scepticism as necessary for the long-term health of the constitutional 
order. When the source of this remedial authority is uncertain, the indeterminacy of the law 
becomes even more evident. This is what happens in when there is a crisis in the political or 
social order. From the pragmatic perspective this is the normal state of affairs in 
international society; institutional uncertainty is the governing principle.  
In these circumstance, for states to be committed to legality is not to engage in a 
practice of blind obedience. Instead, the responsibility of those with an interest in the 
system is to fill out the law, to construct its meaning and purpose by exercising their 
discretionary powers.31 As Ian Hurd argues, ‘The political use of international law is not an 
aberration or a misuse of the law; it is the normal and inevitable result of striving for rules-
based international politics’.32 There will always be gaps in a legal order; a legal order will 
always require “filling out”. The crucial point for the pragmatist is that this filler must be 
located outside of the legal order, in the domains of politics and morality. As Michael 
Glennon puts this: ‘The law’s indeterminacy requires that the filler comes from something 
other than law; there is no alternative. Thus, confronted with the accusation that the 
pragmatist approach is merely politics masquerading as law, the pragmatist might respond: 
Compared to what?”.33 From this perspective, playing games with the law – using law to 
advance strategic goals – is not a challenge to the law; it is the essence of law. The fact that 
international law can’t respond to the effect this has on the conception of legality simply 
highlights the weakness of the international legal order in the first place.  
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This leads to an account of international law’s binding authority that focuses on its 
normative capacity, its efficacy, in identifying the rules that have the force of genuine 
customary practice, the rules where the perception of the line between legality and illegality 
is so crystal clear that that the rule can’t be unsettled or watered down by an adversarial 
practice of “game playing”. International law can foster an idea of the constitutional rules of 
international society, but only once the battles for the perception of legality have been 
decisively won or lost – once the binding authority of a legal rule can’t be easily dismissed in 
the attempt to resolve a hard case.34 Pragmatism is in this regard concerned with the fringes 
of legal authority, with the constructivist practices legitimated by law’s ‘penumbral 
uncertainty’. On this logic a practice such as lawfare – a practice that a constitutionalist 
might want to bookend as illegitimate, or at least demanding a development of the legal 
rules, rather than as functioning as an excuse for operating outside of the rules – can be 
justified as the responsible practice of legality. Presenting lawfare as a legitimate practice to 
be used against those who would abuse international law implies that lawfare has the 
potential to functions as a constitutionally responsible practice. The problem isn’t that 
lawfare is a battle for the perception of legality; the problem is that this battle for the 
perception of legality constitutes legality in a particular way, as a pragmatic response to a 
constitutional order defined by crisis and uncertainty.35  
 It is in this respect that the ‘darkly alluring figure’36 of Carl Schmitt has become a 
foil for both the critique and advancement of the liberal commitment to the rule of law, in 
both the international37 and domestic context.38 One explanation for Schmitt’s influence is 
the lack of alternative accounts within liberalism of the effect of uncertainty or crisis on 
constitutional authority in uncertainty (in the next chapter I explore a possible Augustinian 
alternative). Another explanation is that the rule of law is itself a fundamentally limited 
constitutional virtue, and that any effective constitutional order must be able to manage the 
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exception in order to function effectively. It is in this respect that pragmatism can be 
thought to share essential features of the Schmittian response to crisis, namely that a crisis 
exposes the hollowness of constitutional legalism as a responsible practice. As he puts it:  
‘There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a 
normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this 
normal situation actually exists. All law is “situational law.” The sovereign produces 
and guarantees the situation in its totality. He has the monopoly over this last 
decision. Therein resides the essence of the state’s sovereignty, which must be 
juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the 
monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most clearly the essence of the state’s 
authority. The decision parts here from the legal norm, and (to formulate it 
paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on law.’39  
  
Not all pragmatists would accept this sweeping apologia for political power, but they do 
share the underlying scepticism about the capacity for the legal order to justify a claim to 
rule in conditions of fundamental, constitutional uncertainty. As Giorgio Agamben 
expresses this more basic idea, it is that the background uncertainty about the terms of 
legality embeds uncertainty into the institutional order about who has the legitimacy to 
define both the nature of the exception and the terms of its resolution: ‘The state of 
exception is neither internal nor external to the juridical order, and the problem of defining 
it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not 
exclude each other but rather blur with each other’.40 The problem with the pragmatic ethic 
– as with lawfare – is that it blurs the sense of what legality requires in a constitutional order. 
What this implies is that acting on the commitment to legality requires a particular 
disposition, a disposition appropriate to these ambiguities. If international law requires a 
healthy scepticism in order to identify those rules capable of claiming a genuine 
constitutional authority, if part of a state’s responsibility is to discern the real legal 
obligations from the nominal obligations, if international law is to function to provide order 
in international society, there needs to be a recognition that legality is constructed concept, 
constructed out of the war-footing of states and other actors. The scope of the 
responsibilities implied by the commitment to legality need to be matched to this 
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uncertainty, able to reflect how crisis undermines the space for legality to constitute 
international society except as a site for political dialogue and contest. Rule-following, from 
the pragmatic perspective, is the irresponsible ethic where legality is itself a socially 
constructed practice.  
 
A constitutionalist resolution?  
 
If the practice of lawfare can be justified as an expression of states’ constructive 
commitment to legality in circumstances of uncertainty, what basis is there for the claim that 
lawfare-like practices are constructing, to use Philippe Sands’ phrase, a ‘lawless world’?41 For 
Sands, the flourishing of lawfare and other practices linked to the “war on terror” have 
eroded the authority of international law in recent years by attempting to confound the 
objectivity of international law, by creating a “legal black hole”. Painting these practices as 
“responsible” – justified by a prior moral or political duty – feeds the idea that international 
law tolerates, and even enables hypocrisy, that it ultimately fails to restrain the most 
powerful members of international society. It seems to provide evidence of a privileged 
authority claimed by the US and other powerful actors, a superior claim to ownership of the 
international legal order. The reason that lawfare appears responsible when the US engages 
in it and irresponsible when Palestinian activists do it is because, to US eyes, they can be 
trusted to develop the practice and concept of legality in a way that advances and 
strengthens the legal order, to a degree that Palestinian activists cannot. Apart from the 
critique of American neo-imperialism this triggers, apart from the justification of American 
exceptionalism it implies, the problem is that this attitude – the institutionalisation of 
privilege – runs against the most basic principles of legality, including the protection of an 
equality of arms and the limitation on arbitrary exercise of power. It dismisses what Jeremy 
Waldron characterises as the ‘original habitat’ of the rule of law – constraining the abuse of 
power.42 As Brian Tamanaha argues, the instrumental use of law threatens the constitutional 
ordering function of law, because it leads to ‘a Hobbesian conflict of all against all carried on 
within and through the legal order . . . law will thus generate disputes as much as resolve 
them. Even where one side prevails, victory will mark a momentary respite before battle is 
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resumed.’43 Far from remedying the legal order, lawfare and the pragmatic approach of 
which it is symptomatic embeds a degree of uncertainty into the system and, in the process, 
undercuts law’s institutional authority to effect a practical resolution of the terms of legality, 
deepening a picture of international law as a contested, unconstitutional order.  
To avoid this pragmatist creep, the constitutionalist counter-move is to emphasise 
the essential features of law in a constitutional order. The point of this is to show that 
international law is not as indeterminate as pragmatists have supposed, that there is a fixed 
core to the legitimate practice of legality and therefore that a commitment to the idea of 
legality carries with it a clear sense of the actions or responsibilities required. Law – 
including international law – has an essential core that scepticism can’t diminish, that 
pragmatist arguments can’t touch. The very existence of a valid legal order entails a 
particular conception of legality, with a determinate sense of what constitutes the  
responsible practice of law. As an institution, the law entails that the commitment to legality 
will take a particular form, and that this form will give rise to particular responsibilities able 
to guide decision-making even – especially – where the social order is in crisis.44 This is to 
say that international law can establish an authoritative account of the constitutional rules 
without relying on either political intervention or social solidarity.  
In general, there have been two methods aimed at establishing the legal order as 
fixed around certain essential characteristics, characteristics able to guide decision-makers in 
a hard case: these are the natural law and legal positivist accounts of the legal order. 
Identifying what it was about the concept of law that allowed legal institutions to ‘rule’ was 
key for H. L. A. Hart. Understanding these types of challenges to law’s supremacy involved, 
first and foremost, understanding what it was that was distinctive about a legal obligation, 
and how legal rules maintained their authority in light of the pressures from the political 
sphere. Departing from earlier positivists, Hart argues that the source of obligations to the 
law cannot simply lie in the existence of a coercive authority or command; the ability to 
punish cannot be the sole reason for obedience. The legal system is not ‘the gunman 
situation writ large’.45 Because legal authority isn’t to be found in its coercive power, there 
needs to be something about the law that makes it deserving of obedience. Hart argues that any 
                                                          
 
43 Brian Tamanaha, Law as Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law, 2006, p.  
44 This is to say that a legal order generates a claim constitutional authority as it shows a capacity to ‘absorb the 
need for change’, as Thomas Franck has expressed it, see Thomas Franck, ‘Preface: International Institutions: 
Why Constitutionalize?’, in Dunoff and Trachtmann (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance, p. xi 
45 HLA Hart, Concept of Law, 1997, p. 20 -25 
 
 
63 
description of the nature of legal obligation must be able to account for the fact that legal 
rules are generally followed because actors believe they ought to, rather than out of a fear of 
punishment or harm. In other words, these legal rules have force for the simple reason that 
the legal order claims legitimate authority.  
Hart is not primarily concerned with making a claim about the standing or force or 
importance of a legal obligation relative to competing moral obligations. This is important 
for heading off the pragmatic criticism of rule-following, which presents legality as value in 
tension with standards of moral legitimacy. As Hart argues, however, one of the differences 
between legal and moral rules is that while legal rules may be trivial or non-vital, moral rules 
are always of the utmost importance. Rather than claiming that legality always has the 
superior claim to authority, the claim advanced by Hart is that within the legal system we should 
presume the primacy of legal obligations. As Raz would later put this positivist point, one of 
the necessary characteristics of law is that it claims exclusive authority within its domain.46 
This is not to say that a legal obligation cannot be set aside in certain circumstances of 
sufficient seriousness by competing moral obligations, but it is to say that there is a 
presumption in favour of the bindingness of legal obligations.47 Hart would have no 
problem with Antigone’s decision to disobey Creon, for example, given that burying the 
dead was a morally weight reason for disobedience and – even more importantly – she 
accepted the illegality of the action. The most that can be said on this topic, Hart thought, is 
that ‘if the system is fair and caters genuinely for vital interests of all those from whom it 
demands obedience, it may gain and retain the allegiance of most for most of the time, and 
will accordingly be stable’.48  
For Hart, the authority of a legal system will be determined by whether the legal 
rules can give sustain a culture of legality, independent of the presence of coercive force. 
This doesn’t mean that the legal order must be “just” in any thick sense in order to claim 
normative authority as law, but Hart understood that if a legal order couldn’t claim a degree 
of justice it was unlikely to generate the kind of culture of legality needed to sustain its 
authority in the long term. In these circumstances, as Hart puts it, ‘All that can be claimed 
for the simple positivist doctrine that morally iniquitous rules may still be law, that this 
                                                          
 
46 Joseph Raz, Authority of Law, 1979, pp. 22-27 [This position is known as exclusive positivism and is to be 
contrasted with inclusive positivism, which allows that certain moral considerations may be operative within a 
legal system when an existing social-fact sourced rule allows. In later works – especially in the postscript to CL 
– Hart seems to acknowledge his is an inclusive version.] 
47 See Raz on constitutional authority, Authority of Law 
48 Hart, Concept of Law , p. 201 
 
 
64 
offers no disguise for the choice between evils which, in extreme circumstances, may have 
to be made’.49 A legal order lacks loses its authority when it ceases to have a decisive 
significance in decision making. This suggests the need to consider the authority of a legal 
rule in light of the character of the legal system – the criteria for a legal system’s validity – 
because it is this institutional character of law which will determine whether a legal rule can 
claim a legitimate type of authority.  
But Hart avoided elaborating on the conditions under which illegality could become 
the responsible option for the subjects of law. This was connected to his assumption that as 
key part of establishing a valid legal order was the development of mechanisms for resolving 
and heading off challenges to the legitimate authority of the law. These are remedial 
responsibilities provided the flexibility needed to prevent ‘penumbral uncertainty’ from 
becoming evidence of a wider crisis of legitimacy. As he explains it, the ‘primary rules’ of a 
legal order – the substantive rules detailing the type of action required – will tend to be 
backed up by ‘secondary rules’, able to remedy the defects or gaps in the legal order: 
‘Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or primary 
type, human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they 
wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon or secondary to 
the first; for they provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain things 
introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various 
ways determine or control their operations. Rules of the first type impose duties; 
rules of the second type provide for operations which lead not merely to physical 
movement or change, but to the creation or variation of duties or obligations’.50  
In this regard, the secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication function as a 
remedy for the defects of primary rules. This includes the possibility that the primary rules 
might be abused or misapplied. For Hart, ‘all three remedies together are enough to convert 
the regime of primary rules into what is indisputably a legal system’.51 There is another 
function, however, and that is to establish the responsibilities of legality, among those 
charged with enacting the law; ‘rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity 
and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public 
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standards of official behaviour by its officials’.52 This leads to the argument, crucial for 
international law, that a legal order may be customary, with none of the remedies you find in 
a domestic legal order, yet still claim authority. This is because there are certain primary rules 
‘distinguished from others by the serious social pressure by which they are supported, and 
by the considerable sacrifice of individual interest or inclination which compliance with 
them involves’.53  
This raises the question, however, of what happens when neither the willingness of 
sacrifice or the serious social pressure exists? To put this another way, this is where the 
emphasis on the closed aspects of the legal order can be seen to generate its own limits, in 
the inability to resolve a hard case where it is the legitimacy of legality that is itself at 
question.54 It is helpful to realise that this is not a problem specific to the practice of 
international legality but rather a challenge that all constitutional orders espousing a 
commitment to the rule of law have had to confront. Where protecting some constitutional 
values, such as the security of government institutions, seem to require a willingness to set 
aside what had been regarded as absolute constitutional values, such as the right to a fair 
trial, it begins to look like resolving the commitment to legality as a constitutional principle 
is not as fixed or absolute as liberal constitutionalist rhetoric might have supposed. This 
creates a potentially paradoxical situation – a situation into which the pragmatic ethic is able 
to assert itself as the responsible ethic – where acting on the commitment to legality requires 
either the suspension on legality as a governing principle or the introduction of exceptions 
to the operation of legality. As David Dyzenhaus argues, the central question posed by this 
is not when the rules are set aside due to a genuine emergency, but when the exception 
becomes the norm, and, crucially, ‘how such a trend might be resisted.’55 This is not a 
question that can easily be bookended as a penumbral concern; as he argues, this challenge 
to the limits of legality raises ‘the central question of jurisprudence’.56 This is a question 
about whether introducing exceptions to the rule of law are a product of or a challenge to 
the capacity of the legal order to rule – whether a crisis in the social order must seep into the 
legal order, or whether the legal order offers the means to resolve the ambiguity of legality in 
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a crisis situation.57 To put this another way, it becomes a question about law’s role in 
resolving this crisis, in particular the control a legal order has over legal meaning in a 
constitutional order, and a clash between ‘jurisgeneration and extralegal action’.58 
Dyzenhaus posits that the natural law tradition might contain the solution to this 
problem, in offering a justification for retrenching around legality as a particular kind of 
‘wishful thinking’.59 Natural law accounts have been the traditional alternative to positivism, 
and it will be useful – especially for arguments developed later in this thesis – to have a bit 
of a sense about where the core differences between these traditions of thinking about the 
law are – and their shared understanding of the importance of maintaining an essential idea of 
the nature of legality. In the traditional gloss – summed up in the slogan ‘unjust laws are not 
law’ – the authority of a legal rule is conditional on, and limited by, its moral character and 
whether it fits with the broader requirements of justice. The tension between legality and 
morality as guides to action are rectified through the argument that the rules themselves do 
not possess any distinctive form of authority; claims to legal authority are conditioned by the 
priority of our moral commitments. And yet, as John Finnis argues, this reading of the 
natural law tradition is in many respects a straw man invented by classical legal positivism.60 
In placing value on “the rule of law, not men”, the natural law tradition entails that a legal 
system be put in place which would allow those moral principles part of the common law of 
all reasonable peoples to be ‘shaped’ or codified by the legal order. No matter how good or 
just a moral rule might seem, until it has been codified by the legal system it is not law. And, 
contrary to the straw man built by legal positivists, if a legal rule was unjust it does not cease 
to be a legal rule; rather, it is the moral obligation to follow such a legal rule that lapses. 
Legal rules, and indeed legal orders, can be deprived of authority by virtue of a clash with 
‘the higher and perennial laws of humanity’, but not of its status as law. The authority of a 
legal order, on this account, is not contained in the form of law, but in the purpose of law.  
Lon Fuller pressed this point in his battles with Hart, and it is this respect that 
Dyzenhaus find him useful. Fuller argued that there are moral principles, characterised as 
aspirations, that are specific to a legal order rather than part of a general commitment to 
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morality. Fuller starts from the idea that we need to have a clear idea of the purpose, not just 
the formal characteristics, of the legal system. The legal rules fixated on by legal positivists as 
descriptive of the nature of the law only seem so because they express and are aimed at 
furthering what he calls the internal morality or purpose of a legal system, our ideas about 
what the law ought to be. Laws and legal obligations are not primarily attached to power or 
authority, but rather arise from the constitutional purpose of law, characterised as ‘the 
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules’.61 Fuller’s criticism of 
Hart is that in fixating on the normative essence of the rules of law he fails to appreciate the 
central role played by the ideal of law, and, as a result of this oversight, his effort to explain 
the separation of law from morality is motivated by an overly substantive idea of the nature 
of the moral claim that attaches to legality. When Fuller talks about the law ‘in quest of 
itself’, what he means is that the authority of law must be understood in principled terms, as 
a combination of the law that is and the aspiration purpose that the existing rules are 
intended to serve.62  
Law is at its core, for Fuller, a procedural  ideal – a commitment to govern society in 
accordance with certain fundamental principles, principles that allow a legal order to 
advance this procedural justice. In his narrative this ideal is contained in the 8 criteria he 
argues a legal system must aim at if it is to be called law. As Fuller puts it: ‘What 
distinguishes law from other types of social ordering is not form, but adherence to specific 
criteria of legality: generality, promulgation, non-retroactivity, clarity, and congruence 
between rules and official action.’ Importantly, a legal system does not need to achieve, only 
to aim at this ideal state in order to have legal validity; we can ‘know what is plainly unjust  
without committing ourselves to declare with finality what perfect justice would be like’.63 
He goes even further than this, however, arguing that perfect justice is an impossible aim, 
since the conflict of legal rules is inevitable in any legal system, even in an imagined perfectly 
just system. For this reason, Fuller argues, the rule of law must be regarded as primarily 
aspirational. Good law is about the effective and just administrative purpose of government, 
not the specific justice or morality of each legal rule or obligation. In this regard Fuller 
argues that ‘fidelity’ does a lot of work in allowing a legal order to manage its imperfections, 
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including the threats to the rule of law.64 As Dyzenhaus puts it, this expresses the idea that in 
order for law to rule, there need to be ‘believers in the rule of law’. 
 The difficulty of using this to respond to the pragmatic challenge, however, can be 
seen in the common ground between Hart and Fuller. Despite in many ways defining the 
terms of the opposition between positivism and natural law, the differences between Hart 
and Fuller are not as deep as they first seem, or as either man initially felt.65 Hart argued, for 
instance, that the procedural form of the ‘inner morality of law’ espoused a redundant, 
hollowed out conception of morality. To glorify the rule of law criteria – which Fuller 
justified as necessary for the ‘efficacy’ of the legal order – as an inner morality was, Hart 
argued, akin to justifying a list of the eight most efficient way to poison someone as the 
inner morality of poisoning.66 Nevertheless, both Hart and Fuller shared the more 
fundamental idea that law’s authority is tied to its institutional form. For both, the authority 
of law – the “rule of law” – entails a legal order that embodies, at its core, a set of essential 
principles. Hart acknowledges as much in accepting that there must be a ‘minimum content 
of natural law’ in any legal system dictated by the requirements of social order: ‘The union of 
primary and secondary rules is at the centre of a legal system; but it is not the whole, and as 
we move away from the centre we shall have to accommodate . . . elements of a different 
type’.67 These are rules necessitated by the facts of living in society, or ‘social-fact rules’. The 
important implication of this is that the function of the secondary rules, for Hart, is not 
merely to establish the commitment to legality as a general practice, but to provide a 
mechanism to sustain a society’s commitment to legality.68  
This reconciliation is perhaps most fully expressed in Neil MacCormick’s 
institutional theory of law. There are many different forms that a legal order can take, but 
whatever form it takes, there are institutional requirements to be met if a legal order is to 
claim the binding authority which characterises a legal obligation. MacCormick argues that 
law’s social function – and it’s claim to constitutional authority – is determined by the 
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capacity to provide ‘institutional normative order’.69 Whether the legal order has this capacity 
to claim constitutional authority will be determined by the degree to which it is ‘a genuinely 
observed source of the genuinely observed norms followed by those carrying out official 
public roles specified in or under it’.70 At one level this could be taken to say simply that law 
needs to be able to ‘inspire legality’, as Fuller puts it.71 But MacCormick goes into more 
detail about who he regards as having the authority to ‘fill out’ the conception of legality not 
with those subject to a legal or constitutional order, but with reference to those charged with 
enacting the legal order. The responsibilities created by the general commitment to legality 
fell on those required to enact the law, on ‘officialdom’. What this means is that there is far 
less scope for political actors to change the terms of legality to fit their policy preferences. 
Law’s essential principles need to be capable of motivating a set of essential practices 
designed around preserving the institutional function of the legal order, but these are 
practices designated to particular actors in a constitutional order. At one level this could be 
seen simply as an argument for the importance of the separation of powers to making sense 
of the rule of law in practice, but he goes further than this, in focusing on how this 
separation of powers becomes virtuous by sustaining a culture of legality among those 
charged with enacting and protecting the rule of law in a constitutional order.  
Nevertheless, this seems to close the loop on attempts to use the value, and virtue, 
of legality to resolve hard cases. Because it assumes a relatively settled institutional form to 
the constitutional order, a constitutional order that has both institutionalized a commitment 
to the rule of law and that has cultivated a coherent sense of responsibility among those 
charged with pursuing and maintaining the coherence of legality. At least on the first of 
these pillars, this raises the nature of the pragmatist challenge to international law’s 
constitutional authority – in particular the perception that before international law can rule – 
before international law can resolve the hard cases of international society – and before a 
constitutionalist mindset can be justified there needs to be evidence that the international legal 
order fits the form appropriate to constitutional order.    
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From Compliance to Commitment 
 
Following the institutionalization of rules protecting ‘communal interests’, following the 
development of erga omnes obligations, rules with a constitutional form, it would have been 
reasonable to expect international legality to be increasingly tightly defined in and through 
the mindset of constitutionalism, through the idea that international legality generated an 
essential set of responsibilities. But, with some limited exceptions, it is only recently that 
international law’s claim to define the constitutional rules has begun to shape the politics of 
international law. Why is this? At least part of the explanation is that the debate about the 
constitutional authority of international law was co-opted by uncertainty about which of 
international law’s rules could claim this kind of higher authority and the contradictory 
ethics of legality this gave rise to.72 From the pragmatist perspective the fundamental charge 
is that the ambiguous and contested practice of international legality in international society 
entail that the responsibilities towards legality should be treated as essentially a matter of 
perspective.  
Efforts to counter this charge in the domestic context have centred on establishing 
that legality has a determinate core which entails a clear sense of the responsibilities owed to 
a legal order. This basic strategy has also structured efforts to prove international law’s 
authority, first in the idea that international law has a clear customary force even in the 
absence of a clear idea of the “remedial” responsibilities it requires, second in the idea that 
the these responsibilities can be derived from international law’s capacity to reflect parallel, 
socially prevalent senses of obligation, and most recently in the idea that the practice of 
international legality and the common understandings embedded in the legal rules has 
internalized a sense of responsibility. What I want to show in this section is that all of these 
efforts at some level admit that legality is, at base, a constructed idea and that this has the 
effect of endorsing the pragmatic claim that international law lacks the constitutional 
authority needed to remedy hard cases.  
Before getting to that point, what are the existing strategies for responding to the 
claim that international law is fundamentally indeterminate? One influential perspective is 
that justifying international law’s authority is a question that can be resolved by analysing 
compliance with the rules. Compliance can function as a key indication that there is some 
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essential form to the practice of international legality. A state’s decision to comply with 
international law can function as a strategy to reconstruct the nature and extent of the 
commitment to international legality, as a starting point from which to understand the 
nature of the rule of international law. For many focusing on compliance, the lesson from 
Louis Henkin’s observation that ‘It is probably the case that almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and almost all of the obligations almost all of the 
time’73 was that that substantiating international law’s authority meant getting rid of the 
conditional ‘probably’. If it could be shown that international law was certainly obeyed the 
majority of the time, this would be enough to convince the sceptics about the capacity of 
international law to rule. Rules that generated a particularly high level of compliance – a 
customary, habitual sort of compliance – could begin to be understood as constitutional-
type rules.  
Of course this poses a problem when it comes to understanding those rules that do 
not generate a particularly high level of compliance but are regarded as fundamental and 
binding nonetheless – most obviously human rights obligations. The fact that states have 
signed up to so many onerous human rights commitments which, in practice, don’t seem to 
be particularly well respected or implemented challenges the idea that the authority of 
international law could be explained simply by reference to the existence of determinate 
obligations. In order to make sense of why these rules could be regarded as establishing a 
commitment to international law even in the absence of widespread compliance, the fact of 
compliance needs to be placed in the wider law-making context.74 Compliance is not only a 
way to establish a fixed fact about international legality; it also functions as a tool and a 
process for developing and expanding legality. This was Thomas Franck’s great insight, that 
isolated instance of compliance by responsible states could generate a “compliance pull”, a 
social pressure on other members of international society which, in turn, could justify the 
authority generated by an initially vague legal rule. This is to say that international law 
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functions, as Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink put it, to instigate a ratchet-like ‘norm 
cascade’ which eventually ends with law’s subjects internalising a habitual commitment to 
the legal norm.75 There is more to compliance, in other words, than simple rule-following; it 
is evidence of a sense of obligation that all legal orders require. As Finnemore puts it, 
‘Effective law generates a sense of obligation, not just in a formal sense but also in a felt 
sense’.76   
And yet compliance can also be used to highlight the lack of commitment too, to 
show how the commitment to certain rules dies off and falls into desuetude.77 In assessing 
states commitment to international law, non-compliance can be as potent a signal as 
compliance.78 From the constitutionalist perspective, this makes the use of compliance as a 
base from which to substantiate the constitutional effect of compliance with international 
law a tricky proposition. If non-compliance is a legitimate way of signalling a lack of 
commitment, the idea that international law has a normative authority independent of the 
political order becomes rather difficult to sustain because any incident of non-compliance 
becomes potential evidence for international law’s need to change. This is to say that an 
excessive focus on compliance creates a situation where understanding the nature of states’ 
commitment to international legality becomes a fundamentally descriptive task of 
determining which rules are emerging, which rules are settled and which rules are in the 
process of changing. This in turn raises questions about the appropriate method for 
determining what constitutes really binding international law.79  It was for similar reasons 
that Hart thought the focus on enforcement was both mistaken and dangerous. It gives the 
impression that commitment is something that rests on the fact of compliance with the law, 
whereas in actual fact compliance follows from a commitment to the normative principles 
embodies by the law.  
Maintaining the sense that the force of international legal obligations were derived 
from their status as normative claims rather than a capacity to generate compliance meant, 
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as Christian Reus-Smit argued, developing an understanding of international law that starts 
from an appreciation of the essentially ‘interstitial’ nature of international legal obligations.80 
This constructivist account of international law locates the binding force of a legal obligation 
in its capacity to reflect the parallel social, political and ethical obligations operating in 
international society. International legal obligations get their force by reflecting state’s 
judgement about the appropriate rules, a judgement that holds constant across the variety of 
types of obligation to which an actor might be subjected. Once we begin the process of 
‘discovering deeper, truer sources of obligation’, once we understand that international law 
generates a claim to authority by virtue of its ‘milieu-contingency’, that it emerges out of the 
overlap between socially prevalent normative ideas about appropriate action, it becomes 
possible to justify the occasional gap between compliance and commitment. The authority 
of international law at base the result of a common conversation about the social norms 
which should govern international society. The practical application of this can be seen in his 
argument that human rights norms, rather than functioning as a challenge to the norm of 
state sovereignty, actually emerges as an inherent part of a discourse of legitimate state 
action. Rather than accepting the existing implication that international law’s capacity to 
govern is torn by the need to choose between fundamentally opposed norms of protecting 
state’s right to self-determination or individual human rights, by locating human rights as an 
essential part of modern state, the problem lies in the ‘inherently contradictory nature of the 
modern discourse of legitimate statehood’.81 Because the protection of human rights were 
regarded as integral to the moral purpose of the state they could play an essential 
justificatory role in the constitution of the sovereign order, providing the crucial grounds for 
claims to self-determination in the wake of colonialism. This is not centrally about the 
nature of international law’s authority but it does reflect an important claim about 
international law fosters the constitution of international society. Legal norms function as a 
language of legitimacy, and in the process structure a political conversation about the nature 
of states’ fundamental commitments that constitutes the international order.  
And yet this highlights the danger of failing to specify an essential core to the 
practice of legality – or a potential route for establishing this. In taking Robert Jackson to 
task for thinking of human rights as a way to curb sovereign rights, he highlights the effect 
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of constructivist lens. He is able to make sense of international law as a constitutional force, 
but only at the expense of the coherence of international law’s claim to rule as an 
independent normative order. What matters is how international law’s rules are taken up and 
used by states to justify sweeping changes in the international order. It matters far less 
whether these legal norms are used in the correct way. International law becomes another 
species of social norms, with law’s normative authority tied to – and ultimately limited by – 
the reliance on how states use international law to generate their claims to legitimacy. There 
is no conception here of how international law could function to impose meaning on the 
world where fundamental norms have been misused, where international law faces a hard 
case. Instead we get a call to ‘recalibrate’ the existing normative framework.82 Hard cases can 
be reconciled, but only by giving up on the absolute status of the existing norm.  
It was in an effort to hold on to a more coherent, more fixed idea of the value of 
legality that Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope argue for an ‘interactional’ approach. This 
constructivist account puts a greater focus on how the institutional values and processes 
embedded in the practice of international law justify the commitment to international 
legality. This approach draws on Fuller’s insight that a valid legal order gets its legitimate 
authority from its capacity to inspire a practice of legality among the subjects of law by 
ensuring that the legal obligations reflect the key criteria of legality: rules must be of general 
application, publically promulgated, non-retroactive, clear and unambiguous, realistic, 
relatively constant and reflected in the actions of officials operating under the law.83 The way 
this works to generate law’s authority is that where the legal rules are appropriately clear, for 
instance, states will consistently recognise an obligation to obey; where rules are confusing, 
states will be more likely to use alternative standards to guide their decision-making. This in 
turn is used as the basis for the argument that ‘only when law is produced through the 
interactional framework can it be said that law is “legitimate”’.84Legal obligations have force 
because in a virtuous legal order where the rules protect these values the subjects will want 
to obey the law.. For Brunnée and Toope, ‘when norm creation meets these criteria and is 
matched with norm application that also satisfies the legality requirements – when there 
exists what we call a “practice of legality” – actors will be able to pursue their purposes and 
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organise their interactions through law. These features of legality are crucial to generating a 
distinctive legal legitimacy and a sense of commitment – what Fuller calls “fidelity” – among 
those to whom the law is addressed.’85  
This emphasis on the practice of legality generates law’s legal legitimacy as it fosters 
shared understandings between actors about the purpose and the norms of law, as it 
establishes a community of practice motivated by ensuring that the criteria of legality are 
met, and as both the sense of commitment to the rules and the coherence of the rules 
themselves are reinforced.86 On the face of it this is an incredibly comprehensive account of 
how international law generates and maintains a sense of obligation, an account that goes 
well beyond existing conceptions of international law by focusing on the authority reified by 
the idea and practice of international legality. But there are some problems here which only 
emerge in attempting to justify international law’s constitutional role in international society, 
and in the attempt to remedy the hard cases without recourse to the political domain.  
Crucially, they can’t avoid a degree of subjectivity in how they define the way that 
Fuller’s criteria of legality ought to apply to the international legal order and, as a result, 
despite positioning their criteria of legality as an account of the inner morality of law, they 
build in a bias for how states have understood this inner morality. The second issue is a 
more general issue to do with perspective, namely the thought that an objective list of the 
hallmarks of legality could function as an objective standard for evaluating the justification 
for international law’s normative authority. As Thomas Poole expresses this, there is a 
tendency of constitutionalist scholars to downplay the political import of their arguments, 
and this comes out in the exaggeration of ‘the normal nature of the normal’ as well as ‘the 
exceptional nature of the exceptional’.87 But this tendency is more pronounced in Brunnée 
and Toope’s account, in that they conjure their own definition of the normal, over-running 
international law’s own institutional methods for establishing and developing the criteria of 
legality.88 The effect of this is that their approach seems to concede to the pragmatist idea 
that international law’s capacity to generate its own sense of legality – and the 
responsibilities which follow – is somehow defunct. This leads them to engage in the same 
sort of ground-clearing exercise that pragmatists call for – to attempt to differentiate 
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genuine international law from norms that don’t generate the necessary commitment, that 
don’t reflect the practice of legality.  
Despite the attempt to write, as Robert Beck puts it, ‘outside the rationalist idiom’,89 
constructivist accounts end up implying that before international law can rule in a 
constitutional way there must be a determinate sense of states’ commitment to international 
law’s claim to rule. But in the process of justifying this commitment the specifically 
constitutional practice of legality in which international law is seen to generate the terms of its 
rule – and in the process establish limits on the policy domain – fades from view. This 
highlights how entrenched the pragmatist ethic is, because both the interstitial and 
interactional accounts described above started with a strong sense of the importance and 
depth of states commitment to legality. The reason these accounts end up shading into 
pragmatism is that they lack a sense of how international law can maintain the value of 
legality while at the same time sufficiently reflecting the social context. The authority of 
international law becomes something to be constructed through international (or scholarly) 
practice, rather than something that emerges as a result of the commitment to legality itself. 
Legality is itself a practice of knowledge generation; it generates knowledge about the 
responsible practice of legality. Law admits and tests evidence against established principles, 
principles of interpretation, of fair trial, of necessity and proportionality. But the nature and 
function of these principles, their character and scope, and, most importantly, ‘the sense of 
trusteeship and the pride of the craftsman’90 that are acknowledged as crucial for the 
maintaining the authority of international law needs to be revealed in and through the 
jurisprudential practice of law, not as outside variables that can be swayed through either the 
policy or social scientific imposition of a judgement about which rules can genuinely claim 
authority – however elegantly conceived that analysis might be.91 In a context where this is 
possible and/or necessary, the legal order must lack the capacity to generate the superior 
claim to authority needed to remedy a constitutional order’s hard cases, in particular to 
                                                          
 
89 Robert J. Beck ‘International Law and International Relations Scholarship’. Routledge Handbook of International 
Law (London, Routledge: 2009) p13-43, 
90 Judith Shklar, Political Thought and Political thinkers, edited by Stanley Hoffman, University of Chicago Press: 
1998, p. 33 
91 For one good example of this, see especially Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The Choice of Law Against Terrorism’, 
Journal of National Security Law and Policy, Vol. 4, p. 343, 2010 [She argues that it is a crucial problem that 
international law seems to allow states to choose between applying peacetime law or the law of armed conflict 
in structuring their counter-terrorism practices. But she also argues that the fact that states use their authority 
to choose the easier option shouldn’t be taken to mean that international law is itself weak, because 
international law has developed guidelines governing the circumstances in which one or the other regime 
applies. The fact that there are problems in the practice of international law should not be taken ion itself to 
mean that international law can’t establish a coherent, constitutional-type sense of the practice it requires.]  
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counter attempts to define the ethic of legality in line with the ambiguity and uncertain of 
the international institutional order. The challenge of responding to hard cases highlights 
that law “rules” – at least in a constitutional context – to the extent that it gets taken 
seriously as a closed order capable of protecting the core constitutional rules, even in a hard 
case. Law rules to the extent that it is able to claim the prerogative to objectively determine 
which of its rules are ‘genuinely’ binding, where there might be a legitimate exception to the 
rules, which rules have fallen into desuetude, without policy-driven political interference in this 
process. But for the pragmatist, acting on, and believing in, the fact that international law’s 
rules and institutions enjoy this level of authority is not the solution but the core problem, 
the core peril.  
 
From Commitment to Responsibility 
 
Returning to Judith Shklar’s arguments against legalism will help to highlight why these 
efforts to establish the force of the commitment to international legality have struggled to 
generate a constitutionalist ethic, and at the same time served to further entrench a 
pragmatic ethic. The problem, at base, is that these various attempts to shore up 
international law’s claim to authority in international society fail to fully engage with the 
need to justify – and hold on to – a liberal faith in the rule of law in circumstances of 
uncertainty. This is important for justifying law’s authority in a constitutional order at all 
times, but it becomes especially crucial – and paradoxically most difficult – in establishing 
law’s authority to rule where a constitutional order is characterised by crisis.  
Nevertheless, despite Shklar’s deep worries about the dangers legalism poses to 
maintaining a just social order, she is equally worried about a healthy scepticism shading into 
a dangerous cynicism about the possibility of constitutional order. There is, she argues, a 
crucial role to be played by the general belief in the authority of a society’s legal institutions: 
‘if one begins with the fear of violence, the insecurity of arbitrary government, and the 
discriminations of injustice, one may work one’s way up to finding a place for the rule of 
law.’ The rule of law, for all the conceptual confusion it can generate (and sustain), 
establishes ‘institutional restraints that prevent government agents from repressing the rest 
of society’.92 It provides a standard of legitimacy that guards against the arbitrary exercise of 
political power. This ‘liberalism of fear’ as she puts it seems on the surface to leave a 
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difficult line to hold, between a virtuous scepticism (a rejection of legalism) and a rejection of 
cynicism, a rejection of the inevitability of institutional corruption, and a belief in the good 
of legality as a governing principle.93  
What is interesting in terms of understanding the requirements for instantiating a 
broader constitutionalist ethic in international society is Shklar’s argument that, in fact, the 
only reason this looks like such a difficult line to hold is because of the rationalist drive to 
systematize the tricky, slippery concepts of legality, authority, and obligation. Legality in 
particular entails both concepts and practical responsibilities which defy such easy 
simplification. There is no one right answer to the nature of the commitment implied by 
legality not because there is no essential core but because legality is, at its core, a 
fundamentally dispositional ethic.94 Law’s subjects, authors and enactors need to feel 
committed to the legal order if it is generate an effective claim to authority. The nature of 
this dispositional ethic comes out in one particularly revealing essay, as Shklar attempts to 
flesh out the requirements of obligation as opposed to the bonds of loyalty. To focus on the 
obligation, we’re told, is to understand authority as premised on the prevalence of rule-
governed conduct.95 But instead of focusing on the claim to obligation, she argues, the real 
work gets done by the concept, the practice, of loyalty. As Shklar puts it, ‘what distinguishes 
loyalty is that it is deeply affective and not primarily rational.’96 
This reflects Fuller’s emphasis on the need for a ‘sense of trusteeship’, or as Dicey – 
and Dyzenhaus – have put it a ‘culture of legality’, or as Hart (perhaps misleadingly) put it, a 
‘rule of recognition’, or as David Kennedy has put it, a ‘sense of responsibility’. All of these 
calls relate to the need – and the difficulty – of holding on to the motivation to act in pursuit 
                                                          
 
93 This is one of the central differences between Shklar and Arendt. For Shklar, the dangers of legalism cannot 
be resolved simply by appealing to the political domain. Arendt, in contrast, gives the political domain far 
greater scope to resolve the tensions connected with legal authority. The dangers of legalism justify a political 
constitutionalism.  Nevertheless, as Michael C. Williams argues, Arendt’s work never shakes off its ‘tone of 
despair’ because of its underlying scepticism about genuine progress; Williams, ‘Arendt and the international 
space in-between’, p. 201, in Lang and Williams (eds.), Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Readings 
Across the Lines, 2005  
94 For Shklar this emerged from her reading of Rousseau; here is a thinker whose justification of the state’s 
authority – that there are public institutions able to track the general will – seems, on the surface, to challenge 
individual liberty by  putting the community first. But Shklar rejects the communitarian reading of Rousseau, 
arguing that his scheme for advancing the common good relied on the presence of a virtuous public – and 
virtuous practitioners, servants of the public good – ready and willing to ensure that the institutions continue 
to rule for the common good. The signal for this is not in some imagined institutional criteria, but in the 
continued willingness to work for and through these institutions for the common good, a willingness to 
maintain and improve the capacity of these governing institutions to institutionalise their commitment to 
govern in the best interests of their citizens. 
95 ‘Obligation, loyalty, exile’, in Political Thought and Political Thinkers, p. 40-41 
96 ‘Obligation, loyalty, exile’, in Political Thought and Political Thinkers, p. 41 
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of the value of legality in circumstances of uncertainty. This dispositional element is an 
important aspect of resolving challenges to the capacity of legality to govern a constitutional 
order, but it is in many respects not clear how faith functions to justify a responsible practice 
of legality in a way that doesn’t simply replicate or double-down on the ambiguity 
surrounding legality, introducing an even more ambiguous and contested practice. This is to 
say that these various nods towards the importance of a dispositional ethic struggles to 
establish faith in the rule of law as an adequate, appropriate and justified response to the 
pragmatic concerns. This reliance on an uncertain and contested faith in law creates, as 
Dyzenhaus puts it, a reason for thinking that ‘those who value the rule of law and human 
rights should be greatly depressed.’97 Faith functions as an internal justification, something 
that can sustain ‘believers in the rule of law’ during times of crisis; but this kind of closed 
reasoning – this appeal to an inner morality – seems, at first glance, wholly unsuited as a 
response to the ethical framework motivating those who would challenge the constitutional 
ethic of legality.  
 Despite the acknowledgment among those writing on global constitutionalism that 
constitutionalism is at its core a mindset, there is no very great sense of how this mindset 
functions in practice to advance international law’s constitutional authority – and how it is 
able to sustain and institutionalize an alternative to the pragmatists contrasting mindset. This 
is not a problem specific to international law, but it is felt more keenly by international law 
where the ‘constitutional furniture’ is less than fully developed.98 The impact of this is felt 
most when international law is forced to confront its hard cases. In these circumstances, 
where the correct course of action is uncertain, where the practice of legality begs complex 
questions about the essential responsibilities attached to international legality, the fact there 
are competing mindsets, competing ethics of legality – and the fact that constitutionality 
requires a demanding faith in law – dictates both the limits and the possibility of 
international law governing international society. But it is not only the fact that there are 
competing ethics of legality which impacts international law’s capacity to rule, its capacity to 
resolve international society’s hard cases. Returning to the example of lawfare, it becomes 
possible to see how the problem this represents isn’t only that it gives political actors the 
power to determine what constitutes the responsible practice of legality, but that it feeds the 
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perception that the authority of international law is fundamentally a matter of perspective, 
rather than something that can be settled by elaborating on the existing principles of 
international law. To put this another way, this is an exercise in circularity which regards a 
practice like lawfare as both the evidence for an existing pragmatic perception of legality 
driving state practice and a practical argument for continuing to act from a pragmatic ethic. 
This is the ‘downward spiral’ that a constitutionalist ethic must find the resources to break, 
at least if it is to be regarded as a justified practice.  
 
Conclusion: Faith and the institution of responsibility 
 
The battle between the constitutional and pragmatic practices coalesces around competing 
conceptions of the essential responsibilities embedded in the institutional practices of a legal 
order. The problem structuring these two approaches to international legality is, at base, that 
they are motivated by very different conceptions of international law’s capacity to generate a 
coherent ethic of legality appropriate to decision-making in international society.  
In this regard, uncertainty – or, to use a more loaded term, crisis – is at the heart of 
international law’s constitutional politics. International law’s inability to resolve hard cases 
becomes in the first instance a challenge for the legal order to amend the governing 
conception of legality and, in the final instance, evidence for the ‘tragic’ limits of 
international legality and a justification for supplementing legality with principles and 
perspectives from outside of international law. In this way, pragmatism dismantles 
international law’s claim to constitutional authority by feeding the perception that, in order 
to ‘prove’ its constitutional authority, international law must first show a capacity to respond 
to ingrained pragmatic practices. This reflects Dyzenhaus’ observation that the real effect of 
lawfare like practices was not, as Sands has argued, the creation of a legal black hole, but in 
the creation of a ‘grey hole’, in the institutionalisation of uncertainty and ambiguity about the 
terms of law’s rule.99 At least the void left by a black hole can be readily observed. Its 
capacity to determine the institutional normative order for international society is 
undermined by its institutional weaknesses. Without actors with the authority to remedy or 
redress the crisis narrative, international society institutionalises an ethical disposition which 
understands international legality as fundamentally a matter of perspective, rather than as 
implying a necessary practice of responsibility.  
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In the next chapter I build on the idea that a practice of fidelity, or faith, or loyalty or 
whatever you want to call it flags a particular sense of responsibility essential to the 
commitment to legality. When this is understood as a motivated by the knowledge of the 
ambiguity and uncertainty of the institutional order, it becomes possible to see a practical 
basis for advancing a constitutionalist ethic of legality able to withstand the charge that the 
international order is fundamental, constitutionally, uncertainty.  
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Chapter 3 
Discovering faith in the rule of law 
 
Have faith and pursue the unknown end. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1 
 
 
Michael Glennon concludes his call for a pragmatic approach to international law by arguing 
that:  
‘The first task of international lawyers in this new global era, before they try to 
repopulate the new legal order with fresh rules and institutions, is to desacralize 
international law. They must disenthrall themselves of the remnants of the moralistic 
medievalist culture from which international law emerged and examine sceptically 
the basis of the rules and institutions that international law comprises. They must 
insist upon a foundation of empirical data, not deontological fantasy as a basis for 
new ones . . . The new rules and institutions, if they are to work better than the old 
ones, have to be grounded solidly on such research.’2  
 
The previous chapter showed, on the contrary, that the sequencing of evidence then a 
commitment to legality serves to reinforce the perception that the only responsible ethic is a 
pragmatic ethic, and in the process undermines the scope for international law to rule, to 
establish a fixed sense of the legitimate practice of international legality. As a result of 
premising the scope of the responsibility owed to international law on the need for rules to 
reflect the policy context, the idea of international legality is co-opted under the belief that 
the rule of international law is tainted by uncertainty, contingency and crisis.  
Countering this narrative is the central challenge facing attempts to justify the 
appropriateness of a constitutional ethic to international society. This chapter suggests that 
the core issue facing attempts to justify constitutionalism is one of ‘faith’ versus reason, and 
that constitutionalism can benefit from re-engaging with the “medievalist” culture of legality 
Glennon dismisses. The constitutionalist mindset, if it is to effectively challenges the 
pragmatic approach to international law, needs to better understand the role that a practice 
of faith has played in institutionalising the constitutionalist mindset.  
                                                          
 
1 Letter to Jingxiong Wu (1924), published in Harry Clair Shriver, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices 
and Uncollected Letters and Papers, 1936, p. 175. 
2 Glennon, The Fog of Law, p. 222-223 
 
 
83 
The argument is that there are three key reasons for focusing on the idea of “faith” 
in justifying constitutionalism. First, it highlights the importance of the aspiration for legality 
in justifying constitutionalist practice, as opposed the pragmatist focus on the empirical 
evidence limiting legality. Second, it highlights the idea that legality is itself a strategy for 
limiting the uncertainties surrounding the exercise of constitutional authority, of holding on 
to the commitment to legality as an ordering principle in spite of the practical challenges or 
limits this imposes on political decision-makers. Finally, a practice of faith results in an 
image of legality as justified through the virtuous pursuit of the core principles of 
constitutional order, through the exercise of public responsibilities. I conclude that, in 
contrast to pragmatist claims that a constitutional faith in legal rules is undermined by the 
political exercise of public responsibility, a degree of self-legitimation, of interiority, is – and 
historically has been – justified as a result of the underlying values being developed and 
protected through constitutionalism. I conclude that it is only by resacralizing international 
law, by rehabilitating the idea that international law expresses institutional values which 
should be protected even in conditions of uncertainty, that the constitutionalist image of 
international law make headway against the pragmatist.   
My aim here is not to resolve the competing claims of pragmatism and 
constitutionalism, but to show how the foothold that international law already has in the 
institutions of international society can be thought to carry practical normative weight, even 
in those circumstances of uncertainty where a pragmatist conception of legality might appear 
to be the only responsible option.  
 
The tragedy of faith  
 
Faith in international law is not an easy sell. The obvious problem with appealing to faith in 
law as the justification for legal authority, as Martti Koskenniemi argues, is that the 
profession of faith has both a heroic and tragic register. Koskenniemi uses the Old 
Testament story of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son to God as analogous to ‘the 
situation of the international lawyer in the face of the god of law.’3 In the traditional telling, 
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his willingness to act on his belief with no regard to the personal cost of his actions renders 
it a heroic act. And he was rewarded precisely because of his willingness to suffer the 
consequences of his faith. The heroic lesson is in his willingness to set aside personal, 
subjective values – even conventional social and moral values that would have condemned 
killing an innocent child as wrong – to trust to the superior judgement of an outside agency, 
and to construct his sense of responsibility from a belief in the superior judgement possessed 
by this outside agency. The more critical gloss, however, sees the willingness to sacrifice his 
son, the readiness to kill an innocent, as ‘the height of foolishness or dogmatic insanity’, 
both sad and dangerous, a tragic reminder of ‘the ease with which any of us might be led to 
complicity with cruelty induced by passive faith in authority and the bracketing of personal 
responsibility under an explanation of “just following the rules”’.4 Abraham is, to use the 
vernacular, a sucker.  
Resolving the tension between these two images of legality, for Koskenniemi, 
revolves around the certainty in the source of the command. Abraham had it, but from an 
outside perspective scepticism – and a pragmatic ethic of rule-following – looks like the far 
sounder proposition. This is doubly true for international law where there is plenty of 
available evidence for law’s human and institutional fallibility, of those occasions where a 
willingness to sacrifice in order to further the rule of international law, a willingness to set 
aside subjective interests for the common good of the international order, has generated 
hypocrisy and disappointment as the costs of obeying rises, as law is used to cloak power, 
and as other states fail to adopt the same level of commitment. Faith might have traction as 
a motivation and a justification at the personal level, but where it is presented as a publically 
authoritative reason for action, it is not unreasonable to require a better standard of proof 
that international law establishes a superior form of judgement to that established through 
the political life of sovereign states. In fact, as Koskenniemi argues, international lawyers 
tend to recognize the flaws in blindly believing in the virtue of international law, professing a 
strategic faith in the certainty and objectivity of international law while at the same time 
espousing a contrary belief that to play with the rules, to disagree about the rules, is a 
legitimate practice, a responsible practice because the nature of international legality is 
fundamentally contested. Once these tensions are cashed out, it becomes clear, he thinks, 
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that the institution of international law is a paper castle, the seat of a puppet authority.5 The 
problem this leaves for international law – and the entry point for a pragmatic ethic wanting 
to substitute a more complete, less defunct form of political judgement – is that ‘a 
purposeful determination to avoid being a sucker, we now know, if generalized to the 
human race, would subvert human sociality more or less in its entirety’.6  
This difficulty of using faith as a justification for the constitutional practice of 
international legality is compounded by the possible side-effects effects of faith. One of the 
dangers of acting from a sense of faith – in the law, or in other institutional actors – is that 
this entails adopting a sacrificial disposition – a willingness to suffer for your beliefs. The 
danger of this, of course, is that you get sacrificed as a result of your beliefs.7 There has been 
a recent effort within International Relations to try and accommodate these doubts, in 
arguing that trust can make sense in certain circumstances. The depth of social cooperation 
that can be justified through an appeal to trust has historically been limited by the tendency 
to conceptualise trust as a rational choice, based on an understanding of how a prospective 
partner is likely to act, and the likelihood that trust will be not result in harm.8 In explaining 
institutional cooperation, as Brian Rathbun argues, international relations theory has tended 
to over-emphasise the degree to which cooperation is premised on rational calculations, and 
as a result has missed alternative ways to respond to social uncertainty.9 Rathbun suggests 
instead that the role of trust in establishing social cooperation through treaty agreements and 
organizational formation is far better explained by the initial dispositions of the relevant actors 
– whether they regard their prospective partners as trustworthy. This is a decision based on 
an assessment of a partner’s integrity.10 There is a broader constitutional logic to trust as 
well: there can be ‘spirals of trust’ as well as ‘spirals of fear’, as a result of the fact that trust is 
a largely self-referential.11 So what might begin as a strategic decision to trust based on 
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perceptions of how a state will act and located within well-defined parameters can, over 
time, develop into a more generalized moral trust.   
 Some of the implication here for institutions such as international law or diplomacy 
– institutions in the English School sense, institutions as constitutional order – are fleshed 
out by Vincent Pouliot who, in addition to emphasising the dispositional element of trust 
points to the importance of the institutional culture in which trust is fostered as ‘the 
commonsensical way to go’ to become, eventually, a habitual practice.12 In his analysis a 
practice is simultaneously a description of a special type of knowledge (practical knowledge), 
often grounded through insider or professional experience (practitioner expertise), leading to 
a particular type of action (a practice) which is or is likely to become customary or 
conventional (the practice). As Pouliot argues, in order for a constitutional practice to 
emerge – and here he is focused on diplomacy rather than international law – a degree of 
social trust is necessary: there must be a practice of ‘believing despite uncertainty’. As he 
explains:  
‘As a background feeling, trust does not derive from instrumental calculations, norm 
compliance, or reasoned consensus: it is informed by the logic of practicality. The 
reasons why an agent trusts another are not readily verbalizable; they derive from 
tacit experience and an embodied history of social relations. Trust is practical 
sense.’13  
 
To adopt Koskenniemi’s terms, can this justify the ‘heroic’ vision of the rule of international 
law? It is difficult to see how the re-emphasis of international legality could function in this 
way, not if you take seriously the ambiguity surrounding the practice of legality in 
international society. This is to say that explaining the habitual persistence of social orders, 
as IR theory has sought to do, entrenches around the easy case rather than the hard case, or 
in Niklas Luhmann’s terms around an analysis of the basis of trust rather than the more 
tenuous issue of confidence in the object of trust. 14 This can be seen, for example, in the 
different attitudes that can be taken to the fragmentation of international law: this can either 
provide evidence of international law’s dynamism, its capacity to govern different domains 
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and manage any conflicts that arise, or it can be taken as evidence of the structural weakness 
of international law as law.15 The more interesting question this poses, at least where 
international law’s constitutional authority is concerned, is how to motivate, to generate, and 
to sustain this sense that trust in international law is not only a legitimate practice but the 
responsible practice in conditions of uncertainty.  
The more substantive reason for pointing to these limited attempts to make sense of 
trust as a reasonable disposition to adopt in international society is to flag, first, that this 
type of disposition is not necessarily irresponsible. State leaders and their agents can and have 
acted from a sense of the trustworthiness of their partners, from a generalized trust in the 
value of a cooperative organisation, and from a habituated sense of trust as the common-
sense practice. But at the core of these accounts is an assumption that this trust is generated 
through customary practices or dispositions. Trust is the result of a clear and unambiguous 
sense of the way to act or the ‘modality of action’.16 The definition of trust in this regard 
needs to be qualified. Trust is, first, believing despite uncertainty about the motives of other actors. 
Second, trust is believing from certainty about the norms guiding practice.17  
 As the previous chapter argued, this certainty, this sense of confidence in 
international law’s constitutional authority, is undermined through the ethic of pragmatism 
that presents international law’s constitutional authority as fundamentally ambiguous. In this 
regard, lawfare and the hard case is represents for international law’s claim to constitutional 
authority backs up Koskenniemi’s claim that the institution of international law is too weak 
to reconcile the heroic and tragic registers. Faith may be a conceptually viable option for 
grounding the commitment to international law but, in practice, sacrifice is not likely to be a 
persuasive option (i.e. austerity measures don’t win votes). A strategy of “bringing the 
unbelievers on board”, as Kirsten Ainley has put it to me, is unlikely to be persuasive, at 
least not without some degree of violence.  
 What I want to suggest in this chapter, however, is that this perspective on the 
irrationality of faith in law in conditions of uncertainty (or, to put it in Schmittian terms, the 
requirement of retrenching around a faith in the political order in circumstances of 
uncertainty)18 is the product of a modern idea of constitutional authority, as the product of 
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natural rights, consent and rationality, in which fidelity to the law as sustained and justified 
by its protection of the popular right to revolution. I want to argue that this displaced an 
earlier and potentially richer conception of faith in the law, as the product of natural order 
and as an explicit strategy protecting against uncertainty. Rehabilitating this earlier 
republican strand of thinking about the commitments required to make sense of the 
responsibilities entailed by uncertainty can begin to justify the idea of faith in international 
law as a responsible practice, despite the pragmatists’ attempts to close down the space for 
such a disposition. This is to argue that maintaining an aspirational faith in the rule of law as 
a part of virtuous leadership was, in this tradition, part of the entry requirement for engaging 
in the legitimate exercise of public responsibility. More simply, faith was not a tragic 
practice, neither was it a heroic practice; it was instead a virtuous practice.  
 
Reason, rationalism and consensualism: faith as trust 
  
International law’s efforts to generate a clear sense of the responsibilities it requires from 
those committed to the ideal of legality is not a new phenomenon, but it is a modern 
phenomenon. This is to say that the current anxiety surrounding international law is a 
consequence of the rise of the modern liberal state and the effect this had on the law of 
nations as a coherent source of international authority.19 My claim in this section is that it 
was in trying to explain the rational basis for the authority of the law of nations – and the 
law of nature, because this division itself was a product of liberal modernity – that 
international law first lost its constitutional authority. To put this another way, the reason 
the idea of faith in international law causes such anxiety is the same reason faith in the rule 
of law caused such anxiety: both are the product of a liberal framing of the nature and limits 
of political authority. The difference is one of constitutional form, or ‘furniture’:20 whereas 
states were able to evolve their existing domestic institutional orders21 to fit the new 
ideological context that culminated in the Enlightenment, no such institutional architecture 
existed for the law of nations. The emphasis on custom as the source of the law of nations 
                                                          
 
19 Note however that the slipperiness of both liberalism and its relationship to the emergence of the modern 
state gives rise to inevitable differences over both the crucial moment and the key conceptual shift; 
nevertheless, see Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, 2005, p. 5 [he ties the emergence of an exceptionalist 
narrative to ‘the creation of the democratic revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one’] 
20 Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law, p. 233 
21 Giving an excellent sense of the continuity in these institutions, at least in the British common law context, 
see Bingham, The Rule of Law, p. 5-18 
 
 
89 
emerged as, in effect, an accidental result of having gotten rid of the basis of authority 
granted by the natural law and not really having had any available institutions or ideas capable 
of filling the double gap created by the genesis of nation-states as a protected form of 
political authority and a concurrent idea of the international as a distinct domain requiring a 
new form of authority equally capable of reflecting an ideological vision centred on the 
image of the rational, autonomous individual providing the source for their own political 
freedom.22 Where no coherent alternative was forthcoming, empire and, eventually, nation-
states adopted this image of the rational individual as the justification for their own practical 
authority to this domain. It was in this guise that customary practice filled the void left by 
the demise of a medieval constitutionalist mindset, an imperfect fit that would be frame the 
positivistic conception of legality that was eventually institutionalised in the late 19th 
century.23     
This argument is in danger of running ahead of itself however. In order to 
understand how international society came to internalise this conception of legality, with all 
the ambiguities it fosters in the practice of international legality, it is important to 
understand the context for the shift to liberal ideas of the rule of law. There is no bright line 
between the ancient world and “liberal modernity”, just as there is no definitive starting date 
for international law. Indeed, some have argued that the concept of international law – as a 
form of extraterritorial authority – tracks back to the earliest written records. But there is a 
clear sense that the modern idea of international law emerged at some point during the 
ideological shifts during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, as the solidarism wrought by the 
Roman empire and continued through the Christian world fragmented into competing 
claims to political authority before eventually resolving into the territorial nation-state.24 
Hugo Grotius stands in as someone who inherited earlier changes in the law of nations, in 
particular those ushered in by the Salamanca School under the pressure of having to update 
the conception of the natural law in order to meet the questions posed by colonial 
expansionism – in particular the ‘novel problem of the Indians’.25 These changes opened up 
questions about the nature of the sovereign, and the scope of ‘dominium’ or sovereign 
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authority.26 But his ideas can also be regarded as a kind of tipping point for the natural law 
tradition. This is in part why Grotius is charged with being a ‘sorry comforter’ of sovereign 
power undermining the resources available to challenge the status quo, blurring together the 
customary practices embodied in the law of nations with the moral obligations inherent in 
the law of nature and, at the same time, confounding the existing understanding of how the 
natural law worked to limit the extent of sovereign authority.27  
What was this existing understanding of the natural law, this strong justification for 
international authority, that was displaced? For some, the natural law tradition provided an 
essentially cosmopolitan framework, establishing rules that could claim to be universally 
valuable without reference to any particular social context.28 As Robert Jackson argues, this 
is necessary connected to ‘the notion that humans are social creatures who must live 
together but in order to do that in a morally defensible way they must recognise and respect 
each other as equal members of the community of humankind’.29 The danger of this gloss is 
that it gives the mistaken impression that natural law was at its core concerned with 
protecting humanity, where in reality the primary concern was preserving social order. A 
better way to explain natural law – and to understand what was lost during this epochal 
transition – is as setting out a particular conception right reason – or an idea about what it 
meant to reason rightly – in the process of exercising public authority. In the natural law 
tradition this did not refer to getting it right absolutely, or a capacity to know some objective 
truth. Objective truth really was a matter for God or the gods, something impossible to 
achieve constrained by a fundamentally imperfect human nature. The claim instead was that 
pursuing the value of good order required that the person (or institution) in authority had a 
capacity to reason their way to an understanding of the universal and essential; principles of 
natural law. This builds on the Aristotelian idea of the rule of law as bringing the political 
order into line with the natural order, with the constitutional law functioning to ensure rule 
by ‘reason unaffected by desire’.30 Similarly, for Cicero, natural law was ‘right reason in 
                                                          
 
26 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and International Law: The real Spanish contribution’, 2011, available at 
www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/MkToronto.pdf  
27 Amanda Perreau-Saussine, ‘Immanuel Kant on International Law’, in Amanda Perreau-Saussine and John 
Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2010) 
28 Hedley Bull, ‘Natural law and International Relations’, British journal of International Studies 5 (1979), p. 171 
29 Robert Jackson, ‘Jurisprudence for a Solidarist World: Richard Falk’s Grotian Moment’, in Jackson, Classical 
and Modern Thought on International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan: 2005, p. 127 
30 Aristotle, Politics, bk, III, ch.16, 1287a; this doesn’t do justice to the full idea: ‘[T]he arbitrary rule of a 
sovereign over all citizens in a city which consists of equals, is thought by some to be quite contrary to nature; . 
. . That is why it is thought to be just that among equals everyone be ruled as well as rule, and therefore that all 
should have their turn. And the rule of law, it is argued, is preferable to that of any individual. On the same 
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agreement with nature’, where the justification for law stemmed from a natural, human 
instinct towards justice.31 These ideas shaped natural law thinking which, at least for those 
thinkers concerned with the law of nations, took its cue from the thinking of St. Thomas 
Aquinas.32 One way of looking at Aquinas’ thought is to see it as offering, as Fuller suggests, 
its own idea of the inner morality of law, and generating a claim to authority on the back of 
this.33 A state’s positive laws must reflect the principles of good order contained in our 
understanding of the natural law. It is here that the injunction to preserve good order 
required a particular type of institutional order: a corrupt human nature diminishes the 
capacity to choose wisely, to understand and pursue the best course of action. It because 
realising the natural order relied on a ruler being able to interpret the natural law in the right 
way that he put such focus on the need for those in power to cultivate personal virtue, or a 
virtuous form of reasoning. This is to say that the natural law tradition wasn’t defined by its 
appeal to, as it has been put, some ‘brooding omnipresence in the skies’, as Oliver Wendell 
Holmes once put it, but by the responsibility of a ruler to act in the pursuit of good order. 
The natural law emerges from the understanding that among right thinking individuals there 
will be a degree of coherence in those actions understood to be both necessary and justified 
in the pursuit of a good, stable order. This coherence comes from a common ‘habit of 
virtue’ among those applying the natural law.34  
It is in this respect that Richard Tuck’s characterisation of Grotius as providing ‘a 
manifesto for a new science of morality’ become important.35 Tuck argues that Grotius is 
the turning point for the justification of political authority because, although speaking in the 
medieval language of natural law, under the influence of rationalism and the drive to codify 
right reasons his emphasis shifted from a concern with the right way to interpret the natural 
law so as to preserve and protect natural order to a concern with the natural rights that an 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
principle, even if it be better for certain individuals to govern, they should be made only guardians and 
ministers of the law . . . Therefore he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, 
but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast, for desire is a wild beast and passion perverts the 
minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire’.  
31  Cicero, On the Commonwealth, III.33 
32 Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and International Law’ 2011; see also John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2011 (1980)  
33 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 1968, p. 261 
34 Much attention has been paid to Aquinas’ cardinal virtues – those of prudence, temperance, courage and 
justice – and the type of ethical judgement or ethical discourse this entails.  And yet, for Aquinas, it was the 
theological virtues that took priority. These theological virtues of faith, hope and charity sustain and fill out the 
‘cardinal virtues’ of prudence, temperance, courage and justice, the virtues that govern our day to day actions 
and decisions. The theological virtues cultivates a habit of virtue. 
35 Richard Tuck, Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 2000) 
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actor could claim as a result of their interpretation of the natural law.36 Although he 
approaches natural law in much the same way as his predecessors, as a dictate of right 
reason, Tuck argues that Grotius detached the natural law assumption that right reason 
provided the authority to act from the institution of the state, and away from a commitment 
to political rule. Grotius instead presents a right to claim the authority provided by natural 
law as a property of all moral persons, a moral quality, a faculty or an aptitude that allowed 
an individual to act with justice. Similarly, Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury 
characterise Grotius as representing a move within natural law theorizing from objective 
right to subjective right, from seeing natural law as  concerned with the general conditions 
necessary for the exercise of political authority, to a concern with articulating the rights or 
capabilities that the individual could legitimately claim against the state, and indeed 
independently of the state.37 This comes out of Grotius’ attempt to justify the actions of the 
Dutch privateers. Grotius argued that individuals had a right to make war and punish others 
for breaches of the natural law. They didn’t need to have the cover of state authority, they 
didn’t need to be able to claim a right to rule in order to be able to use force legitimately. All 
that was required is that there had been a breach of the natural law, in particular the natural 
right of self-preservation. This right to punish breaches of the natural law was, not the 
preserve of the ruler but rather the right of all human beings. The central conclusion he 
draws from this is that our actions should in no way need to be justified with reference to 
the state; actions are moral and hence justified simply by virtue of being directed to self-
preservation or to redress some violation of the natural law.  
The effect of this is that despite holding out a commitment to law’s capacity to order 
international society, Grotius undermines the existing basis for certainty about the 
normative justification for the ordering function.38 But again, the anxiety this generates and 
the shift it unleashes in the established bases of international legal order is not immediately 
clear, or immediately attributable to Grotius. For example, Hersch Lauterpacht argues that 
Grotius appeals as a source for a progressive liberal internationalism because of his ‘faith in 
                                                          
 
36 See however Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, (Scholars Press: 1997) [arguing that Grotius was far less 
bothered by the challenge of epistemological scepticism, had far more religion in his thought, and was covering 
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37 Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, ‘Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations,’ in Bull 
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the rational constitution of man and his capacity to see reason and learn from experience’.39 
It is this liberal faith in the ‘power of man as a rational social being’ which allows a sense of 
moral obligation to triumph ‘over unbridled selfishness and passion, both within the state 
and in the relations of states’.40 Grotius in other words is seen to package an image of the 
international as ordered through the conjunction of the reasonableness of states with authority 
of the natural law.41 States are governed by the law of nations both by virtue of their 
customary consent to the law of nations and by the law of nature.42 This was the context 
that Grotius regards the moral commitment to preserve the binding force of treaties as the 
basis for international law, as indeed for municipal law, and sees the obligations of promise-
keeping, good-faith and pacta sunt servanda as principal tenets of the law of nature to be 
upheld by any ruler, in all circumstances.43  
But this appeal to and reliance on the power of rationality would reverberate to 
institutionalise a belief that constitutional authority must ultimately be generated through 
those processes governed by individual rationality, namely consent, custom and contract.44 
Whereas the idea of international law had traditionally been buttressed by a certainty about 
the acceptance of some form of authority being a necessary requirement for ruling - a 
fundamental part of a ruler’s commitment to the natural law – the introduction of a 
subjective right, authority divorced from the responsibilities of political rule, in effect 
politicized the form of authority generated by the natural law. If anyone can apply the 
natural law, how could it provide order? And if the answer is that order comes from custom, 
where does the normative imperative lie? How does custom generate the deep practical 
                                                          
 
39 Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 British Yearbook of International Law 1 (1946) p. 
25.  
40 Ibid, p. 26; see also Christoph A. Stumpf, The Grotian Theology of International Law: Hugo Grotius and the moral 
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41 Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p. 19 - 21  
42 Charles Covell The Law of Nations in political Thought: A Critical Survey from Vitoria to Hegel, 2009, p. 60 [arguing 
that it is in this respect that the law of nations emerges as a form of positive or voluntary law distinct from the 
law of nature.]  
43 Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition’, p. 42 
44 See Koskenniemi’s most recent work on international law’s three “deaths”, forthcoming.  
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commitment needed to ensure adherence to the rules?45 As Mary Ellen O’Connell puts it, 
‘The fact that natural law is derived from revelation and/or reason presents a problem about 
reaching consensus as to what the law is once the authority of the priest or the pope was 
lost.’46 
If Grotius had turned the handle, Hobbes kicked down the door for the idea that 
individual rationality and natural right could generate the necessary commitment to political 
authority. Hobbes consolidated the shift from natural law to natural right, although here 
again his arguments are more complex and nuanced than they are often credited with, and 
their effect on reframing the terms of the conceptual challenge represented by the 
justification of political authority owes as much to the way he has been read as to the 
arguments he actually makes.47 Nevertheless, the reason Hobbes’ arguments are important 
for understanding how faith in the authority of law came to be regarded as a threat to 
political order, rather than a solution, was that the crucial challenge motivating Hobbes was 
that that England’s singular political order had collapsed in the face of divided loyalties. The 
inability to reconcile the competing faiths of Catholic and Protestants through reason had 
led to a breakdown of political order and security, to ‘the miseries, and horrible calamities, 
that accompany a Civill Warre’.  
This led Hobbes to argue that there was a reciprocal relationship between obedience 
and stability: an unconditional acceptance of a sovereign’s absolute authority provided 
security; its absence entailed insecurity. For Hobbes the good of order and certainty covered 
a multitude of sins on the part of the sovereign. In his famous analogy, if a highway robber 
asks you for your money or your life, you are free to choose which you would like to give 
up. The rational individual will choose to part with their money rather than their life. 
Likewise, when the state asks whether you wish to part with your natural liberty in exchange 
                                                          
 
45 Recognizing the danger here, Gentili, writing in the 16th Century, had tried to reject the use of custom as the 
basis for international authority out of a fear that this would make the law of nations changeable and indefinite, 
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for political security, you have a free choice to make, but the degree to which the benefits 
from contracting into and committing to the state outweigh the costs of retaining your 
natural liberty makes choosing the liberty of the state of nature the fools choice.48 In 
contrast to the classical tradition which regarded the political and social order as an 
extension of the natural order, for Hobbes the point of contracting in to the sovereign’s 
authority was to provide a fix, a patch, a remedy to the otherwise ‘solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short’ experience in the state of nature, to the state of war, conflict and 
uncertainty. It was only by granting individuals the space to recognize this that a crisis of 
legitimacies could be avoided.  
But there is another image of Hobbes that speaks to the ambiguities created by the 
emphasis on the rational justification of political authority, in some measure of consent, real 
or implied. Whereas in the natural law tradition it had been enough that political institutions 
act for the people, the effort of avoiding a clash of legitimacies entrenched around the idea 
that ruling institutions also had to be legitimated by the people. At one level, Hobbes’ 
conception of public authority rests on an understanding of the principles of legality – non-
arbitrary rule in particular – establishing the terms of the relationship between the sovereign 
and the people. It protects and institutionalises the reciprocal basis on which an individual 
gives up their natural rights. As Evan Fox-Decent argues, the operation of legality in this 
relationship is premised on a presumption of trust rather than consent, and that this 
establishes the constitutional function of legality, as a protection against the sovereign 
violating the terms of the social contract. If a sovereign violates these principles of legality, 
he is in effect subverting the basis for his both own authority and the people’s obligation to 
obey, because he violates the terms on which the people have decided to trust the 
sovereign’s capacity to provide order.49 This tempers the degree to which Hobbes can be 
seen as an apologist for absolutism, instead suggesting a degree to which sovereign authority 
had to be, ultimately, owned by the people, even if exercising by an absolutist government. 
This, as Hobbes contemporary Bishop Bramhall would put it, suggests that an image of 
Hobbes’ Leviathan as a ‘rebel’s catechism’.50  
These two pictures of Hobbes as an absolutist and as revolutionary set the tone for 
subsequent liberal anxieties about the right to revolution, about the legitimate form of civil 
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disobedience, about the justified limits on civil liberties, about the effect of law on individual 
liberty, about the limits and excesses of sovereign power and the general scope and nature of 
political obligation became sources of practical anxiety and dispute, rather than questions 
that could be bookended under the more fundamental responsibility to provide good order. 
But these anxieties were largely managed by the existence of a sovereign order, with a 
disposition to trust and a practical sense of political obligation sustained through the 
institutions and practices of the state.51 There were occasional breakdowns, revolutions, civil 
wars and civil disobedience, but these were able to be excised as the exception, not the 
norm.52 This is to say that the language of exceptionalism – if not the underlying practice, 
which is tied to the much older tradition of martial law53 – was necessarily tied to the 
modern state, for the simple reason that trust was habituated through a social practice of 
believing the law to be legitimate54 and a general certainty about the nature of both the norm 
and the exception guiding the conditions under which citizens could legitimately give or 
withhold their consent.55 
 But this conception of trust, or faith as trust, has important knock-in consequences 
for the law of nations and the forms of authority that were regarded as appropriate to the 
international order, because the traditional source for certainty about the essence of this 
commitment to the natural order no longer existed. As Michael Williams argues, this was the 
consequence of Hobbes’ ‘engagement with scepticism [about political knowledge] and the 
limits of political order, and his attempt to provide a renewed understanding (and cultural 
practice) of subjectivity and sovereignty that would allow a maximum degree of autonomy . . 
. both within and between states’, and it was this idea that would ring the changes to the 
international order.56 But the forces mediating and limiting this claim to autonomy at the 
domestic level, namely trust, did not function in the same way at the international level, 
shading far more readily into mistrust and a lack of confidence in the international order, to 
be replaced by an strategy of trusting oneself, self-belief. This is to say that motivational 
force of trust in the international context resolved into a commitment to customary law, 
which in turn reinforced the idea that there was no superior authority and no superior 
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responsibility than that possessed and defined by the sovereign through their habitual 
practices, even if those practices generated ambiguity and uncertainty. The prior natural law 
assumption justifying the authority of the law of nations that international decisions were 
made from a common perception about the nature of good order were displaced by a 
pseudo-science of reason of state,57 which in turn bolstered the perception that political 
authority was the only type of constitutional authority appropriate to the international order. 
In stark contrast to the domestic realm, state practice did not entail trust in international 
forms of authority, and in the space left behind inserted a pragmatic ethic of international 
law that constructed the constitutional politics of international law as, to use John Dunn’s 
phrase, ‘a sorry blend of immediate impotence and protracted disappointment.’58 
 
Republican virtues and natural orders: faith as responsibility  
 
By now this story in which pragmatism attacks the constitutionalist ethic should be familiar. 
What I want to argue in this section is that there is a more robust understanding of trust – 
trust as faith – that can establish a sense of certainty able to respond to the pragmatic 
scepticism about the level of responsibility that can be generated by a commitment to 
legality in circumstances of constitutional uncertainty.59 To put this another way, this is to 
say that behind the story traditionally told in international relations and international law 
about the demise of natural law and the rise of natural right, this effected a parallel and 
potentially more fundamental transition from a republican conception of trust as a public 
response to uncertainty to a liberal conception of trust as a private response to uncertainty.  
 The republican influence on international law and the law of nations has been noted 
many times before. Mortimer Sellers, for example, has argued that republican principles 
both lie at the foundation of modern international law and can best explain the conceptual 
framework through which modern international law justifies its claims to bind sovereign 
states.60 He regards the core of the republican idea as the premise that ‘ international society 
exists for the common good of its subjects’.61 Nicholas Onuf has drawn similar inferences 
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from the existence of a republican tradition of international thought, emphasizing how the 
basic values of republicanism – the rule of law, political participation, constitutional 
government, a particular conception of liberty as non-domination – created a standard of 
political authority premised on the value of being part of a common community, values 
which sustained forms of authority that didn’t rely on the institution of the state.62 Samantha 
Besson has recently gone even further, explicitly positioning republicanism as a tradition 
capable of strengthening the conceptual framework for the constitutionalization of 
international law which, she suggests, revolves around the idea that there exists ‘an 
international community with shared objectives and universal interests and institutions to 
promote those interests’ yet has suffered from vagueness and indeterminacy when it comes 
to specifying the nature of these shared understandings.63 In this regard she argues that 
republicanism can sustain a call for the democratization of international law, as part of an 
attempt to resolve ‘the legitimacy chain of international law-making’ and in turn help the 
subjects of international law to appreciate the full extent of their common interests and how 
best to protect these interests.64  
Missing from these accounts, however, is an idea of how the broad scope of 
republican commitments, including the rule of law, have been constituted to as a reaction to 
the indeterminacy of the social order.65 This has been a key feature of, for example, 
republican interpretations of how Machiavelli’s injunction that a leader must have virtù 
establishes a basis for republican institutions as the uncertainty of fickleness of fortuna forces 
the virtuous leader to look outside of his own virtù to broader forms of civic virtue as 
providing a more resilient source of order, security and certainty. But I want to look to 
different source, partly because Machiavelli’s ideas carry a lot of baggage in international 
thought, but partly because the earlier republican ideas of St. Augustine were even more 
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closely structured around the problem of the ethic appropriate to circumstance of 
uncertainty.66  
The root conception of faith here, faith as a responsible rather than tragic practice, 
can be seen in Augustine’s approach to the pluralistic circumstances of politics, and his 
argument that in spite of a full appreciation of pluralism as an essential and inescapable 
social fact, a solidarist ethic could be justified. For Augustine our confidence in reality – and 
with this the possibility of a progressive politics – was conditioned by ‘our restless heart’.67 
Constitutional authority – the capacity to create the institutional order anew, the capacity of 
the existing order to react to the need to change – was locked in a battle framed by the 
human incapacity to perceive an objective account of the good, one that could be fully shared 
by all members of a political community. When aggregated as part of a society, our 
individual failures to perceive a common truth generate a lack of social objectivity, 
establishing a pessimistic view of politics as continual and inevitable conflict over the values 
which ought to be pursued as part of a community. To explain why this realisation doesn’t 
justify nihilism, however, Augustine appeals to faith.  
Augustine, in full Aristotelian mode, contrasts the justification of dominium in two 
sorts of household: those living by faith and those not. Both households act from a degree 
of necessity – to put food on the table and the like – but the ends for which these 
households are constituted are fundamentally different. The household living by faith is 
driven by hope for a future happiness, a peace that far exceeds anything that could be gotten 
from their present circumstances. The other type of household is satisfied with the 
contingent, temporal good that is set before them. (Pared down, this is Aesop’s fable of the 
ant and the grasshopper). Augustine argues that this provides an analogy for understanding 
the difference between the earthly city and the City of God: the earthly city ‘does not live by 
faith but desires earthly peace’ and therefore takes ‘the ordered harmony of commanding 
and obeying among citizens’  as the source of the unity needed to provide for earthly goods 
of security and well-being.68 The City of God provides for a unity, a genuine community, 
where there is no difference - and hence no possibility for conflict or strife – between 
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individual human wills and desires: ‘the perfection of our unity . . . will be that everyone’s 
thoughts will not be hidden from one another nor in conflict among themselves on any 
point’.69 At one level this was a call to live a good Christian life, in the hope of gaining entry 
to the City of God where there would be genuine community. This can be read as evidence 
of Augustine’s unyielding pessimism about the good of politics in this life. And yet, as 
Phillip Cary argues, to leave it at this misses the more crucial point: the interesting thing 
about Augustine is that his recognition of pluralism didn’t resolve into a justification for 
cynicism and passivity; it served as a call to arms.70 
Augustine’s response to pluralism was a call to impose a contingent form of good 
order on a pluralistic world, because, human nature being what it was, good order would not 
naturally, organically emerge. It was for this reason that Hannah Arendt characterised 
Augustine as ‘the first philosopher of the will’.71 As Jean Bethke Elshtain argues, a large of 
the appeal of Augustine is his unwillingness to hide behind impossible hopes or utopian 
dreams. Augustine, as she puts it, ‘is second to none in cataloguing the discontents of the 
“earthly city”. No elegant theory of justice; no morally edifying paean to discourse theory; 
no high-minded appeal to cosmopolitanism over and above ‘lesser’ or ‘lower’ loyalties is 
going to blanket the globe with a warm layering of normativity. The effort to make more 
sturdy a regime of international human rights tells this tale, surely.’72 What is crucial as far as 
the attitude appropriate to international law is concerned, is that the act of struggling against 
pluralism carries normative weight; battling to craft a point of solidarity, being willing to 
accept the “taint of contingency”73 is a virtuous alternative to the cynicism that results from 
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the enlightenment hope in rationalism’s power to resolve all questions of legal and political 
authority.  
Although Augustine, in stark contrast to Aristotle (and Aquinas), saw ‘all politics as 
unnatural, pervaded as it is with servitude and domination’, he did not exclude the possibility 
of those with faith from making a positive contribution to the promotion of peace in this 
life.74 For Cary, an Augustinian politics revolves around ‘the promotion of the peace of the 
earthly city’.75 This is not to say that the promotion of peace and order and harmony is a 
natural thing – Augustine is far too pessimistic about the venality of human nature to admit 
that – but it is a good thing. As Robert Markus characterises Augustine’s idea, it is that the 
institutional order offers hope for containing ‘the disorder and the tensions inevitably 
present in any society of sinful men’.76 
Rather than providing a scientific understanding of the nature of legal and political 
authority, Augustine provides an insight into the ‘art of the possible’ in circumstances where 
a truly decontested meaning is impossible.77 In this process of carving out a point of 
solidarity, reasoning about the uncertain nature of the social order and faith become 
complementary forces, pushing and pulling us towards an understanding of the good.78 In 
this way, Augustine also points towards an ethical attitude appropriate to “discerning the 
mystery” of global constitutionalism. This is not the passive faith that Koskenniemi 
criticizes, but an active faith informed by the need to protect, preserve and advance the 
value of legality as a check on the ‘downward spiral’ generated by the pressures of political 
rule, by the difficulty of holding on to the value of legality in a realm beset by the competing 
conceptions of the appropriate response to uncertainty. This provides a strategy for 
justifying legality as a responsible practice, the outgrowth of a particular type of faith, a faith 
premised on a commitment to privilege public responsibilities over private desires, a 
commitment to sacrifice for the good of the community. At the core of this is an idea that 
faith is a strategy for making peace with the inbuilt uncertainty of the natural order; for 
developing a point of solidarity in a world where pluralism is an established fact. As Aquinas 
would later put this, belief is ‘giving assent to something one is still thinking about’. Faith is 
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something that follows from asking questions about the nature of reality; faith is the act of 
coming to terms with the uncertainty of the answers. It is only once ontological uncertainty 
has been accepted as a background fact that a prudential attitude, for one, will be lead to an 
appreciation of the virtuous course of action.79   
What does this mean in practice? It suggests that justifying faith in law is connected 
to the public responsibilities actors have in establishing in a constitutional order. Augustine 
expresses this in his argument that faith, when combined with spirituality, can bring a 
practical unity to a community of believers.80 In this, Augustine connects the good of 
institutional authority to the capacity to both act from a commitment to the public good and 
to be enlarged through the practice of ruling.81 Leadership comes from a love for the 
community, rather than from a desire for power, from a paternalistic desire to care for and 
exercise responsibility over the community. This, as Thomas Martin argues, has two effects: 
the exercise of authority becomes legitimated both through sacrifice, a sacrifice made out of 
a love for the community and, second, the exercise of authority becomes a form of mercy, 
because in taking on authority the leader is accepting responsibility for the consequences of 
that leadership. This establishes an ethic of responsibility centred on the idea that, as 
Thomas Smith argues, ‘political authority serves rather than is served; it exists to coordinate 
the practices of a whole community in a way that fosters genuine flourishing of every part 
rather than the aggrandizement of the ruling part. This requires an extraordinarily difficult 
degree of spirituality because it requires turning away from the temptation of using one’s 
office as an opportunity to pile up power and glory for oneself and one’s cronies.’82 But it is 
in this act of turning away from the easy option that leadership becomes virtuous.  
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This concept of faith as responsibility is important to the constitutionalist approach 
not because it justifies ‘bringing the unbelievers on board’ but for the far more basic reason 
that it makes sense of the constitutionalist practice as a responsible practice. It establishes a 
justificatory framework for a belief in international law’s constitutional authority that doesn’t 
immediately collapse in the face of evidence for the weakness or failures or ambiguities of 
international law. This Augustinian tradition provides a starting point for thinking about the 
uncertainty surrounding the practice of international law as itself a justification for 
constitutionalism, rather as a consideration serving to institutionalise international law’s 
limitations. The idea of faith in law denotes a practice of belief that is strengthened through 
rather than eroded by the pressure of uncertainty.  
 
From the pre-modern to the present day 
 
This tradition has parallels in the development of the pluralist and solidarist ethics, 
which will help to bring this medieval conception of faith to bear on the current challenges 
facing the constitutionalist perspective. Indeed, according to one commentator, there a 
distinct ‘Augustinian moment’ that helped distinguish this approach to international 
politics.83 This Augustinian tradition can be used to explain – or, better, make peace with – 
the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the constitutionalist approach to international 
law.  
There is a sense here that the crucial opposition for the constitutionalist to 
overcome isn’t between faith in international law and scepticism about international law but 
between faith and fear, fear in the consequences of believing in international law’s 
authority.84 This in fact is the line that Herbert Butterfield advances, warning against the 
debilitating impact of fear. In a wonderfully florid argument he flags his particular concern 
as the impact of ‘a generalized fear that is no longer conscious of being fear, and hangs 
about in the form of oppressive dullness or a heavy cloud, as though the snail had retreated 
into its shell and forgotten the reason, but had not the spirit to put out its feelers any 
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more’.85 This fear, and the anxiety it generates, stifles the possibility of positive, productive 
change. He doesn’t go so far as to herald faith as a magic bullet – he regards fear as far too 
entrenched, and far too institutionalised, an emotion for that. But even so, he writes that 
‘there comes a moment when it is a healthy thing to pull every cord tight and make an 
affirmation of the higher human will. When we seem caught in a relentless historical 
process, our machines enslaving us, and our weapons turning against us, we must certainly 
not expect to escape save by an unusual assertion of the human spirit.’86 Where the challenge 
is to find a way to get a purchase on establishing productive directions for international 
relations, Butterfield finds comfort in his personal experience of faith. Faith is part of a 
strategy for exercising responsible judgement in a hard case, for owning the responsibility to 
judge where the decision has severe consequences. 
Martin Wight, one early member of the English School, was also heavily influenced 
by both his personal faith and the Augustinian tradition.87 Scott Thomas argues that his 
mature scepticism regarding the possibility of human progress in international relations 
reflected the sense that his early liberal faith had been betrayed and shown to be false with 
the failure of the League of Nations. His realism was grounded in his analysis that the kind 
of prophetic attitudes he and other liberals had bought into hadn’t given sufficient weight to 
the hollowness of obligation in international relations.88 In this regard Wight’s pluralism was 
premised on the belief that a realistic assessment of the scope of political progress needed to 
come before the institutions of international society could generate the sense of commitment 
needed to claim authority. While not impossible, faith in a progressive politics needed to be 
grounded in a realistic assessment of the available avenues and institutions that could 
instantiation such a progressive politics. With all the evidence that international society 
lacked any widespread sense of a moral obligation to obey international law, a politics of 
scepticism was the only reasonable, realistic disposition.89  
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One of the effects of this anxiety about a betrayal of faith is that Wight and others 
writing in this Augustinian vein tended to regard hope in progress as a private, theological 
virtue.90 The exercise of responsible decision-making in the public realm required a more 
hard-headed, evidence-driven practice. Bookending this hope in progress was, however, 
easier for Wight, as an academic. He was not in a position of having to decide on hard cases, 
having to decide whether to act from hope or scepticism. I have already discussed the way 
that Hersch Lauterpacht and others were motivated by their practical, institutional roles as 
much as by the conceptual challenge of making sense of international law’s capacity to rule 
in international society. Dag Hammarskjöld provides another practitioner perspective, 
grounded even more explicitly on the constitutional function of faith, a perspective shaped 
with his direct engagement with medieval Christian thought. Although extremely protective 
of the personal nature of his religious faith, he was drawn to defend the relevance of 
international law and role of the international civil servant as grounded in a faith in the 
possibility of progress. He argued that it wasn’t the fact of progress but the possibility, and 
the act of striving for progress, that mattered. There was an essentially aspirational quality 
about the international institutional order, and this made him, paradoxically perhaps, more 
willing to bear the disappointments, failures and intransigence of international politics. The 
role of international institutions and of international law was not to achieve, but to strive, to 
aspire.91 It was to provide a home for what he called a ‘fighting optimism’. As he argued, ‘we 
have learned [this fighting optimism] the hard way, and we will certainly have to learn it 
again and again and again’.92   
What Hammarskjöld’s example highlights is faith generates an ethic of 
constitutionalism capable of standing up against the pragmatic reaction to international law’s 
uncertainty. This ethic is reflected in C.S. Lewis’s influential – and almost certainly read by 
Hammarskjöld – explanation of the practice of faith. He argues that there are two 
components to faith. In the first instance, “Faith . . . is the art of holding on to things your 
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reason has once accepted, in spite of your changing moods”.93 In the second instance, faith 
refers to a type of practical orientation, “trying [to obey] in a new way, a less worried way”.94 
Lewis argues that faith in this second sense only arises after man has “discovered his 
bankruptcy” through trying – and failing – to act virtuously. This is to see faith as a habitual 
and continuous practice of believing, a willingness to set aside doubt and act from a sense of 
certainty, even while acknowledging the intellectual lack of certainty. Within the Augustinian 
tradition this cashes out in an attempt to redefine the public domain. As Rowan Williams 
argues, the crucial opposition here ‘is not between public and private, church and world, but 
between political virtue and political vice.’95  
A number of recent arguments have pointed towards the need to rehabilitate the 
concept of faith in order to respond to a sceptical, pragmatic disposition institutionalised in 
modern life. Terry Eagleton provides one recent argument for rehabilitating this concept of 
faith. He argues that the Christian account of faith is rooted in a larger belief that ‘the very 
frailty of the human can become a redemptive power’.96 In this sense faith speaks to a 
disposition that goes beyond the institution of the Church; it speaks to a more fundamental 
force in human social and political life. The specific idea of faith in the law, or faith in the 
Rule of Law, is evocatively described by Cameron Stewart as ‘the Tinkerbell effect’. 
According to Barrie’s tale, fairies cannot exist unless we both believe in them, and act on 
this belief (“‘If you believe in fairies’ he shouted to them, ‘clap your hands; don’t let Tink 
die’”), and continue to believe. Stewart argues that something similar is going on with the 
rule of law, which is in many respects an imaginary idea, derived from a liberal conception of 
law. But this doesn’t undermine the rule of law’s importance; instead, the ideological 
foundations of the rule of law suggest that it is vitally important to continually express belief 
in this ideal, to act on this belief in spite of any scepticism we might have about the 
foundations for this belief. Stephen Hopgood similarly argues that a sense of the ‘sacred’ can 
justify a claim to authority – a claim capable of mobilizing international action even where 
‘there is simply no prior agreement on what the “good” constitutes.’97 Making sense of 
human rights practice as a non-utopia idea requires connecting with this sense of the sacred. 
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Michael Barnett ends his history of humanitarianism with the observation about the crucial 
willingness of actors to keep faith with the value of humanitarianism despite the ambiguity 
of humanitarian practice.98 Jeremy Waldron has also recently pointed to the relevance of the 
theological ethic for international law,99 while Mary Ellen O’Connell has pointed to the 
importance of a ‘belief in higher things’100 in order to justify international law’s authority.  
What I have tried to do here is to provide a way to think of faith in international 
legality as a responsible practice, a practice which could justify the decision to ignore 
pragmatic efforts to paint a posture of legality in conditions of uncertainty as a 
fundamentally mistaken practice, part of a tragic narrative, part of a refusal to respond 
realistically, prudentially, politically to the ambiguity occasioned by the commitment to 
legality.  
 
Conclusion: Faith and the practice of constitutional responsibility 
 
This chapter has attempted to show how the terms of legality have traditionally demanded a 
much wider dialogue about the basis for faith in the institutional order. I argued that making 
sense of the constitutionalist perspective as a reasonable, responsible ethic to adopt in the 
circumstances of international society requires understanding the justificatory function that 
faith plays. Most importantly, locating constitutionalism as a practice of faith in the legal 
order establishes a means by which to answer the pragmatist scepticism about acting in the 
absence of evidence for international law’s constitutional authority. In the remainder of this 
thesis I argue that this faithful disposition – and the constructive, constitutional potential it 
presents – has provided the degree of institutional certainty needed to justify international 
practices designed to advance international law’s constitutional authority, and to counter 
pragmatic attempts to limit international law’s authority by appealing to the uncertainty 
surrounding the application of international law. In this I hope to show that 
constitutionalism should not be judged on whether it can successfully bring the unbelievers 
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on board, but on whether it can establish a degree of certainty among the actors with the 
responsibility to develop international law to meet new threats, new challenges, new 
changes.  
The focus up to this point has been on the theoretical debate surrounding 
international law’s claim to constitutional authority. In the next section, I show how these 
debates have begun to structure the practice and politics of international law. But I also 
highlight how constitutional authority has begun to emerge as a result of institutionalising an 
ethic of public, communal responsibility, itself guided by a commitment to remedy the 
conceptual uncertainty surrounding the terms of international law’s rule.  
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Part II 
 
Constitutional Responsibility in Practice 
 
Up to this point the focus of this thesis has been on showing how the pragmatic and constitutional mindsets 
establish competing understandings of the ethic of responsibility which follows from the commitment to 
international legality. I have argued that the precise terms of the ethic of responsibility generated by a 
commitment to international legality relies on the normative effect granted to institutional uncertainty.  
 In the chapters which follow, I develop this account of the constitutional politics of international law 
using four domains in which the authority of international law can be seen as uncertain. The following 
chapters are tied to four challenges the pragmatist makes to the possibility that constitutionalism could 
function as a responsible practice in the uncertain circumstances of international society. First, enforcement 
has been a traditional point of scepticism about international law. This in itself doesn’t disable the possibility 
that enforcement could develop into a constitutional practice. The challenge comes from the pragmatic 
argument that enforcement is a necessarily political act, and that this establishes international law as 
necessarily contingent on state power. Second, international law’s capacity to claim constitutional authority is, 
the pragmatist argues, undermined by the uncertain basis for its claim to legitimacy. Promoting the rule of 
international law over the rule of domestic constitutional law is an irresponsible practice given that it unsettles 
the state’s traditional claim to constitutional independence and that this mindset can be used to foster an 
imperialistic politics. Third, even where international law establishes a formally absolute obligation – an 
obligation that, from the constitutionalist perspective, should clearly function as a constitutional rule – the 
uncertain interpretive rules and roles of international law gives states the authority to challenge the absolute 
status of these rules. Finally, where international law is ambiguous the pragmatist argues that this 
undermines the coherence of the responsibility owed to international law and justifies introducing alternative 
political and ethical frames to the interpretive process. By showing how practitioners have in practice been able 
to meet these challenges by adopting a constitutionalist mindset, the aim is to show that constitutionalism can 
give rise to the sense of responsibility needed to respond to the pragmatic perspective.  
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Chapter 4 
Commanding the Commons: Constitutional Enforcement and the Law of the Sea 
 
 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has, since before its inception, been 
widely regarded as a ‘constitution for the oceans’.1 The obligations the treaty sets out are 
structured by the challenge of effecting genuine oversight over activities in the ocean 
domain, the challenge of governing the global commons. Most importantly, it implies a 
change to the free seas principle which establishes a presumption in favour of open and 
unrestricted rights of access and limits on enforcement jurisdiction. But at the same time as 
heralding a potential revolution in the law of the sea, its claim to constitutional authority is 
far from settled. The practical difficulty of enforcing the rules in this geographically 
expansive domain gives one especially forceful reason for rejecting the claim that the oceans 
are now constitutionally governed. The weakness of enforcement becomes part of the 
pragmatic arguments for understanding the rules as, in practice, reliant on political 
persuasion in order to claim authority.2  
 The pragmatic position is that international law’s ‘hard’ ability to effect compliance 
as a key determinant of – and limitation on – its ability to claim constitutional authority in 
international society. International law may set out the rules for what is expected of actors, 
but it lacks a sufficiently rigorous mechanism for sanctioning those failing to live up to their 
responsibilities. This lack of a law-enforcing capacity is enough to introduce serious doubts 
about the independent, constitutional force of international law.3 Debates about the 
constitutional nature of the law of the sea provide a useful touchstone for evaluating the 
broader issue of enforcement as a specific practice of global constitutionalism because of the 
strong customary presumption about the limits on enforcement embedded in the free seas 
principle.4 Understanding how UNCLOS, a particularly comprehensive legal regime, 
struggled to generate the constitutional authority necessary to challenge this traditional, 
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pragmatist presumption – and how adopting a principled approach to constitutionalism has 
finally begun to establish a basis for constitutional rule – will help to show how 
constitutionalism can get traction against an established pragmatist ethic.  
The argument advanced here is, ultimately, that the pragmatic conception of 
enforcement fails to account for the special nature of enforcement in a constitutional order, 
which is to both reflect, determine and delegate public responsibilities. Analysed in these 
terms, the law of the sea framework is able to exert a much greater – although by no means 
perfect – claim to “command the commons” than the pragmatic account implies. 
International law in this domain helps to structure the delegation of responsibilities by and 
to a wide range of actors, and in so doing provides institutional support for the 
constitutionalist ethic of legality. The first section sets out the pragmatic conception of 
enforcement, which uses the weakness of the current enforcement regime as a reason to 
doubt international law’s capacity to claim constitutional-type authority. The second section 
challenges this perception, arguing that focusing on the weakness of the enforcement regime 
– especially the measures available to effect compliance – is a mistake. This is because the 
practice of constitutional enforcement isn’t concerned with compliance as much as with the 
institutional capacity to delegate special responsibilities. The final sections apply this to the 
constitutional rules contained in the law of the sea. The practice of constitutional 
responsibility in this domain has traditionally been tied to a presumption in favour of the 
free seas, which undermines international law’s claim to constitutional authority. But the 
principled shift which has seen the law of the sea increasingly framed as an aspect of global 
commons law has enabled and expanded the institutional scope for constitutional 
enforcement.  
 
Anti-Constitutional Enforcement  
 
There are a wider range of enforcement mechanisms available to international law than have 
traditionally been recognised by the pragmatist. But on the face of it, they do seem to have a 
point about the role these practices play in constructing or reflecting international law’s 
constitutional authority. The traditional pragmatic argument for denying the constitutional 
authority of international law is that so many international legal obligations seem so patently 
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unenforced and unenforceable.5 The suspicion is that lacking a credible enforcement regime 
international law can only have a formal type of authority, certainly not the kind of 
overweening social authority typically associated with a constitutional legal order.6 As 
Thomas Franck classically put it, ‘the international system is organized in a voluntarist 
fashion, supported by so little coercive authority.’7 Scepticism about the structural lack of 
coercive authority undergirds an assumption that the limited enforcement mechanisms 
available in the international order which do exist are of limited use in explaining 
international law’s authority. This cashes out in the belief that the authority of international 
law can only be persuasive, certainly not anything like the binding commands typically 
associated with obligations in a domestic constitutional order.   
This essentially persuasive character of international law becomes the source for a 
more general assertion that ‘ownership’ of the international legal order rests with political 
actors. These circumstances limit the constitutional effect enforcement practices can have 
on the authority of international law.8 The basis of this claim is that enforcement powers do 
exist, but they are either not used, or are used in a way that undermines international law’s 
claim to constitutional authority.  For instance, universal jurisdiction provides states with the 
most sweeping of enforcement powers. But in one study looking at those clear cases of 
piracy over which states could have exercised universal jurisdiction to enforce the law shows 
that between 1998 and 2009 only 1.47% of cases were prosecuted.9 A marginal figure by any 
measure. Other more highly institutionalized attempts at enforcement attract the same sort 
of concerns. The raft of institutional mechanisms now dedicated to enforcing international 
criminal law suggests the difficulty with attributing a constitutional effect to international 
enforcement practices. Critical voices point to the various ways in which, despite the degree 
of institutionalisation, the actual process of enforcing international criminal law and 
successfully bringing individuals to justice remains contingent on the exercise of political 
                                                          
 
5 See Posner, Perils, 2009; also Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security and International Law 
(Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Washington, D.C. and Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2010); for a 
detailed overview of the sceptical arguments, see O’Connell, Power and Purpose 
6 Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver, The Changing Constitution (5th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004)  
7 Thomas Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ 82 American Journal of International Law (1988) 705; 
for a different starting point see J Goldsmith and D Levinson, ‘Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law’ (2009) 122 Harvard Law Review 1791  
8 On the link between international authority and the claims to ‘ownership’ of international law, see especially 
Kenneth Anderson, ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: intended and unintended consequences’, (2011)  
20 European Journal of International Law 331-358 
9 Steven Art and Eugene Kontorovich, ‘Agora: Piracy Prosecutions: An Empirical Examination of Universal 
Jurisdiction for Piracy’ (July 2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 436.  
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power.10 This contingency feeds doubts about whether the existence of an institutional 
mechanism for enforcement should be accepted as evidence of genuine advance in the 
structures of international enforcement, or simply old wine in new bottles. The sceptical 
claim, in other words, is that even highly institutionalized enforcement practices shouldn’t 
be taken as evidence of constitutional authority, merely as evidence of a context-limited 
political will for enforcement. 
This grounds a much broader reason to be sceptical about the constitutional effect 
of international enforcement practices. One of the central challenges to claims that 
international represents a constitutional type of authority is that enforcement practices 
seemingly justified by international law are so easily co-opted to serve subjective interests. 
As Anthony F. Lang, Jr. argues, enforcement practices are almost always validated by those 
undertaking them with reference to international legal rules.11 On the surface this can create 
the perception that more enforcement equates to a deeper constitutional order. The catch is 
that the international order lacks a body capable of establishing whether international legal 
rules are being legitimately enforced or whether the authority of international legal rules is 
being used as a nefarious cloak for the advancement of subjective political interests. From 
this perspective, for a practice of enforcement to be justified it needs to be first located as 
part of a wider constitutional order able to regularise and legitimate a punitive regime. What 
state practice shows is the gaps in such an order, and as such international law’s lack of an 
independent, institutional power dictate the terms of constitutional order in international 
society.  
The pragmatic worry goes even further than this, however. Because current punitive 
practices are of an ad hoc and sui generis character, and not the practice of a genuine 
constitutional order, international practices to enforce international law creates a situation 
where, rather than enforcement practices building up a constitutional world order 
characterised by the rule of law, enforcement instead retrenches a world order defined by 
power and power politics. Whatever the formal authority claimed by the institution of 
international law, the fact that the architecture of international law can’t provide definitive 
guidance or oversight about the legitimate means, mechanisms or agents empowered to 
enforce its strictures attacks the idea that international law has the normative authority to 
                                                          
 
10 Gerry Simpson, Law, War and Crime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Polity, London, 2007); Kirsten 
Ainley, ‘The International Criminal Court on trial’ (2011) 24 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 309-333. 
11 Anthony F Lang, Jr., Punishment, Justice and International Relations: Ethics and Order after the Cold War (Routledge, 
London, 2008). 
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order international society. This includes validating enforcement practices as constitutional 
practices because, for the pragmatist, without clarity about the constitutional rules there is 
no basis for thinking of international law enforcement as a legitimate constitutional practice.  
This suggestion that we might be required to discount the constitutional effect of 
international law enforcement even where it looks as if international law is being effectively 
enforced – because this is in reality an expression of political power, or a function of the a 
lack of genuine constitutionality – creates real problems for any attempt to use 
improvements in enforcement practices as evidence of international law’s expanded 
constitutional authority. It doesn’t seem to leave any room for an authoritative form of 
enforcement which doesn’t collapse back into a flawed or facile constitutionalism. The 
pragmatist’s scepticism about enforcement in this sense challenges the constitutional 
possibilities of international law, particularly the claim that disparate international law 
enforcement practices might be seen as part of a constitution building process.   
 
Constitutional Enforcement 
 
The constitutionalist approach generates a different conception of the responsible 
practice of enforcement. This is in line with the idea that institutional roles are instrumental 
in constructing the necessary ethic of constitutional responsibility. In this section I set out 
an alternative to the pragmatic conception of the link between enforcement and the 
justification of constitutional authority.  
H.L.A. Hart provides the clearest support for conceptualizing enforcement as a 
process of delegating the roles and responsibilities necessary for validating the institutional 
authority of a legal order. This includes, importantly, an understanding of enforcement as a 
practice that can be constitutional even in the absence of empirical certainty regarding the 
constitution effect of the underlying rules. This isn’t a great surprise given Hart’s claim that 
the normative force of a legal order is something entirely distinct and prior to the question 
of whether or not the law is backed by a sanction or command. Sanctions, he argued, are 
necessarily the result of a normatively authoritative system of rules, not the basis for such a 
system.12  The crucial reason he gives for law’s normativity being protected in practice even 
in the absence of a hard sanctioning mechanism is the presence of what he classically terms 
                                                          
 
12 See especially HLA Hart (n 12) 20-25; N MacCormick (n 17) 51-52; critiquing the scholarly preoccupation 
with compliance with international law, see R Howse and R Teitel, ‘Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why 
International Law Really Matters’ (May 2010) 1:2 Global Policy 127-136.   
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the ‘secondary rules’ of a legal order.13 Secondary rules of recognition, change and 
adjudication function as a remedy for the authority of the legal order, such that ‘all three 
remedies together are enough to convert the regime of primary rules into what is 
indisputably a legal system’.14 Importantly, however, secondary rules – including those 
enabling enforcement – are only a part of justifying the authority of the legal order. These 
rules are not essential to the concept of law on which a legal order’s claim to authority is 
premised. This is why Hart regards the customary basis of international law as sufficient to 
establish valid legal order, but as lacking the ‘full-blown’ practical authority law tends to have 
in the domestic context.     
The answer to the pragmatic claims about the anti-constitutional effect of 
enforcement comes from the manner in which Hart endows primary and secondary rules 
with the additional function of linking the formal, internal validity of the legal order to the 
broader constitutional role of the legal order. The reason the union of primary and 
secondary rules provides evidence of the authority of the legal order is because they arise as 
part of a complex and deeply embedded socio-theoretical conversation about the 
appropriate relationship between the different normative standards available in a social 
order, namely the competing standards operating in law, politics and morality. As such, the 
division between primary and secondary rules is not only a prescriptive picture of what any 
valid legal system needs, but also a way of understanding how, in practice, a legal order fits 
into and claims authority within the wider constitutional order. This suggests that the 
secondary rules – or, better, responsibilities – play an important constitutional role in 
conferring, assigning or entailing rights and responsibilities of enforcement as enactors of a 
legal order.15  
The important thing to note for purposes of understanding the institutional 
dimension of the practice of constitutional enforcement is that a legal order’s constitutional 
authority is intimately tied to the presence of “officialdom”, actors with public roles and 
public responsibilities to enact the law. The actual capacity of these actors to effect 
compliance is not the immediate point. In order to establish a claim to authority law needs 
to be able to inspire legality – a sense of commitment – in law’s officials. Crucially, this is 
not a general appeal to law’s social acceptance, but a far more targeted appeal to those 
                                                          
 
13 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997).  
14 Ibid 94. 
15 See for example, H.L.A. Hart, John Gardner (introduction), Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Law (Second Edition, OUP, Oxford: 2008) 
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charged with enacting the law. Taking these actors as the target results in an institutional 
middle ground in which enforcement has a central role in determining constitutional 
authority, but at the same time has a limited role in determining the normative content of 
the legal order. This presents what is in effect a ratchet-like, one-directional concept of 
enforcement within the constitutional order: enforcement can strengthen constitutional 
authority but it can’t weaken or undermine it, either in its absence or because of problems in 
its application. Constitutional law doesn’t have to inspire obedience or compliance among 
its subjects; more important is that it a culture of legality among those charged with enacting 
the law.16 
 Analysing enforcement through the lens of the responsibilities generated by the 
institutional practice of legality helps answer the pragmatist’s scepticism in three ways. First, 
focusing on institutional practice of legality highlights the fact that enforcement in the 
context of constitutional law is a fundamentally normative practice. Contrary to the 
scepticism of, for example, Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, constitutional law is not 
inherently divorced from sanctions and therefore lacking in authority.17 It is simply prior to 
sanctions in setting who has the responsibility – and can claim the authority – to enforce the 
law, in what circumstances, and within what limits. Second, this shifts the emphasis onto the 
question of whether the existing institutional mechanisms are capable of effectively 
delegating responsibility for enforcement. Finally, this entails that evidence for the 
constitutional (or anti-constitutional) quality of enforcement practices becomes a question to 
be answered with reference to institutional actors’ perception of the authority of the 
constitutional principles or rules, rather than something that can be dismissed by reference 
to either a general scepticism about the possibility of constitutional authority or a structural 
claim about the incompleteness or illegitimacy of set of the existence mechanisms for 
enforcement. Instead of remaining mired in the general inadequacy or illegitimacy of existing 
enforcement practices, the principal emphasis rests on the functionality of a far more 
targeted range of institutionally allocated special responsibilities. 
At the root of the pragmatist claim is the denial of constitutional agency to actors 
other than states. The traditional obstacle to extending this picture of constitutional 
enforcement to international law is that states are regarded as inhabiting the remedial roles 
available in the international legal order. The pragmatist can plausibly argue that because of 
                                                          
 
16 Hart talks about this in the context of the ‘internal aspect’ of legal conduct, Concept of Law, p. 56-57.  
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the prevailing pluralist structure of international law there is no pay-off from 
reconceptualising enforcement as a remedial practice. If states are international society’s best 
hope for responsible agents, there is not much cause for optimism: establishing that states 
hold remedial responsibilities will still result in the same lack of constitutional enforcement, 
so long as the impact of these responsibilities is defined through a sovereigntist lens. This is 
to see any remedial responsibilities as ultimately failing to give effect to the supremacy 
required of a constitutional order. It is too strong to say that states’ agency in enforcement 
necessarily runs against an idea of the constitutional authority of international law. Some 
international and regional courts or tribunals are in fact recognized as exercising quite a thick 
standard of authority over states. But because this enforcement still tends to be channelled 
through – and limited by – both the domestic constitutional order and the pressures to 
advance subjective state interests, it is difficult to attribute pre-eminent or supreme type of 
authority to the international legal order, of the sort that marks out constitutional law.18   
One way of broadening out this question of agency is simply to deny that the 
involvement of states in the enforcement of international law does serve to undermine the 
constitutional authority of international law. Mary Ellen O’Connell suggests exactly this in 
showing how international law has developed an extensive institutional capacity for 
enforcement independent of state practice.19 International law’s enforcement mechanisms 
are evidenced by the way international law been used by states to justify and structure the 
application of armed measures, countermeasures and judicial measures where there has been 
a failure to comply with international law. These have both unilateral and collective roots in 
the international order but, crucially, are governed and ultimately legitimated by the strength 
and coherence of the underlying customary principles and an overarching commitment to 
the law’s authority. O’Connell argues that this commitment is justified by the fact that ‘we 
fundamentally accept the binding power of international law for the same reason we accept 
all law as binding. Our acceptance of law is part of a tradition of belief in higher things.’20 
This isn’t to suggest that these enforcement mechanisms are always used correctly, or are 
used as systematically as they could be, but it provides an answer to the sceptical claim that 
international law suffers from a structural lack of enforcement authority.  
                                                          
 
18 See for example Anne Peters, ‘Supremacy Lost: International Law meets domestic Constitutional Law’ 
(2009) 3 Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional Law 170-198. 
19 See O’Connell, Power and Purpose.  
20 Ibid, p. 16. 
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These are not isolated arguments. In a different conceptual key but to similar ends, 
Robert Scott and Paul Stephan point to how what they call a ‘modern view’ of enforcement 
opens up the field of those who could and should be considered responsible agents of 
international law enforcement, independent holders of remedial obligations.21 They argue 
that enforcement in international law encompasses both formal and informal mechanisms, 
and that there is nothing to prevent this potentially disparate set of enforcement practices 
being regarded as a comprehensive enforcement regime for international law. As they put it, 
once the pre-conception of what an enforcement mechanism looks like is broadened out it 
‘allows private enforcement, employs independent tribunals and courts to do the enforcing, 
and empowers those tribunals and courts to wield the same array of tools that domestic 
courts traditionally use to compel compliance with their decisions.’22 Writing to explain the 
specific nature of the enforcement of erga omnes obligations, Christian Tams similarly 
focuses attention away from the regime-specific mechanisms of enforcement, arguing that 
the  informal, decentralized processes of enforcement are crucial to the protecting and 
development of the authority claimed by these rules.23 At risk of labouring the point, Alan 
Boyle and Christine Chinkin also make similar claims, bundling the remedial practices of 
international law into the notion of ‘soft law’.24 The point is that a wide range of the 
literature on international law in recent years – see for instance the various arguments for 
“new international institutional law”, “soft law”, and “global administrative law” – 
understands there to be remedial processes or mechanisms supplementing the formal 
architecture of international law. It is no longer a justified presumption that international 
law’s enforcement capacity revolves solely around a state’s structurally privileged position in 
the international legal order.  
Understanding enforcement as an institutional capacity to exercise remedial powers 
challenges the notion of international enforcement having an anti-constitutional effect. In 
contrast to the sceptical conception of enforcement, my suggestion in this section was that 
the currency of enforcement is the institutional capacity of the legal order to delegate 
responsibilities rather than to effect compliance with specific rules. It follows that the type 
of evidence to look for in assessing constitutional authority isn’t the practical mechanisms 
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for policing compliance with international legal rules but the institutional mechanisms for 
allocating special responsibilities to enact international law. The crucial measure of 
enforcement is the institutional capacity to effectively delegate responsibilities, and by doing 
so to shape the normative order governing international society. 
   
Constitutional Enforcement in the Free Seas 
 
The ‘high seas’ is a legal term describing an area covering roughly 50% of the planet.25 The 
high seas are a transit to profit, carrying  an estimated 90% of global commerce,26 and a 
source of profit in their own right, with natural resources to be exploited on, in and under 
the sea. The term has historically been synonymous with the idea of the ‘free seas’, the 
designation of an open-access area immune from appropriation or legitimate command by 
any one state. This principle and accompanying customary international law establishes 
constitutional obligations but of limited scope, essentially protecting open access and 
freedom of movement; with remedial obligations limited to those of self-policing. As Hugo 
Grotius argued, any thicker rules of enforcement aren’t appropriate to this jurisdiction 
because no effective oversight could possibly be exercised. The high seas, he thought, are 
simply too big a domain for there to be any realistic hope of positive legal obligations being 
enforced. The only possibility left by the scale of the governance challenge is to embrace this 
as a domain of subjective right rather than objective duty. On this conception, freedom of 
the seas does not designate either a lack of constitutionality or a lack of enforcement, simply 
a self-policing governance regime characterized by negative responsibilities and freedoms – 
obligations not to act or to refrain from acting in a certain way – rather than positive 
responsibilities or freedoms – obligations to actively protect or promote the rules.27 The 
constitutional rules are set here by reference to this presumption in favour of the free seas.  
 Although the concept of the free seas and the associated laissez-faire governance 
regime is now firmly entrenched in customary international law, it has not always been 
uncontested. In particular it needs to be remembered that the context for Grotius’ argument 
                                                          
 
25 See Global Governance Monitor: Oceans, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 December 2010, available at  
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that the seas were essentially free, a mare liberum, was to provide a legal justification for the 
hotly contested practice of Dutch privateerism, notably Jacob van Heemskerk’s 1603 seizure 
of the Portuguese ship the Santa Catarina. In other words, Grotius wrote to provide a legal 
justification for fighting Spanish, Portuguese and, later, British claims to ownership - and by 
extension the rights of trade and access - of certain maritime domains by arguing that no-
one could own the sea and, therefore, private actors were well within their rights to seize 
whatever they could. William Welwod and, later, John Selden opposed this, in support of 
British naval and colonial ambitions. As the title to Selden’s work suggested, the nub of the 
argument was that the seas were subject to the same appropriation as land-based territory 
was, and that as a result the ocean space was a mare clausum, a closed sea which could be and 
historically had been effectively appropriated and occupied through naval power.  
The scale of these issues has been resolved to some extent by slimming the legal area 
designated as ‘high seas’ and extending the reach of state’s sovereign jurisdiction. Originally 
this was determined by the three mile rule – the high seas began at the limits of cannon shot; 
certainly a visible manifestation of the how freedom of the seas began at the limits of states’ 
enforcement ability. This became a 12 mile rule. And this in turn has been expanded 
through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which introduces an 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends 200 nautical miles beyond a state’s 
territorial sea and creates thicker rights and responsibilities than those within the high seas 
domain. Although states don’t have legal ‘ownership’ of this area, they do have exclusive 
rights of access and use of this area – for example for fishing, or natural resource extraction. 
In the majority of cases these special rights create the conditions of de facto ownership. 
Correspondingly, it creates special responsibilities within this zone that narrow the (positive) 
enforcement gap in the law of the sea, although even here there are limits to how general 
this legal claim is.28 The important point though is that this 200 nautical mile geographical 
expansion of state jurisdiction, as with the earlier iterations, only really tinkers with the 
enforcement regime suggested by the free seas framework. It’s a regulatory drop in the 
governance ocean, you might say.    
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But the constitutional significance of this regime goes far beyond the establishment 
of the EEZ. UNCLOS potentially challenges the prevailing constitutional presumption in 
favour of the freedom of the seas. Replacing the narrow presumption that this domain is an 
area beyond effective juridical control is the attempt to establish the law of the sea as a 
comprehensive, unified framework which could effectively govern this domain. It would do 
this by bringing together the various overlapping regimes and treaties dealing with issues 
arising in this domain, aiming to systematize the relationship between the efforts to tackle 
specific regulatory challenges. The complexity of this field of governance is reflected in the 
issues covered, ranging from classical concerns with the delimitation of sovereign 
jurisdiction, piracy and high seas enforcement, to more modern concerns with the regulation 
of ships, environmental protection, and the right to national resources on, in and under the 
sea. It was in this light that Tommy Koh – who presided over the conference at which 
UNCLOS was adopted – hailed the framework as a ‘constitution for the oceans’.29 In this 
respect the “constitutionality”’ of UNCLOS is contained in the claim to provide a 
comprehensive, general and authoritative framework with the capacity to detail the 
appropriate rules for action on the oceans.30 All three of these aspects of constitutionality are 
contained in the claim that the rules systematized in UNCLOS reflect, for the most part,  
customary international law. The implication of this is that to the extent that UNCLOS 
embodies customary rules the enforcement regime it creates can claim the legitimate 
authority to direct the future development of law and governance in the this area.31 
The root scepticism is that this framework lacks the practical force necessary to 
generate a genuine claim to constitutional authority. Crucially, regardless of the customary 
basis of the core obligations, the regime lacks the important constitutional hallmark of 
supremacy.32 Although this can be regarded as merely one black mark (albeit an important 
one) against an otherwise complete set of constitutional features, the lack of supremacy 
carries rather a lot of weight when it comes to assessing the constitutional character of a 
regime. As Dan Bodansky argues, this is because there is an important distinction between a 
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governance regime possessing constitutional features, and the description of a set of rules as a 
constitutional order.33 That UNCLOS systematizes customary international law in this 
domain only begs the additional question of the nature of customary international law’s 
claim to authority. Establishing a legitimate claim to pre-eminent or supreme authority is key 
to whether a legal regime can be understood as establishing constitutional order, both within 
the specific domain governed by law and as a part of a wider global constitutionalism in 
which principles specific to this regime reflect and strengthen more general principles of 
global public order. If UNCLOS lacks a mechanism for establishing pre-emptive authority 
over states, however, any claim to constitutional authority is, to use Jeffrey Dunoff’s term, a 
mere ‘constitutional conceit’.34  
The interesting feature of this as far international law’s claim to constitutional 
authority goes is that evidence for the absence of constitutional authority hangs on 
scepticism about the viability of enforcement practices in the global ocean commons. 
Despite the regulatory advances, including the presence of international bodies empowered 
to settle disputes, the  suggestion is that very little has changed in practice since the golden 
days of privateerism which formed the backdrop for the debate between Grotius and 
Selden. As William Langewische argues in The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos and 
Crime, despite the rhetoric and regulation suggesting otherwise, the high seas are still ‘free’ in 
the most anarchic sense of the word; this is an area beyond authority, outside the effective 
reach of law.35 Langewische highlights how efforts to bring high seas actors under state and 
international jurisdiction have been stymied by the continued reliance on regulation through 
negative responsibilities, by the presumption of free and open access, and by the fact that 
what regulation there is ‘lacks teeth’, particularly in the continued reliance on the flag state 
regime as the key enforcement mechanism. The structure is premised on the good-faith 
commitment of the various actors in this domain to refrain from violating the rules, rather 
than any threat of punishment or sanction for having violated the rules. Regulation aside, 
this is still an essentially lawless domain governed by private rather than public mechanisms 
enforcement.  
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The continuing operation of the flag-state regime36 is a paradigm example of how 
the legacy of self-policing undermines the plausibility of UNCLOS representing an extant 
‘constitution for the oceans’. The flag state regime essentially extends sovereign territoriality 
into the high seas by granting states jurisdiction – hence enforcement powers – over ships 
flying their flag. On the surface this seems to delegate responsibilities in line with a practice 
of constitutional enforcement. The problem is that the standards of enforcement among the 
flag states vary widely, particularly in the ‘genuine link’ they require from a vessel in order to 
be registered as a flag ship, and the level of oversight they exercise once registration has 
occurred.37 Because the flag state regime is a sizeable source of income for some states ship 
owners have been able to leverage their market position into loose regulations and few 
responsibilities; it’s a buyer’s market. In a reflection of why self-policing doesn’t work, and 
how “flags of convenience” have dominated the market, over 40% of vessels now fly the 
flags of either Panama, Liberia or the Marshall Islands.38 This genuine link test looks rather 
stretched when you consider that taken together these countries represent roughly 0.1% of 
the world’s population. But the income from this business is substantial, meaning that states 
tend to treat ships flagged under their registry as clients rather than subjects. The end result 
of this marketization has been to make re-flagging ships an easy, penalty-free way to dodge 
regulatory oversight. Liberia provides one illustration of the weak interest some states will 
have in more proactively fulfilling their enforcement responsibilities under the flag-state 
mechanism. During the Liberian civil wars, where international sanctions restricted 
legitimate sources of state income, the Liberian Ship Registry accounted for some 70% of 
government income.39 With other flag states there is an even more direct challenge to global 
enforcement practices. North Korean and Cambodian flagged vessels, for instance, are 
known to engage in illicit trafficking of drugs, people and weapons, with the presumption of 
flag state jurisdiction restricting efforts to interdict and enforce prohibitions on transnational 
crime.40  
Port states and coast guards are in a position to pick up some of the slack this 
creates in the global enforcement regime. Port states can use their role as the gatekeepers to 
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large and lucrative markets to demand repairs or issue fines for non-compliance with 
international standards. But port states are also in competition with each other, and there are 
few benefits from exercising anything but the most formal oversight; it is far easier simply to 
refuse entry rather than risk tying up dock space with a sick or unseaworthy ship.41 Similarly, 
the coast guard has interdiction powers if a ship is suspected of illicit trafficking once a ship 
has entered territorial waters and regardless of the flag it flies. A network of bilateral treaties 
in which some states have ceded jurisdiction powers for the purposes of enforcement to 
other states – notably the US – who are regarded as better placed to exercise these 
enforcement powers extends enforcement authority beyond territorial waters. This is 
complemented by some multilateral enforcement regimes, both to prevent drug trafficking 
but also to police compliance with obligations relating to fishing stocks, weapons of mass 
destruction, and migration.42 But the enforcement regime this creates is far from universal, 
reliant in the first place the flag state’s willingness to cede such interdiction powers, on the 
strength of the treaty regime, and on the strategic interests powerful states have in policing 
the oceans or commanding the commons.43  
There are some exceptions to the limitations on enforcement imposed by the flag 
states regime. There is a universal right to inspect ships suspected of piracy, slavery, 
unauthorized broadcasting or lacking a nationality.44 This is certainly not an extensive range 
of issues but, even so, the enforcement regime fails to create positive responsibilities of 
enforcement, promising much more enforcement capacity than it delivers in practice. The 
difficulty of responding to piracy in the Gulf of Aden is one example of how the general and 
non-specific nature of the interdiction regime has resolutely failed to translate into a practice 
of constitutional enforcement.45 Reflecting this, those states engaged in counter-piracy 
operations off the coast of Somalia (and now within Somalia) have resolutely rejected 
suggestions that this is anything but a short term operation. To this end, counter-piracy 
enforcement practices have been structured in such a way as to avoid any link to 
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generalizable constitutional responsibilities of enforcement, either for the naval forces 
involved in policing the seas or as a judicial matter in terms of establishing a responsibility to 
try captured pirates.  
Although piracy and trafficking have, for good reasons, generated the headlines in 
this area, in terms of international law’s constitutional authority the greatest challenge is 
from ordinary, everyday practices of legal oversight. It is the everyday nature of the failings 
here that does most to feed the perception that this is an unconstitutional legal order 
defined by sovereign exceptionalism and private ‘plunder’. In one memorable story used to 
illustrate the essential lawlessness of this domain, Langewische recounts how the family of 
one victim – Dianne Brimble – has faced an eight year battle for justice, despite the presence 
of chilling photographic evidence showing her being raped while unconscious, by multiple 
men, the same men in who’s cabin she was later found dead in.46 Rather than questioning 
those involved when the ship docked, her body was removed, the men were allowed access 
to their cabin, the ship continued on its journey, and the criminal investigation that would 
normally have happened as a matter of course was never begun in earnest. Public pressure 
has now resulted in criminal proceedings against some of these men, but the point to take 
away here is that this is an extreme but not an exceptional case. Deaths on cruise ships often 
go down as accidents, suicides or disappearances; prosecutions for crime at sea are rare, 
partly as a result of investigative responsibilities falling on the cruise companies rather than 
on any public authority. The ordinary default mindset of states is that they are not positively 
responsible for law enforcement on the high seas. This is a domain where self-regulation is 
the norm.   
This same fall-back tendency of states to think that their legal responsibilities don’t 
extend to the high seas is part of a more pernicious practice of states using the perceived 
weakness of their enforcement responsibilities in this domain as a way to contract around 
international human rights obligations. This mindset is most evident in the detention of 
‘boat people’ on Christmas Island, in which the ordinary human rights of migrants and 
refugees are seen as inoperative because these individuals are still in a technical legal sense 
‘at sea’. There are signs too of the Australian approach – the ‘Pacific Island Solution’47 – 
being considered elsewhere, for example in Canada where the arrival of 492 Tamil refugees 
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on the MV Sun Sea was met by calls from some quarters to install a refugee holding ship 
outside of Canada’s territorial waters; hence, to hold them on the high seas beyond the 
sphere of Canada’s human rights and refugee obligations. These proposals highlight the 
perception that the high seas legal regime doesn’t just lack an enforcement regime but 
actively neuters the positive responsibilities arising in overlapping areas of international law. 
And the principles endangered aren’t marginal; the specific challenge is to the peremptory 
principle of non-refoulement.48 In an extension of this, positive responsibilities of rescue are 
increasingly contracted out to states with far less compunction about adhering to their 
international legal obligations, in much the same way that the judicial responsibilities accrued 
during counter-piracy action are passed on to institutionally weak states.49 As Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tanja Aalberts persuasively argue, the tragedy of this domain is 
that ‘the “drowning migrant” finds herself subject to an increasingly complex field of 
governance, in which participating states may successfully barter off and deconstruct 
responsibilities by reference to traditional norms of sovereignty and international law. Thus, 
rather than simply a space of non-sovereignty per se, the Mare Liberum becomes the venue for 
a range of competing claims and disclaims to sovereignty’.50 
All of this points to how the perception of international law’s limited institutional 
capacity for enforcement bolsters sceptical arguments regarding international law’s 
constitutional authority. The various practices undertaken and sustained with reference to 
the law of the sea shows how gaps in the enforcement regime creates and sustains 
scepticism about the constitutional authority of the wider legal order. It may be a 
comprehensive regime on paper, in formal terms decisively shifting the terms of governance 
away from a presumption in favour of the free seas, but there is little respect for the 
constitutionality of these rules in practice. The lack of ‘hard’ enforcement mechanisms and 
the reliance on a process of self-policing create a sense, at least among the subjects of this 
legal order, that this is, at best, a regulatory regime imposing few actionable enforcement 
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obligations, appealing instead to a weak, non-justiciable sense of responsibility. And where 
states do support enforcement measures – for example against ‘boat people’ – this is part of 
a strategy to declaim more onerous responsibilities, rather than to give constitutional effect 
to the law of the sea. There is, in other words, plenty of available evidence for the fact that 
international law in this domain lacks constitutional authority, at least as long as the 
appropriate measure of constitutional authority or supremacy is tied to a general capacity to 
get states to comply with their enforcement responsibilities.  
 
Constitutional Enforcement in the Global Commons 
 
So far, so sceptical. In this last section, however, I want to point to ways that constitutional 
enforcement is being developed in this domain, specifically through the institutional 
delegation of enforcement responsibility. The point is to show how looking for institutional 
practices of responsibility delegation creates a much rounder picture of how enforcement is 
able to construct constitutional authority than is likely to emerge from the sceptic’s analysis.  
Support for seeing the law of the sea as an example of international law’s 
constitutional authority comes from perception that the law of the sea is but one aspect of 
an emerging “global commons law”. The global commons refers to those areas that are the 
‘common property of all mankind’.51 In John Vogler’s words, the global commons are ‘areas 
or resources that do not or cannot by their very nature fall under sovereign jurisdiction’.52 
Susan J. Buck similarly defines the commons as ‘resource domains in which common pool 
resources are found’, by extension seeing international or global commons as ‘the very large 
resource domains that do not fall within the jurisdiction of any one country’.53 This idea 
denotes the oceans and deep-sea bed, the atmosphere and global environment, outer space, 
areas of special ecological and cultural significance and, increasingly, cyberspace.54 The 
governance challenge is set by the ever-present spectre of “tragedy”; as Garrett Hardin 
famously argued, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is that you have an area designated either by 
nature or social convention as open access, hence as beyond the effective control of any one 
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actor or institution, designated unmanageable.55 But at the same time, without some measure 
of control or cooperation to manage the (scarce) resource, the commons would over time 
degrade and become unusable. The tragedy here is that the open access model creates a 
structural lack of adequate incentives to regulatory cooperation. The promise of the global 
commons, providing common pool resources, also has the potential to function as a global 
sink, threatening independent resources.56 Extending from Hardin’s conception of the tragic 
is the inevitability that legal rules promising to govern the commons will fail to fulfil this 
function, at least as long as they protect a presumption in favour of free and open access. 
Here of course the ‘free seas’ become a paradigm example of the tragedy of the commons.  
Since Hardin’s pessimistic, rational-actor model, others have pointed to how 
common pool resources such as the high seas can be effectively governed if the 
“communal” nature of the domain is taken seriously. Elinor Ostrom in particular has 
detailed how local, non-centralized governance models provide lessons for effective 
commons management which can be ramped up to manage national, regional or global 
commons. Where common pool resources have been managed effectively it is because the 
governance framework acknowledged that a centralized, top-down regulatory framework 
was inappropriate but, crucially, where there was also an exceptionally strong sense among 
those at the point of enforcement regarding the responsibilities owed as part of accessing 
this domain. Ostrom’s point is that the tragedy of the commons gives us the terms of the 
governance challenge, rather than pointing to the impossibility of governance itself.57 The 
institutionally driven re-orientation of (some aspects of) the law of the sea as a framework 
for protecting either ‘our common heritage’ or ‘our common threat’ or ‘our common 
responsibility’ can be read as an effort to provide an institutional protection for this culture 
of responsibility, through the delegation of enforcement responsibilities.  
The basis for this institutional shift is provided, in part, by the way that the structure 
of these obligations has spilled beyond – if it was ever truly contained within – the 
UNCLOS framework. The structure of the treaty obligations constrains the prospects for 
international enforcement by suggesting that it is the bilateral, or, in the case of a multilateral 
treaty, the bilateralizable relationships of responsibility that condition and protect the 
authority of international law. The reason is that this structure allocates enforcement 
responsibilities through the principle of reciprocity,  where a harm against one state’s 
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interests creating a right of enforcement or redress. Where obligations are structured in this 
way it is difficult to understand the international legal order as a genuine reflection of a 
genuine community interest, or states as enforcing a community standard. All of the 
necessary remedial rules are contained in and limited by this bilateral structure of state 
responsibility. If the practice of enforcement is triggered by the harm done to an individual 
state, what triggers enforcement to redress the harm done to the international community? 
The sceptic’s suggestion is that the constitutional value or principle needs to be, and 
potentially can be, pursued and enforced through the traditional bilateral structures of 
international law. There isn’t a need for international law to move beyond the horizontal 
model and establish more hierarchical enforcement mechanisms for delegating 
responsibilities, because these responsibilities are already sufficiently delegated, albeit 
through the negative responsibilities characterising the free seas principle. There can be 
constitutional authority even in the absence of anything more than a power to persuade.   
As the limitations of enforcement in the “free seas” suggests, however, the bilateral 
structure of enforcement leaves a number of gaps through which states can wriggle out of 
their responsibilities. The overarching cause of the worry – and legal gap – is the fact that 
not all states are signed up to what has the potential to be ‘a resounding success for the 
principles and purposes of the UN, including, crucially, progress towards the rule of law in 
international affairs’.58 UNCLOS lacks the supremacy it would get from a universal 
acceptance, and as a result lacks the power to unsettle the customary presumption of free 
and open access, at least in the coherent and comprehensive manner its proponents had 
initially hoped for.59 But, on the surface, who or who hasn’t signed up to UNCLOS 
shouldn’t matter for the authority of the obligations created because the majority are also 
obligations under customary international law. The real gap is not in the enforcement regime 
of UNCLOS, but the gaps this exposes in the wider practices of enforcing constitutional 
rules. As a matter of assigning remedial responsibilities it is not just the affected state whose 
enforcement responsibilities can be triggered, but all states as common members of the 
international community, as holders of a common interest. It is this interdependent, public 
responsibility that UNCLOS has needed to effect.    
It is in this context that the emergence of the law of the sea as an aspect of global 
commons law has helped institutionalize a practice of constitutional enforcement. 
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Particularly important here is the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.60 
Although this principle has emerged in the specific context of international environmental 
law, it has become the unifying thread to many recent efforts to manage the global 
commons more broadly, and to give constitutional bite to enforcement practices. In effect, 
the global commons concept functions to usher in the idea that an underlying obligation of 
trusteeship, or responsible stewardship, sets the scope of legitimate enforcement authority in 
this domain.61 Responsibilities are allocated to the actor best placed to protect the global 
commons. The fact that these environmental responsibilities have been developed in 
relation to the basic idea that the agent best placed to act also has a responsibility to act 
forces positive responsibilities into existence.  International institutions are empowered in 
this way to remedy international law’s constitutional authority by targeted and specifying 
state responsibilities in this domain. Whether or not it replaces the previously benign 
protection regime, principally defined around the rights of access and duties of the flag state, 
it certainly challenges the degree to which practices of declamation can undermine the 
constitutional order. International institutions in this sense act to make sure the structural 
failure of states to comply with their responsibilities don’t inevitably corrupt the possibility 
for constitutional authority, reflecting the institutional concept of constitutional 
enforcement.   
UNCLOS establishes two particularly important institutional bodies whose officials 
increasingly take on this kind of enforcement role. The International Seabed Authority and 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) have both been actively engaged 
in pushing back against the actions of states and their proxy on the high seas and deep 
seabed. For example, the International Seabed Authority has recently requested an advisory 
opinion from ITLOS on the nature of states’ obligations and responsibilities in sponsoring 
seabed mining and exploration; in its judgment the Tribunal leaves very little room for 
doubt about the extent of states’ obligations and responsibilities, and about the oversight 
capabilities granted to the International Seabed Authority.62 ITLOS in turn has also claimed 
jurisdiction over national port authorities, notably in the Juno Trader case, using its limited 
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compulsory jurisdiction to full effect and in the process both solidifying and expanding the 
scope of its own authority.63 The operation of UNCLOS is also actively orchestrated by the 
Division on Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, a branch of the UN Office of Legal 
Counsel, which acts as the Secretariat for UNCLOS. They are responsible for drafting the 
UN Secretary-General’s report on the law of the sea for the General Assembly, a role which 
they have explicitly interpreted as involving the progressive codification of the law of the 
sea. Indicative of this is the setting up of the ‘Ad-Hoc Open-ended Informal Working 
Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction’.64 This inauspiciously titled body has had a 
key role in developing the concept of a ‘marine protected area’, which has in turn been used 
to further elaborate the positive responsibilities of trusteeship held by states and other 
actors.65  
 There is a security dimension to the global commons too, which takes up Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s suggestion that to control this ‘wide common, over which men may pass in 
all directions’ is to hold the reigns of imperial domination.66 As Vogler argues, this 
perspective on the global commons is fundamentally different from that of environmental 
actors. Referencing Barry Posen’s analysis, he points to how the injunction to command the 
commons is part of a hegemonic foreign policy practice.67 By commanding the commons, 
the suggestion is that a powerful state can essentially free itself from all constraints – 
including, one assumes, those of international law. But this has changed too, as the threats 
from a failure to effectively police the global commons have grown. Security actors are 
increasingly accepting that given the limits of unilateral enforcement in the global commons 
there are significantly higher pay-offs from coordinating enforcement efforts. As Tara 
Murphy puts it, in the global commons ‘the security of one is tightly linked to the security of 
all.’68 As part of this general effort to preserve freedom of movement and trade, counter-
piracy efforts begin to look like part of a general practice of constitutional enforcement 
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rather than a narrow practice directed at Somali pirates. One of the mechanisms through 
which UN Security Council has sought to address the growing threat of piracy (especially in 
UNSC resolutions 1816 and 1846) has been to strengthen the principles governing the use 
of force in counter-piracy operations. This has helped resolve some of the gaps in the 
UNCLOS enforcement regime on piracy, specifically the uncertainty about who was 
responsible for policing piracy, who could legitimately be employed to strengthen the 
enforcement regime (including private security companies), and the measures that could and 
should be taken (including intervention to attack pirate bases). It is precisely because the 
Security Council’s role here was directed at giving ‘maximum effect’ to the customary 
prohibition on piracy that it becomes a practice strengthening the constitutional order rather 
than undermining it. This highlights the way that a practice of constitutional enforcement 
can emerge despite the express efforts from states to prevent enforcement practices having 
this effect.   
 This says as much about how international institutional practices reflect the ongoing 
internationalisation of “officialdom” – of international forms of institutional authority – as it 
does about the shift from the free seas to the global commons generating a constitutional 
authority to allocate enforcement responsibilities in international society. These are not 
isolated practices but part of a raft of recent attempts to reconcile the role of international 
institutions as public, constitutional authorities, rather than mere venues for private forms of 
state cooperation. For example, the capacity to act on the ‘common threat’ of piracy can be 
linked to arguments for the functional importance of international institutional authority.69 
The point isn’t the importance of any single instance of enforcement but the 
institutionalisation of a constitutional-type authority, in which public responsibilities are 
delegated by competent actors. The law of the sea regime is one example of how the 
international legal order has begun to establish this constitutional enforcement capacity – 
the capacity to delegate responsibilities – in which a number of institutional actors are 
empowered through the common purpose to promote what Tommy Koh called the 
‘common dream’ of enacting the constitution for the oceans.70  
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Conclusion 
 
I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that at the core of the pragmatic position was a 
belief that the constitutional order was too weak to support a commitment to international 
law enforcement as a constitutional practice. For a start the mechanics of enforcement are 
under-developed: there is no global police force or comprehensive judicial system with the 
power to give effect to the obligations. More fundamentally, because of ambiguity 
surrounding the constitutional rules, enforcement practices retrench state power, rather than 
strengthening the constitutional type authority of international law in international society. 
The result of this institutional weakness is that even where it looks like international law is 
being enforced, the pragmatist is able to argue that this is not “constitutional enforcement” 
but simply evidence of a contingent political reality.  
But this doesn’t adequately capture the normative commitments and attitudes 
shaping the institutional order in this domain. The principles established through the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea enabled constitutionalism in the sense that established a 
principled basis for developing the idea – and aspiration – for the ocean domain as a global 
commons, rather than as an anarchical space, a free seas. This clearly doesn’t fill the gaps in 
the comprehensiveness of the regime, including the abuses continuing to take place in the 
global commons. But it does foster the sense of institutional responsibility among 
international actors needed to remedy international law’s constitutional authority. The 
possibility that these responsibilities are imperfect and contested is hardly the point, at least 
from the constitutionalist perspective. The point is that constitutionalism can function as an 
effective and legitimate strategy for developing international law’s constitutional authority, 
motivated as it is by the drive to make practical and conceptual sense of the constitutional 
rules by developing a clear idea of the scope of the communal responsibilities they demand. 
In this respect at least, international law does offers a viable model of constitutional 
enforcement, a capacity to command the global commons.   
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Chapter 5 
International Rules, Domestic Constitutions: Closing the responsibility gap 
 
The rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international law, the law which 
whether deriving from treaty or international custom and practice governs the conduct of nations. I do not 
think this proposition is contentious. 
Tom Bingham1 
 
The most morally compelling features of the ideal of the rule of law have to do with the ways in which a legal 
system can protect individuals’ interests and respect individuals’ autonomy; but much of IL concerns the 
relations among states and in many cases states do not represent the interests of some or even most of their 
citizens. So it is not clear just how the commitment to the rule of law is to be cashed out in the international 
arena. 
Allen Buchanan2 
 
 
At the point of decision, should a responsible leader act from a commitment to the rule of 
international law and an imaginary global public or from a commitment to their own public, 
to their domestic constitution? From the pragmatist perspective, acting on international 
law’s claim to constitutional authority is to diminish a prior, democratically legitimated 
responsibility to enact the domestic constitution. The worry surrounding international law’s 
democratic deficit is that public institutions need to be able to track the interests of those 
they claim authority over, but that this capacity is complicated by the uncertainty 
surrounding who international law ultimately speaks for and is constituted to protect. For 
the pragmatist the reason the sovereign state has a privileged role in international society is 
that it is functionally better suited to judging and acting on their citizens’ fundamental 
interests. For the constitutionalist, international law has developed a capacity – in clearly 
defined circumstances – to dictate the scope and nature of states’ responsibility to advance 
international legality. Part of the challenge of establishing this constitutionalist perspective is 
the need to specify how this constitutionalist ethic of international legality is able to manage 
the tension between domestic and international practices of legality.3 International law’s 
claim to constitutional authority is premised on its claim to be able to protect and promote 
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not only international society’s existing standards of legality, but to privilege an ethic of 
legality with the capacity to reconcile the competition between domestic and international 
practices of legality. This chapter explores the way this challenge has structured practices of 
rule of law promotion. I argue that the way the tension created for international law by the 
lack of a global democratic process have begun to be redressed at the United Nations 
through a practice of exercising trusteeship over the ideal of legality, and in the process 
implicitly claiming to balance against arbitrary domination.  
 
The responsibility gap  
 
Carving out the space for a constitutional ethic raises both a general problem facing 
justifications of the constitutional authority of law, and a specific problem for the 
constitutional authority of international law. In claiming supremacy within a constitutional 
order, law must at various points clash with the democratic impulse. When this commitment 
to democratic legitimacy is cashed out, it means that for a judge to review and, potentially, 
strike down, democratically authored legislation is for the legal order to over-reach into the 
democratically demarcated and hence constitutionally superior domain of politics.4 In 
practice, however, part of the role of constitutional law is to check the excesses of 
democratic populism, to provide a measure of stability and certainty that the democratic 
entitlement does not. As a result questions about the democratic deficit in constitutional law 
do not necessarily lead to any great worry. Rather than heralding a constitutional crisis, this 
is simply the great ‘paradox of constitutionalism’; as Martin Laughlin and Neil Walker put it, 
constitutionalism ‘is underpinned by two fundamental though antagonistic imperatives: that 
governmental power ultimately is generated from the “consent of the people” and that, to 
be sustained and effected, such power must be divided, constrained and exercised through 
distinctive institutional forms.’5 The tension between legal authority and democratic 
legitimacy – between law and politics – is something that all constitutional orders have had 
to manage; it forms part of the constitutional politics of social order.  
Internationally, international law’s constitutional politics are defined by the 
sovereigntist claim that the state still provides the best metric of “constituent power” in 
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international society and, hence, continues to function as the best source for legitimate 
authority. The “democratic” content of international law is found in the sovereign equality 
of states, in the institutionally privileged role of consent and state practice, and in the 
protection of territorial integrity.6 As Guglielmo Verdirame argues, the state both embodies 
collective liberty and enables individual liberty by protecting the principle of self-
determination – a principle that international institutions have been too willing to set aside.7 
This fits with the traditional justification of the separation between the domestic and 
international realms, as a way to protect the superiority of the domestic constitution, to limit 
the reach of public international law and cordon off what James Mayall describes as the 
‘undemocratic legacies’ of international law.8 As Mayall puts it, ‘At first sight, international 
law, the bedrock institution on which the idea of an international society stands or falls, is 
not well suited to the discriminatory flexibility that seems to be called for if democratic 
values are to be seriously pursued at the international level. To begin with, this was not a 
major problem since the scope of international law was quite deliberately restricted to what 
could be agreed between, so to say, consenting sovereigns acting in private’.9 Where it has 
become a problem is as the constitutionalist of international law began to challenge this 
sovereigntist limitation on the scope of international responsibilities.  
As Steven Wheatley argues, under the guise of constitutionalism ‘international law 
increasingly asserts a right to determine the normative situation of citizens of democratic 
states, without, it would seem, any meaningful connection to the idea of democratic 
legitimacy.’10 The question for international law is how to ensure that it tracks the interests 
of those it most affects better than the sovereign institutions it threatens to displace. Politics 
works (most of the time) in domestic societies to create the sense of fit between the legal 
and political orders; domestic politics (and not only democratic politics, as the Arab Spring 
highlighted) is how citizens make their constitutional preferences and expectations known. 
The worry that international law is unable to genuinely reflect the preferences of those it 
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purports to rule. The lack of a space for genuine political dialogue challenges the capacity of 
international law to justify its constitutional authority over states because it lacks a way to 
close the gap between the authority claimed by international law to rule, and the uncertainty 
among law’s subjects about the terms of this rule. One reason for this stands out: 
international law struggles to identify with any degree of certainty whose fundamental 
interests it ought to protect. There is a fundamental tension between ruling in the interests 
of individuals and ruling in the interests of states. Treating the state as the sole subject of 
international law – and as the only agent with international legal personality – was part of a 
strategy to avoid this tension. Human rights norms have confused this picture, on the one 
hand seeming to enfranchise individuals against their states, while on the other hand lacking 
any real force against a sovereign state beyond the power to persuade. For individuals living 
under the yoke of an oppressive regime that isn’t a danger to international peace and security 
and hasn’t violated rules which could trigger an intervention there is no virtue to 
international legality. Instead, this value cloaks a despotic, anti-democratic leader – think of 
Zimbabwe, for instance – with the sovereign immunities of state. In protecting the privileges 
of state, international law’s ‘others’ lose out.11 
This is to say that there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding who it is that 
international law’s constitutional authority is being exercised on behalf of – and how 
international law might generate certainty in this domain. This creates the type of 
responsibility gap that the pragmatic approach is able to exploit, to pick at until the only 
legitimate strategy seems to be one dictated by the recognition of pluralism. One strategy for 
addressing this problem advocated by some of those writing on global constitutionalism is 
to approach constitutionalism as a functional tool to ‘compensate’ states for their loss of 
sovereign control, incurred as international politics has morphed into global politics, as 
threats and opportunities have been spilled beyond borders, and as states have struggled to 
exercise their domestic constitutional responsibility to protect and advance the interests of 
their own citizens.12 International law and the institutions of global governance are able to 
bolster state capacity, and in this sense to protect the de facto powers of the sovereign state to 
fulfil their democratic responsibilities, to serve the interests of their citizens. The process of 
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fulfilling democratic, domestic constitutional responsibilities must reflect the new 
transnational form of international society.13  
Another answer is to argue that the institutionalization of human rights have ushered 
in a wholesale change to the primary referent of international law. Jeremy Waldron, for 
example, argues that international law – like any domestic government – is legitimated by its 
functional capacity to protect and promote the individual’s autonomy. Because of this the 
benefits from the international rule of law do not accrue to states, but to their citizens.14 Both 
sovereign states and international law are, equally, agents of individual well-being. This 
carries significant normative weight: if international law is constituted for individuals, rather 
than for states, the permissible range of international law promoting actions expands 
dramatically. More importantly, the responsibilities that follow from a commitment to 
international legality cannot be limited by reference to the sovereign privilege, not if the 
sovereign state and the international legal order are both tracking the same basic individual 
needs and interests. Ruti Teitel captures the basic idea nicely in her arguments that 
international law has shifted from being for state to being ‘for humanity’.15 The shift in the 
addressee of international has created a constitutional order where sovereignty is 
responsibility; the legitimacy of international law comes from its function as the trustee of 
this responsibility. This positions constitutionalism as part of international law’s 
cosmopolitan turn (or cosmopolitanism’s turn to international law). This credits 
international law with a degree of normative authority on the basis that it does a better job 
of protecting particularly important moral values than states are able to.16 The point of these 
various efforts to “bind” international law to the individual is to reconstitute states – and 
international lawyers – as local agents of global public order. Framed in this way, however, 
one of the dangers is that deepens the perception that ‘the key to the transformation from a 
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pluralistic international legal order to a constitutionalized one arguably lies in the gradual 
democratization of international law-making’, if only to better reflect and protect these 
common interests.17  
 For a similar reason, from the pragmatic perspective, however, none of these 
arguments really shakes the structures of international society in a way that justifies a 
constitutional approach to the responsibilities of legality. To understand why, consider Anne 
Marie Slaughter’s influential attempt to address concerns about international law’s authority 
by showing how the agents of international and domestic authority are, in fact, one and the 
same. She uses the existence of what she calls ‘transnational expert networks’ as a way to 
show that international authority can be domestic authority too. The fact judicial actors, for 
one, talk to each other helps to craft a global jurisprudence for a new world order. We can 
ensure that these international actors ‘uphold the public trust’ because as part of their 
domestic role they are subject to a raft of administrative, constitutional and professional 
constraints.18 There is an implicit constructivist belief that this gets easier over time, as the 
process of mediating between domestic politics and international law transforms both 
domains.19 But at some point even highly networked actors will have to choose between 
applying the international standard and the democratically grounded domestic standard. 
They will have to confront the problem of divided loyalties and fragmented commitments. 
To put this a different way, arguing for international law’s constitutional authority in 
international society requires engaging with the nature of international law’s claim to 
establish a form of hierarchical authority, not a horizontal, flat account that leaves the 
structures of sovereign privilege untouched.20  
This raises, again, the need to specify the responsibilities of legality in conditions of 
uncertainty. From the pragmatic perspective, the constitutional form – how you resolve the 
paradox of constitutional authority – is still up for grabs. There is a fundamental uncertainty 
about who ‘owns’ international law, and this uncertainty grants states a privileged position 
when it comes to claiming the capacity to best represent individuals’ interests. Moreover, the 
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sort of structures that could justify international law’s constitutional authority – such as the 
UN – further institutionalise uncertainty in the failure to act on the responsibilities that the 
Charter provides. As Philip Allott characterises it, the United Nations suffers from the ‘grim 
ambiguity’ of being ‘an international social system of a new kind trying to organize a new 
kind of international society but still trapped in the folk-ways of the theatre of ritualized 
cynicism which is the world of the old diplomacy’.21 As long as this a domains where the 
image of crisis drives constitutional politics, there is no easy institutional resolution to this 
question. From the constitutionalist perspective, however, the situation is less clear-cut. 
Developing the conceptual nature of the responsibilities that attach to legality can help 
generate the conditions for rightful authority, without necessarily requiring democratic 
institutions. Uncertainty about the democratic purpose of international law does not 
necessarily undermine international law’s claim to constitutional authority.  
In the remainder of this chapter I argue that the divide between pragmatic and 
constitutional approaches helps to characterise some of the debates surrounding the practice 
of rule of law promotion and peacebuilding. But it also helps to show how constitutionalism 
has the capacity to reconstruct and reframe the terms of this debate, as international actors 
begin to realise the scope and terms of their trusteeship for the ethic of legality in the public 
domain, as a response to the need to specify a better and more coherent justificatory 
framework for their actions. In this regard, I suggest, establishing the promotion of the rule 
of law by international actors as a coherent operational practice can be seen as a part of 
instantiating the rule of law as a function of balancing against the arbitrary exercise of power 
at both the domestic and international space, as part of a global public.   
 
Rule of law promotion 
  
Rule of law promotion is an industry, an industry built on the claim to expert knowledge of 
the rule of law. Simply within the United Nations system, some form of rule of law 
promotion takes place across 40 different UN entities, in 125 member states.22 Rule of law 
promotion has become a locus for normative development and ingenuity, especially in the 
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United Nations.23 This is because the practice of rule of law promotion acts as a conceptual 
synapse, cutting across and bringing together work on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, 
development, security, transitional justice and crime prevention – conceptualizing the nature 
of legality has helped bring coherence to the broader work of the UN in conflict and post-
conflict states.24 For the same reason, investment in rule of law promotion has the potential 
to magnify the effect of otherwise limited resources, deepening the relationship with parallel 
efforts to strengthen peace and security, development and human rights.  
Attempts to unlock the institutional potential of the rule of law have had to respond 
to the lack of any single definition of the rule of law. Promoting this value might require a 
relatively thin, procedural set of norms, or it might require a whole host of thick ethical 
commitments including the protection of basic human rights and, for some, the right to 
democratic self-government. In practice, rule of law promoters have tended to rely on the 
idea that there is a relatively coherent understanding of the elements of the rule of law in the 
‘general principles of law recognized by civilized states’.25 This cashes out in a practical sense 
of the institutional features required to establish the rule of law, including limiting arbitrary 
decision-making through the separation of powers, protecting the independence of the 
judiciary, enshrining basic human rights, prohibiting detention without trial and retroactive 
rule-making, and treating all subjects of the law equally. In other words, there is form to rule 
of law promotion even in the absence of agreed content. At the international level, this 
working consensus on the rule of law is most comprehensively captured by the UN 
definition:  
‘The rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which 
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as 
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality 
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
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separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.’26 
 
This raises more questions than it answers, however. How do you prevent a merely 
formal, skin-deep commitment to legality taking root? How do you manage the trade-offs, 
tensions and uncertainty inherent in any legal order? And when the UN commits to ‘ensure 
the supremacy of law’, to which law does this refer: international or domestic? It is in this 
context that rule of law promotion – and all the parallel practices of peacebuilding, 
development, security and so on of which it is a core part – triggers questions regarding 
international law’s constitutional authority. It raises special questions about the scope of the 
responsibilities generated by a commitment to international as opposed to domestic legality. 
This is to say that rule of law promotion is part of the larger constitutional practice and 
politics of reconciling the tensions between sovereignty or ‘national ownership’ and 
international authority, paralleling the tension between pragmatic and constitutionalism 
ethics. The potential for conflict about the nature of the constitutional rules governing this 
domain is particularly evident in the difficulty with specifying the “constitutional” status of 
human rights standards in rule of law promotion. Should these be treated as absolute, with 
states emerging from conflict having an obligation to implement human rights standards as 
quickly as possible? Or do these impose too high a burden on fragile states, an ‘obligation 
overload’27 which suggest legitimate – and legally permissible – reasons to delay?  
In practice these problems tend to coalesce around questions about the legitimacy of 
expert judgement. This occurs in well-developed constitutional orders too, where the role of 
the judiciary in resolving these questions can be argued to entrench a form of anti-
democratic, expert rule.28 But, as I have suggested, these philosophical uncertainties are 
further heightened where there is no clear sense that the legal order is capable of generating 
and protecting a constitutional ethic of legality, where the sense of responsibility needed to 
remedy these challenges to law’s constitutional authority are lacking. In this sense the 
conflict and post-conflict context for rule of law promotion serves as a useful parallel 
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through which to understand the nature of the challenge to international law’s claim to 
constitutional authority. For example, what a Fox News commentator or Daily Mail 
columnist says on the nature of the rule of law has, one would hope, a lesser weight than 
what a Supreme Court justice says. But does that same judge have superior knowledge to the 
local chief or leader of a distant village community? Or, more pointedly, does an 
international civil servant have a greater claim to expertise in this area than a local judge or 
political leader in Costa Rica, Kenya, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan? If so, on what grounds, and 
within what limits?  
There are, I would suggest, three institutional responses to the responsibility gap 
which emerge from the practices of rule of law promotion. The first is to appeal to the 
universal nature of the standards being promoted. The second is to privilege the local, 
rejecting expert rule as anti-democratic. The third approach is to emphasise the expert as an 
orchestrator, a facilitator, an enfranchiser, connecting the local to the international. The 
argument I develop here is that pragmatic concerns cash out in either an argument for rule 
of law universalism or rule of law imperialism, because pragmatism treats the responsibility 
gap in international law as an invitation to assert political, policy perspectives as a necessary 
part of the promotion of legality. The constitutional approach – where the justification of 
authority is treated as a conceptual problem requiring a principled solution – emerges as part 
of a practice of trusteeship. This is to justify a belief in international authority on the basis 
that international law can function to prevent an arbitrary exercise of power, if properly 
constituted. In this regard the practices associated with ‘ensuring national ownership’ can be 
understood as a partial response to the challenge David Kennedy lays down for 
humanitarian actors: to take ‘responsible action as a ruler where expertise cannot be 
perfected’.29 The important point as far as the constitutional authority of international law is 
that there is a coherent sense of the responsibilities required as a result of the commitment 
to legality becoming embedded in the institutional fabric of international society.  
 
Rule of law universalisms 
 
The classical justification for rule of law promotion is as a technical activity. This paints 
legality as a measure of good governance, a series of the technical markers a state needs to 
exhibit on the road to development and stability. On this model rule of law promoters claim 
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to be able to bracket off questions about legitimate authority by appealing to the standards 
of legality.30 The important outcome for the success of this project is establishing the right 
institutions and rules; no matter if, initially, they don’t function as promised, or accurately 
reflect a society’s existing governance norms and structures, or exert any special pull to 
obedience. Experience dictates that establishing the institutions of legality will eventually 
come good.  
If we can identify the elements of the rule of law, this can establish a standard of 
expert authority that allows promoters, regardless of their location, to overcome the 
authority problem. Far from representing a ‘disturbingly thin base of knowledge’31, 
practitioner know-how suggests a quite thick base of knowledge. As Simon Chesterman 
argues, a checklist approach to rule of law promotion can be justified if what we’re ticking 
off corresponds to the necessary elements that the rule of law must express if it is to be able 
to fulfil its regulatory function.32 There is an uncontested core to the practice of the rule of 
law and legality, never mind that it is theoretically contested at the margins. The point is that 
if we can agree on either the normative or functional desirability of the rule of law, and if we 
can agree on the minimum features that should be promoted in practice, this is enough to 
establish the legitimate authority of rule of law promoters.  
This ‘good governance’ rationale was behind what Thomas Carothers terms the 
‘rule-of-law revival’, particularly as spearheaded in the US and World Bank contexts.33 The 
US strategy is quite clear: the universal nature of the aspiration for the rule of law entails that 
‘supporting the rule of law is not necessarily imposing foreign ideas on a society’.34 The 
World Bank is – at least in recent years – somewhat more circumspect about the dangers of 
a universalist, checklist approach to rule of law promotion. They accept that there will be 
conflicts, hypocrisies and trade-offs inherent in the practice of rule of law promotion, and 
that domestic voices might from time to time not be heard. But even while accepting the 
authority problem, they treat their indicators of legality as an a priori standard for all 
countries to aspire to. As Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry have 
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recently suggested, however, these indicators signal a claim to a particular type of authority. 
They do not establish a free-floating technical knowledge, but a claim to knowledge that is 
tied to the particular international practice of global governance. In their words, ‘using any 
given indicator in global governance involves tacitly accepting both a very particular set of 
claims about the standards against which societies ought to be evaluated and a particular 
process for generating those claims.’35 Stephen Humphreys similarly argues that rule of law 
promotion should be regarded as a form of transnationalism because the practice, even 
though claiming access to a universal type of knowledge, is nonetheless ‘undertaken by 
agents in (and of) one set of countries but conducted in another set of countries’.36  
The problem with this approach is that universalism functions in practice to ground 
a claim to external, undemocratic forms of authority. It covers the pragmatic seizure of 
authority by international actors. The problematic nature of this kind of attitude can be seen 
with particular clarity in the international efforts to advance “justice” – including human 
rights and fair trial standards after conflict. This kind of mindset ends up, however, allowing 
practitioners to avoid having to take responsibility for the authority being exercised. It 
prevents practitioners from asking hard questions about the purpose of their actions, and 
about what the intended gains are from the institutions being constructed. As Simon 
Chesterman argues, ‘The “why” question is important because it leads to the corollary for 
whom’.37 
 
Rule of law imperialisms 
 
This difficulty of specifying who it is that rule of law promotion serves – and the legitimate 
scope of the activities that a commitment to legality can justify – leads some to reject these 
practices as imperialism in disguise. Rather than advancing the good of individuals in weak 
states, rule of law promotion helps to embed a form and structure of domination, a rule-by-
elites. The basic claim is that the application of international standards is in practice both 
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targeted at and implemented by transnational elites. As a consequence, rule of law standards 
end up reflecting the interests of these elites: when tensions between rule of law standards 
need to be reconciled, they are reconciled to the benefit of elites, and at the expense of 
ordinary individuals. Rule of law promotion, in other words, is a practice which allows 
domestic and international elites to capture the machinery of developing states and, in so 
doing, replicates ant-democratic and illegitimate colonial modes of domination. Despite the 
progressive rhetoric rule of law promotion stacks the decks in favour of elite actors and the 
status quo. Ordinary individuals get left out and screwed over under the guise of a 
commitment to legality.  
These concerns centre on the claim that in presenting the rule of law as ‘a panacea 
for the ills of countries in transition’38 international practitioners are replicating a colonial 
belief that to build the institutions of constitutional order, as Martti Koskenniemi puts it, 
‘would be to do history's work, in that it would gradually transform backward societies into 
the European state form’.39 Antony Anghie argues that this implied colonial superiority 
abounds in the language of international law, finding that ‘the essential structure of the 
civilizing mission may be reconstructed in the very contemporary vocabulary of human 
rights, governance and economic liberalization.’40 In this rule of law promotion is an 
instance of both political and cultural imperialism – it advances political domination under 
the guise of cultural superiority, embedding a new “standard of civilization” in international 
society. The problem is that the nature of this standard of civilization is controlled and 
interpreted by those already in a position of power, in a position to dominate. As 
institutionalized in international law, in other words, the appeal to legality functions to 
conceal ‘plunder’, practices in which ‘stronger political actors victimize weaker ones’.41  
David Kennedy captures the ideological aspect of imperialism, in particular in his 
skewering of property rights, long the darling of development economists.42 For Kennedy, 
the emphasis on property rights highlights the tendency of development actors to reproduce 
a disciplinary ideology, rather than to establish the sort of sustained social conversation that 
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could endow the legal order with the capacity to protect both public and private interests – 
including the interests of investors and development economists in seeing property rights 
protecting. In place of a genuine attempt to grapple with the complex process of building a 
legal order, these societies instead get a top-down recycling of disciplinary truths like “strong 
property rights lead to development” which allow unfair and ineffective practices and 
policies to persist. Moreover, granting entitlements – which is what property rights does – is 
not a benign practice. It usurps a conversation about the nature of ‘ownership’ within a 
society, a conversation traditionally tied to the democratic practices and institutions of 
constitutionalism.  
This feeds the pragmatic perspective on international law by reflecting broader 
worries about how a claim to expertise or expert knowledge can replace the complex 
political conversation needed to generate a genuine sense of the commitments and 
responsibilities implied by the idea of legality. There is no institutional pressure on 
international actors to question whether the proposals, policies or strategies adopted in 
order to advance legality actually work in practice – and no accountability if they and when 
they fail. Even more than that, there is no accountability when the policy ideals fail to be 
operationalized in practice – there is no democratic mechanism of displacing a disappointing 
ruler.43 How in these circumstances can a commitment to international law substitute for the 
domestic sovereign state as the locus of constitutional authority? This is another way to say 
that the democratic deficit in international law is a problem – there is no mechanism for 
public feedback, and hence no public incentive on these experts to revisit and revise their 
working practices, methods, concepts and assumptions. The result of this is that rather than 
being a part of the solution, expert authority becomes a part of the problem, simply another 
form of elite rule. The ‘governments and recalcitrant populations’ on the receiving end of 
rule of law promotion become ‘rule-takers rather than -shapers’, imperial subjects rather 
than full participants in a conversation about the responsibilities unlocked through 
international actors’ commitment to legality.44 As David Chandler puts it, the end result of 
this is that ‘the needs and interests of those subject to intervention are often ignored, 
resulting in the maintenance of inequalities and conflicts and undermining the asserted goals 
of external interveners.’45  
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Rule of law constitutionalism 
 
The UN’s approach to rule of law promotion emerged as an attempt to reconcile 
international, expert authority with the domestic bases of legitimacy. It approached this 
challenge by stressing that the commitment to the rule of law emerges as an essential part of 
claiming constitutional sovereignty.46 Not only that but this necessary commitment to the 
rule of law generates certain fundamental responsibilities. Rule of law promotion in this 
context should be managed through domestic institutions but conceptualised as an 
international principle, a property required in order to realise the full nature of sovereignty. 
The key provision in the UN rule of law strategy document capturing this position is given 
under the principle ‘Ensure national ownership’ and reads as follows:  
‘No rule of law programme can be successful in the long term if imposed from the 
outside. Process leadership and decision-making must be in the hands of national 
stakeholders. Rule of law development requires the full and meaningful participation and 
support of national stakeholders, inter alia, government officials, justice and other rule of 
law officials, national legal professionals, traditional leaders, women, children, minorities, 
refugees and displaced persons, other marginalized groups and civil society . . . 
Meaningful ownership requires the legal empowerment of all segments of society.’47  
 
One way to understand this is as establishing a standard of legality as an evolved 
institutional practice which can’t be imposed on a society from outside with any degree of 
success. The target community needs to buy into whatever actions are being taken. Rather 
than promote an institutionally proscriptive model of the rule of law, based on international 
expectations or indicators or sheer hegemonic power, this model starts from the 
understanding that the development of the rule of law is part of a ‘long and painful process’, 
as Nancy Birdsall and Francis Fukuyama put it, with the result that ‘institutions such as the 
rule of law will rarely work if they are simply copied from abroad; societies must buy into 
                                                          
 
46 ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance’, April 2008, available at 
http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?doc_id=2124; also ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Second Annual Report 
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47 ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance’, April 2008, available at 
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their content.’48 Part of this process of promoting the rule of law is to enable the domestic 
society to claim ownership of the legal order, including establishing a mindset, a practice of 
believing in the governing institutions, which ultimately enables a society to buy in, to trust 
in the legitimacy of the aspiration for the rule of law.49 Depending on the context, the 
addressee in this process might, as Stephen Humphries suggests, only be ‘a notional public’, 
with rule of law promoters speaking as if their actions track the interests of this public, but 
there are increasingly serious attempts to substantiate this and tailor promotional activities to 
the demands of a real public.50 The UK Department for International Development, a 
particularly important and well-respected actor in this field, makes a similar point, stressing 
the ‘centrality of politics in building effective states and shaping development outcomes’ and 
in turn understanding politics in this context as the networked interactions between states, 
citizens and elites.51 Stephen Golub speaks to something similar in talking about the ‘legal 
empowerment alternative’ in rule of law promotion, which sees experts placed in supportive 
rather than orchestrative roles.52 
The hegemonic nature of international authority doesn’t quite disappear, but the 
focus on the institutional structures through which this authority is mediated has an impact 
on justifying this authority. Rather than being a universal standard, both in terms of the truth 
of the knowledge claim being promoted and in terms of the validity of the actors promoting 
it, the rule of law is regarded as a general standard, constructed on the basis of internationally 
extensive principles. There is a close parallel here with the principled development of the 
communal, constitutional nature of international law, the story I sketched in chapter 1. 
Some constitutional rules in international law, for example jus cogens norms, posit a standard 
that is true without regard to any particular context, with international custom providing 
evidence of a fundamental moral prohibition or entitlement. In contrast international law 
establishes a constitutional claim by elaborating the public standard, by establishing the 
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principled terms of the international community’s public commitment to the values 
protected and promoted by international law.  
But there is a more sweeping implication to the UN approach here, in that this 
conception of needing to ensure national ownership emerged from a more general sense 
that the concept of the rule of law was in danger of becoming meaningless given the variety 
of ways and variety of contexts in which it had been deployed to justify the UN authority. In 
other words, there was a recognition of the need for greater coherence in the concept of the 
rule of law, in order to bring order to the practice of promoting the rule of law in 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, transitional justice, international relations, development, 
security and so on. Having refined their understanding of the value and virtue of the rule of 
law, it strengthened the basis for actions to improve international constitutional authority.  
One way to illustrate how a principle of ensuring national ownership can, in the end, 
strengthen the basis for a constitutionalist ethic is to look at the principle of 
complementarity. The principle of complementarity refers to the key trigger for the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the ICC, but has also slipped beyond this context to be applied across the 
various domains in which rule of law promoters act. At the ICC the basic idea is that if a 
state is genuinely ‘unable or unwilling’ to investigate, prosecute and punish those accused of 
international crimes, “ownership” of the prosecution can be claimed by the ICC. This 
principle was originally intended to safeguard the primacy of the domestic legal system and 
to ensure that the ICC remained a court of last resort. This principle has led Moreno-
Ocampo to regard the best possible outcome for the International Criminal Court as one in 
which it never has any work; in an ideal world, all prosecutions for international crimes 
would take place at the domestic level. From this perspective, complementarity functions as 
backstop for when the domestic institutions fail. Framed in this way, complementary 
establishes a negative responsibility: don’t prosecute if a state is able or willing. But there is 
an implied positive responsibility here too: help states develop their ability and willingness to 
prosecute. It is in this context that the idea of proactive or positive complementarity has 
evolved, as a catchall concept for describing and discussing the broader institutional 
responsibilities for promoting peace and justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. This 
has both been a source of criticism and a cause for optimism. Critically, the worry about 
positive complementarity is that it is underspecified and over-promises.53 More 
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optimistically, it can be seen as offering a way to bring even greater practical coherence to 
the practice of rule of law promotion, both at the local level in terms of including local 
stakeholders, and at the international level, in terms of bridging the divide between the 
various international institutions with a role in pursuing transitional justice, peacebuilding, 
and reconciliation.54 
What is important here is not the practice of complementarity but the language of 
shared responsibilities to advance the rule of law. Putting this in the context of the concept of 
trusteeship can help explain not only the circumstances in which rule of law promotion 
might be legitimate but also how rule of law promotion might be regarded as an exercise of 
constitutional responsibility. This is to say that the drive to develop a conceptually coherent 
understanding of the commitment to legality helps both to justify an expansive set of 
responsibilities in this domain and, by the same token, to make sense of how the UN has 
begun to institutionalize a constitutionalist ethic. Trusteeship is a concept that, at its core, is 
a conversation about the conditions in which rightful rule can be exercised on behalf of 
another.55 In this vein we talk about trusteeship arrangements for the mentally ill, trusteeship 
(or guardianship) over children and trusteeship over a company or estate. In the debates on 
a ‘standard of civilization’, trusteeship became part of a politicized division between civilized 
peoples and barbarian others, used to justify practices of colonial domination. The UN has, 
more recently, exercised trusteeship over failed or post-conflict states, such as in Kosovo. 
But trusteeship has more specific connotations in the context of constitutional law, which 
provides good reasons to think that a trusteeship mentality is both inevitable and justified as 
part of the responsibility to advance the rule of international law, in particular as part of 
maintaining a separation of powers in a constitutional order. In a reflection of this, Tom 
Bingham quotes one Victorian Lord Chief Justice as saying: ‘The constitution has lodged the 
sacred deposit of sovereign authority in a chest locked by three different keys, confided to 
the custody of three different trustees’.56 This is said to become important in the context of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
inflate expectations and gives sceptics ammunition for their criticisms of the legitimacy and efficacy of these 
expressions of international authority. Securing both justice and peace, she argues, ‘may require a pragmatic 
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54 Edric Selous, Director of the UN Rule of Law Unit, Personal interview, 21 September 2011 
55 See generally William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power (Oxford: Oxford 
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parliamentary sovereignty, where parliament ‘is said to enjoy the privilege of striking off the 
two other locks when, for any purpose of its own, it wishes to lay hands on the treasure’.  
The point of this in the context of the present argument is to suggest that the UN, in 
attempting to justify its strategy for promoting the rule of law, has implicitly claimed a 
trusteeship over the idea of the rule of law, and used that position to justify the range of 
practices undertaken. This is not to say that the UN has always exercised this trusteeship 
role wisely or well, or that it has been recognized as having any such role by sovereign states. 
Hammarskjöld, for example, was widely criticized for his role in the Congo crisis; Annan 
presided over the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide; perhaps most damningly from a 
constitutionalist perspective, Moon has resisted the idea that international organisations can 
be held accountable for violations of international law during peacekeeping operations. 
These failings shouldn’t be minimized. Neither should the UN be forgiven for its failure to 
operationalize its pursuit of the rule of law at the international level as vigorously as it has 
done in conflict and post-conflict states.  
But this also shouldn’t be regarded as an issue that fundamentally disables the 
United Nations’ broader constitutional role as ‘the eye of nations, to keep watch upon the 
common interests, an eye that does not slumber, an eye that is everywhere, watchful and 
attentive’.57 It is in the pursuit of the ideal, in the process of exercising responsibility over 
the ideal of the rule of law, the process of claiming trusteeship for this value, that the 
international and domestic constitutional orders begin to be aligned towards the same basic 
ends, as part of the same basic constitutional order.  
 
Conclusion: Trusteeship and the construction of a global public  
 
In order to manage the lack of direct democratic authorization, rule of law promotion must 
be understood as an on-going process of bleeding constitutional authority into the 
international system, and this means responding to the ambiguity created by the tension 
between domestic and international claims. But developing constitutional authority is not a 
one-shot deal, there is not some magic line to cross at which point states cease to have full 
sovereignty and international law takes over in compensation. This is to say that 
international law’s constitutional authority is not ‘compensatory’, because nothing has been 
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lost, except the scope for a pragmatic ethic of legality. The constitutionalist ethic gets its 
footing through the recognition that the international order has been constituted as a 
genuinely public sphere – where actors are expected to fully own the responsibilities created 
through the exercise of public authority, including the responsibility for bringing coherence 
to the value of legality.  
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Chapter 6 
Constitutional Interpretation and Torture 
 
Bybee gives us Humpty Dumpty literary interpretation, styled as careful legal reasoning. In Through the 
Looking-Glass, Humpty Dumpty says to Alice: 
"There's glory for you!" 
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,' " Alice said. 
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't—till I tell you. I meant 'there's a 
nice knock-down argument for you!' " 
"But 'glory' doesn't mean a 'nice knock-down argument,' " Alice objected. 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all." 
Peter Brooks1 
 
                                                      
The prohibition on torture is a clear peremptory norm of international law.2 It is a core 
human rights obligation, establishing absolute and non-derogable responsibilities both as a 
matter of custom and treaty law.3 In the rubric of this thesis, the prohibition on torture is a 
constitutional rule. And yet efforts to counter terrorism have given rise to considerable 
normative backsliding in this area, with some characterizing the prohibition on torture as a 
norm ‘in regression’4, others finding it suffering a presumably less serious ‘crisis of 
legitimacy’5 – on the road to regression but not there quite yet – and others questioning 
whether a mistake might have been made in the first instance in identifying torture as a 
peremptory norm, asserting that since some states have done and still do clearly engage in 
or support torture and associated practices in certain circumstances, it clearly isn’t quite as 
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out of bounds as international human rights standards imply.6 In this way, and despite its 
formally peremptory status, efforts to introduce exceptions to the reach of torture 
obligations and counter-efforts to expand the scope of issues prohibited under the torture 
obligations are part of a battle over whether international law can claim the degree of 
superior authority suggested by the language of legal obligations, and how the agents of 
international law are able to respond to challenges to the authority of international law. For 
the pragmatists, the uncertain application of the prohibition on torture is evidence that the 
rule needed to change. If it cannot or will not be obeyed, it should not have a peremptory 
status. As Michael Glennon puts it, the failure to recognise this leads to ‘peremptory 
nonsense’.7  
 The evidence here is not only the high profile failures of the Bush administration 
but also the widespread practice of torture by illiberal states. The reason the US arguments 
for torture were so important for the larger constitutional question, however, was that these 
arguments implied that torture could be, in the right circumstances and with the right 
definition, a legitimate practice. Torture could be squared with a commitment to legality. 
This tests the coherence of international law’s interpretive practices; it tests whether these 
interpretive practices can function to remedy threats to international law’s constitutional 
authority. It tests whether these interpretive practices are able to generate the right kind of 
change, whether they are able to fill out the nature of a progressive ethic of constitutional 
responsibility.  
 The first section gives an account of the practice of constitutional interpretation, 
suggesting that this practice is crucial to remedying the binding authority of international 
law. The second section suggests that appeals to either social fit or legal integrity as the 
ends of constitutional interpretation reflects the pragmatic and the constitutionalist divide 
on the responsibilities inherent in the practice of legality. But by focusing attention on the 
constitutional responsibilities held and exercised by international actors, and in particular 
the determinate sense of the appropriate, lawyerly practice of interpretation, these debates 
show how a constitutional ethic can emerge as the responsible ethic. The final section 
argues that this was the progressive legacy of the torture debates: it created a far better 
sense of the interpretive responsibilities embedded in the international legal order, and of 
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how the right to progressively interpret a constitutional rule was both limited and premised 
on a capacity to do so within the existing principles of legality. 
  
Indeterminacy, Interpretation and Constitutional Evolution 
 
Both interrogation and the interpretation of international law can be described as ‘dark 
arts’, and for similar reasons.8 In the case of interrogation, the difficulty is extracting the 
necessary information from a subject unwilling to give up their secret. This is a dark art in 
two senses. In the more prosaic sense, it is a practice that can lead to dark places. 
Interrogation relies on deceit, manipulating a subject’s fear, uncertainty and powerlessness 
to foster a desire to tell what they know. Where the aim is to get recalcitrant people to talk, 
being a good interrogator can mean using measures that amount to torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment; hence the euphemism ‘enhanced interrogation’. As one 
ex-interrogator puts it, ‘If you’re not abusing someone’s human rights, you’re not doing it 
right’.9 But it is by no means a universal truth that torture is the most effective method of 
interrogation. There is in reality no one best way to extract information from a recalcitrant 
subject. This leads to the second sense in which interrogation is a ‘dark art’: in the end, 
interrogation is a talent, not a science. The interrogator cannot rely on simply applying 
determinate rules about “how to interrogate a suspect”; they need an intuitive grasp of the 
method that will work with the context and the character of the suspect. They need an 
ability to judge best practice in light of the context. As Mark Bowden summarizes it, 
despite the collected wisdom about best practice, because success comes down to a 
question of inchoate ability ‘some interrogators are just better at it than others.’10  
 In the case of interpretation the difficulty, and the artistic element, comes with 
assigning the authoritative meaning to an obligation.11 Every act of legal interpretation 
contains within it a claim that such and such is “the best meaning” to be attached to the 
obligation. But because there is no settled definition of what this best meaning is, as Sir 
Humphrey Waldock suggests, ‘In most instances, interpretation involves giving meaning to a 
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text’.12 This leads to two opposed conclusions. First, the nexus between interpretation and 
authority suggests that the interpretive practice itself must be as stable, determinate, and 
rule-governed as possible. If interpretation is a creative activity conditioning the force a 
legal obligation is able to claim, protecting against arbitrary or subjectively beneficial 
renderings of the law creates a strong incentive for regulating the interpretative process. 
Rules of interpretation can ensure that the law applies equally to all subjects. The second 
effect of the connection between interpretation and authority, however, is that it becomes 
impossible to imagine interpretive rules that could govern in such an absolute, deterministic 
way without on occasion making a nonsense of the core obligation. In order to be alive to 
the appropriate meaning of an obligation, the interpretive process needs to allow for a 
certain amount of leeway. It needs to allow for practitioner’s judgement. The most we 
should hope for from interpretive rules is that they codify what amounts to a collected 
wisdom about what constitutes best interpretive practice, otherwise the danger is that the 
rules strangle the possibility for the meaningful application of the law.  
 This creative aspect of interpretation makes it central to debates about the 
evolution of international law.13 Interpretation is a key mechanism for remedying any 
weaknesses in the binding force of international legal obligations. This is true of treaty 
obligations, but even more so of the overlapping category of what I have been calling 
constitutional obligations.14 Interpretation involves establishing the meaning of specific 
legal provisions but where constitutional-type rules are concerned, the process of 
establishing the appropriate meaning of a specific rule also tends to implicate the broader 
task of establishing how law should rule over its subjects.15 Constitutional interpretation 
goes hand in hand with the progressive application of law and attempts to establish the 
constitutional authority of law.16  
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 Constitutional interpretation needs to be distinguished from ordinary legal 
interpretation.17 Timothy Endicott suggests that the best way to make sense of this is to 
understand that the act of constitutional interpretation does not always refer to a process of 
legal reasoning. In fact, when the act of interpretation is open-ended and the meaning that 
is at issue is not contained or discoverable within the terms of the obligation itself – when 
the process of legal reasoning fails to produce a determinate meaning – the resulting 
judgment is not strictly speaking “interpretative” but a straightforward exercise of 
authority. In Bankovic, for example, the Court didn’t “discover” the meaning within Article 
1 because there was no such meaning (either “original” or “ordinary”) to discover. Instead 
the Court used the unsettled and far from obvious customary and treaty law on extra-
territorial jurisdiction as a way to read meaning into the ECHR. The lesson that Endicott 
draws from this is that: ‘Thanks to the charm of interpretation, “constitutional 
interpretation” is very widely used as a sort of euphemism for a judicial, constitution-
building function that includes a responsibility for the non-interpretative reasoning that is 
needed to give substance to the community’s broad principles in particular areas of life.’18 
The point is that constitutional interpretation cannot escape the question of who has the 
authority to interpret and, in interpreting, to develop the law. Constitutional interpretation 
privileging an authority to settle disagreement over the nature of the rules. When this is the 
purpose of an interpretive practice, it is “constitutional” in a creative, evolutionary sense.  
 The special challenge for international law is that there is no single interpretive 
authority, no single international agent capable of fulfilling the interpretive function of a 
constitutional court. There is no one interpretive authority with the standing to decisively 
remedy the indeterminacy of international law. Instead, international law has traditionally 
relied on the combined weight of states’ individual interpretations. For example, when we 
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talk about state practice determining the meaning of customary international law what this 
ordinarily refers to is states’ interpretive practice, their interpretation  of whether a rule is 
legally binding or not. The result of this fragmented, horizontal interpretive authority is that 
international law has more of a need than other legal systems for a mechanism where 
meaning can be resolved exclusively through legal reasoning. It relies on the possibility that 
when the interpretive rules are applied to an interpretive question they have the power to 
mechanically produce the right meaning (or at least close of the possibility of subjects of law 
applying the wrong meaning to their obligations). Interpretive rules need to be able to 
produce a relatively fixed “box” establishing where the line is between legality and 
illegality.19  
 But international human rights obligations highlight how problematic this is. These 
obligations are most susceptible to the lack of judicial scrutiny because, by their nature, they 
aim to regulate what is an inherently unequal relationship between the state and the 
individuals within their jurisdiction.20 Where a state’s interpretive powers give them the 
ability to determine how to implement and interpret their obligations, a state has the 
potential to act in such a way that they can take the measures deemed politically or 
militarily necessary and at the same time claim to be in compliance with international 
standards. States’ interpretive authority provides the potential for compliance without 
compromise. As Jan Klabbers puts it, from a state’s perspective interpretive powers mean 
that ‘If you don’t get your way when drafting the treaty, you can still try to get your way 
when a particular provision or term comes to be applied, by trying to control the meaning 
assigned to it’.21 Where presented with a hard case in which legal judgement is put under 
pressure to conform to political or moral spheres of judgement, this heightens the danger 
from indeterminacy, whether real or imagined. Lacking traditional institutions of 
constitutional interpretation, international law needs to get the rules of interpretation right 
because, otherwise, the practice ends up being corruptible in the same way as the dark art 
of interrogation.  
 What, then, is the purpose served by the practice of constitutional interpretation? 
For one, it establishes the meaning of international legal rules. More than that, because law’s 
                                                          
 
19 See ‘You say torture, I say coercive interrogation: the conversation we should have had 10 years ago’, Slate 1 
August 2011, [reporting on Aspen Security Institute discussion on law and the war on terror; image of lawyer’s 
role as providing a legal box in which president can operate was used by Alberto Gonzales in his remarks]  
20 In this respect, in applying human rights provisions a constitutional court acts as a force multiplier for the 
individual against the state, bolstering the individual’s lack of institutional standing with its own. 
21 Jan Klabbers, ‘Interpretation as the continuation of politics by other means’, Opinio Juris 2 March 2009 
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authority is so clearly tied to law’s meaning, interpretive practices becomes a key route for 
maintaining and developing the constitutional authority of international law. In this way the 
purpose of interpretive “rules” is to fill out the terms of the lawyer’s commitment to 
international law, to better establish the ethic of constitutional responsibility.     
 
Determining fit . . . 
 
 There are two broad accounts of interpretation in international law. The first is to 
privilege the social fit of the obligation – to interpret the force of international law in light 
of its social fit or acceptance by international society. The second is to start with the legal 
fit or integrity of the obligation within the broader legal framework. As I argue, these create 
different pictures of what counts as a responsible interpretive practice. In this respect, it 
feeds into the pragmatist’s and constitutionalist’s different understandings of the practice of 
legality.   
 The problem addressed by those who advocate ‘fit’ as the crucial interpretive 
criteria is that some international legal rules no longer express the socially held beliefs or 
practices of international society, and international law is too sluggish to remedy this in a 
way that can both maintain the integrity of the law and their fit with the social context. 
Because of this structural weakness in the mechanisms available to interpret, re-interpret 
and eventually evolve international law, faith in international rules is misplaced. Acting as if 
the rules are truly binding may in fact sharpen and prolong the danger to the rule of law 
ideal, undermining the ability of political actors to make the changes necessary to close the 
compliance gap between what international law claims and what states are willing to obey. 
In the extreme, states may be forced to act illegally to remedy the integrity of international 
law. In this picture states need to deny the supremacy of defective legal rules in order to 
maintain the overall supremacy of the constitutional order. Cataloguing non-compliance is 
not, therefore, a simple descriptive matter of pointing out illegality; cataloguing non-
compliance is the first step to charting norm regression, to understanding which legal rules 
need to be stripped of their binding character, to detailing where and in which direction 
international law needs to be developed if it is to retain the potential to lead to the rule of 
law. The decision to comply or not captures a potentially authoritative political judgement 
about the force or fit of international law which, the sceptic argues, provides the necessary 
context and guidance for remedying the general authority of international law.  
 
 
161 
 The claim that emerges here is that where state practice fails to signal the legitimacy 
an international norm or obligation, the legal obligation can be said to be in crisis. The 
norm is unable to claim the social authority needed to function as a legal obligation; 
namely, to bind law’s subjects. Public challenges to the legal rules in effect show where 
formally obligatory norms no longer capture the true content of states’ mutual expectations 
or custom. This opens up a gap between how states actually behave – and feel justified in 
behaving – and how international law says they should behave. The result of this line of 
reasoning is that non-compliance is perceived to create a justified impetus rule change.22 
This is a process, as Chris Reus-Smit argues, of ‘recalibration, which necessarily involves 
the communicative reconciliation of the actor’s or institution’s social identity, interests, or 
practices with the normative expectations of other actors within its realm of political 
action’.23 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope develop this motif, providing an account of 
international legal obligation centred on the dual need to reflect the public context and 
inspire legality. They suggest that maintaining the authority of international law is, in part, 
about ensuring the continuing appropriateness of the legal norms to the regulatory context. 
The danger to be guarded against is that a gap opens up between what the law claims and 
the ability of the law to carry through on that claim, and that this gap in the end destroys 
law’s ability to bind: ‘a widespread failure to uphold the law as formally enunciated leads to 
a sense of hypocrisy which undermines fidelity to the law, and may ultimately destroy the 
posited rule’.24 One aspect of this, one source of this gap between the promise and practice 
of legality, is that old, existing rules need to be able to meet new challenges. Using Lon 
Fuller’s rule of law characteristics or ‘criteria of legality’ as their anchor point, they argue 
that one of the metrics for determining whether a rule has the necessary ‘fit’ is whether it 
inspires legality, the will to obey. Where the subjects of law do not practice legality, they 
argue, we must question the identification of the norm as an obligation proper. In order to 
ward off irrelevancy international law – all international law – must be capable of inspiring 
obedience.  
 Applying this precept to an analysis of the prohibition on torture, they outline what 
protecting the idea, the aspiration, of the rule of law requires: ‘If we discover that the norm 
prohibiting torture is supported by widely shared understandings, the framework of 
                                                          
 
22 Reus-Smit, ‘International Crises of Legitimacy’; Ian Hurd, ‘Breaking and Making Norms’, p. 197 
23 Ian Clark and Reus-Smit, ‘Preface to the Special Issue: Resolving International Crises of Legitimacy’, p. 154 
24 Brunee and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge University 
Press: 2010), p. 232  
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interactional international law still requires the application of the criteria of legality and a 
further assessment of whether or not the norm continues to be buttressed by a practice of 
legality. Only after pursuing this analysis will it be possible to determine the current legal force of the 
international norm prohibiting torture.’25 Subjected to this analysis their conclusion, reluctantly 
arrived at they tell us, is that the existing consensus on the prohibition of torture is not as 
absolute as the rhetoric suggests. Even before the events of 11 September 2001 it was 
‘close-to-moribund, despite its supposed status as jus cogens’.26 The underlying norm that was 
in reality guiding state practice was that torture was wrong but sometimes necessary; it was 
a norm that permitted derogation. They argue that in the immediate aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks the pervasive fear and pressure for intelligence introduced an even stronger 
challenge the absolute prohibition, with states substituting ‘necessity’ as the guiding 
principle for action.27 As they point out, this exceptionalism was relatively short-lived; there 
has been a widespread backlash against this expansive rendering of necessity, with the 
result that the legal prohibition on torture is stronger now than it’s ever been. Bush-era 
attempts to re-interpret the legal obligation have resolutely failed to carve out a space for 
exceptionalism, helped along by the strenuous reactions from international and domestic 
civil society and other states. And yet, against the grain of this strengthened interpretive 
consensus surrounding the obligation, Brunnée and Toope are led to surmise that general 
state practice has not followed suit: ‘The rule is rhetorically strong but practically weak; it 
does not truly shape the behaviour of scores, perhaps the majority, of states’.28 As Brunnée 
and Toope stress, the relevant social practices in this context are the widely felt social 
understandings of how law should rule. The actors they are most concerned with as 
determinative of the force of the norm are states and their citizens.29 In failing to reflect the 
pressure from these agents, binding law lapses, legal norms regress. 
                                                          
 
25 Legitimacy and Legality, p. 222, my italics 
26 Legitimacy and Legality p. 270; see also Nicholas Onuf, ‘Rules for torture?’, in Anthony F. Lang, Jr. and 
Amanda Beattie, War Torture and Terrorism: Rethinking the rules of international security (Routledge: 2009), p. 25 
27 Legitimacy and Legality p. 249: ‘For the first few years after 11 September 2001, there appears to have been a 
further eroding of the already weak shared understanding precluding torture. The striking fear present in 
international society, and especially in the United States, gave rise to seemingly convincing arguments that 
‘necessity’ drove widening exceptions to the prohibition on torture.’ For an example of this, see the near 
universal support in the UNSC for expanding counter-terrorism practice in the immediate aftermath of 9/11; 
note also that this support has since dropped off precipitously.  
28 p. 269 
29 They put particular emphasis on the popular support among citizens for torture in certain necessary 
situations. Recent evidence suggests that the perception of popular support for torture during the Bush years, 
even in limited circumstances, has been exaggerated. Actually there was a strong majority against torture in all 
circumstances. See Paul Gronke, Darius Rejali et al, “US public opinion on torture, 2001–2009”. PS: political 
science & politics43 (03), p. 437    
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 Michael Glennon draws on the same Fullerian image of the obligation becoming a 
‘dead letter’ to provide pragmatic principles able to cut through the fog of law. On his 
account the great danger facing international law, the danger that needs remedying, is that 
law’s normative claims fail to meet the practical, regulatory reality. This is for two 
connected reasons. First the obedience demanded by law is not reflected in the behaviour 
of law’s non-compliant subjects: a law cannot be obligatory and at the same time fail to 
bind. Second, the fact of non-compliance signals a problem with the legal rule. For 
whatever reason, the legal rule is failing to meet the requirements of its subjects, and 
whatever else law does, it needs to be useable. It is a problem if obeying the promulgated 
obligation strikes law’s subjects as, at some level, nonsensical.   
 These different justifications of non-compliance tie legality and interpretive practice 
to a standard of publicity, appealing to the public, inter-subjective and discursive space of 
international society to authoritatively settle any indeterminacy in the law. Analysing how a 
legal obligation has been received in this public space and the fit that it is able to inspire 
should produce all the necessary criteria for working out whether a particular change in the 
law is legitimate. This is an important insight, and it is an area where the methods available 
in IR theory certainly have something to contribute, in terms of the rigour with which 
publicity and fit can be measured. But the danger is that these measurable criteria get 
elevated to a point where this is the only interpretive standard defining legality.30 The law 
has some communicative avenues, and there is certainly scope for viewing interpretation as 
a politicized practice – a battleground for the continuation of politics by other means31 – 
but interpretation is not an cannot be an entirely communicative practice of signalling the 
force of international law, at least not if the core obligation is to retain its binding force. As 
Gardiner explains this, accepting such a position would make it impossible for international 
law to exercise any stabilizing or ordering function. It is part of the purpose of a treaty, as 
with general international law, is to condition the range of possible meanings to be 
attributed to an obligation.32 Moreover, in methodological terms, using compliance as the 
metric for interpreting the force of law fails to take account of how rules structure state 
practice, including how states comply with the law. This begs the question of what counts as 
                                                          
 
30 See Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, ‘Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters’, 
Global Policy, 1 (2) 7 May 2011.  
31 Klabbers J (2009), ‘Interpretation as the continuation of politics by other means’, Opinio Juris.org 2 March 
2009, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2009/03/02/continuation/  
32 Gardner, Treaty Interpretation, p. 53; 65-66 
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compliance for the purposes of establishing a constitutional change in international law.33 
How widespread and systematic does non-compliance have to be for it to decisively 
undermine the existing legal rules? And if a state maintains that it has complied with 
international law, but this assertion is based on a contentious interpretation of the rule, 
what implications should we draw from this for the strength of the underlying norm? And 
what of “soft law” – at what point does a norm “in flux” either lose or develop a claim to 
constitutional force?  In any event, these are the kind of general questions which are raised 
as a result of the over-emphasis on the interpretive practice as a necessarily inter-subjective, 
dialogic process.  
  
. . . or fostering integrity? 
 
A more orthodox, black-letter perspective of interpretation sees legal integrity as the crucial 
interpretive standard. Alexander Orakhelashvili provides one such account, relying on the 
potential of the rules established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to 
function as objective platform from which to resolve broader questions about the 
indeterminacy of international law and the resulting challenged to international legal 
authority. Looking back to Hersch Lauterpacht and J. L. Brierly to anchor his analysis, he 
argues that international legal interpretation both relies on and is motivated by the need to 
distinguish between law and non-law, something impossible to achieve with a the singular 
focus on social fit. He views the process of interpretation having a key effect in either, 
when the interpretive rules are sufficiently robust, limiting indeterminacy or, when the 
interpretive rules are weak, fostering indeterminacy. In short, interpretive rules are crucial 
to the coherence of international law, and coherence is seen as crucial to the authority of 
international law. As he puts it, in order to understand what these interpretive rules (or 
principles, conventions, norms) are ‘it is first and foremost necessary to identify the proper 
conceptual basis for the binding force of international law and the essence of international 
obligation.’34 If nothing else, this flags the scale of the challenge. If giving an account of the 
essence of international obligation is an essentially contested project, what hope is there for a 
unified framework of constitutional interpretation?  
                                                          
 
33 Howse and Teitel, ‘Beyond Compliance’, p. 127 
34 The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2008), p. 1 
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 Orakhelashvili manfully denies the scale of the challenge, however. He suggests 
instead that the ‘doctrine of the integrity of legal obligations’, or the principle of 
effectiveness, provides the necessary basis for a comprehensive understanding of the 
legitimate mechanics of international law interpretation, a way to authoritatively distinguish 
law from non-law.35 International lawyers can, in other words, resolve the hard questions 
posed by indeterminacy if the interpretive act is conducted with the aim of giving ‘full 
effect’ to the codified obligation. All that needs to happen to ensure that the authority of 
international law survives the interpretive process is to mandate that interpretive acts be 
guided by the aim of ensuring that legal system has integrity. In practice, he argues, this is 
the function served by the VCLT rules: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in light of its object and purpose’.36 On his analysis this allows the meaning of an 
obligation to extend to cover gaps and stave off the possibility of fragmentation that a 
more restrictive interpretation of the meaning of the obligation might throw up. 
 These issues about interpretation, indeterminacy and change in the law track back 
to the problems that arise where it is the coherence of legality itself that is seen to be in 
crisis, and the pragmatic call for the need to integrate some account of the wider social and 
political context in which the law operates. The question is: how do you imbue the law with 
this external considerations without undermining the integrity of the legal obligations 
themselves? Orakhelashvili’s argument suggests an implicit belief that if the rules of 
interpretation are clear enough then such a situation of indeterminacy won’t arise. If, for 
example, South Africa had possessed more robust rules of constitutional interpretation, 
putting greater credence on the need for effective and extensive interpretation of the 
constitutional rules, presumably the state would not have been so readily able to bend the 
law to justify a policy of apartheid.37 His suggestion is that by narrowing the space for 
idiosyncratic interpretations and encouraging integrity-building interpretations, the VCLT 
provides the range of interpretive rules necessary to fill the gaps and, by and large, correct 
for any residual indeterminacy in international law.  
                                                          
 
35 Interpretation of Acts and Rules, p. 2; see also Lauterpacht’s seminal article on this topic, “Restrictive 
Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties”, 26 BYbIL (1949) 248  
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1) 
37 See David Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems; also Jens Meierhenrich, The legacies of law: long-run consequences 
of legal development in South Africa, 1652-2000 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2008) 
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 But in a clue as to why this doesn’t quite resolve the difficulties, consider the court’s 
judgment in the judges’ trials at Nuremberg. What they established was that that effective 
rules of interpretation did exist, but that Germany’s judges had failed in their professional 
and constitutional duty to uphold and protect them. The issue wasn’t as simple as the 
presence or absence of rules of constitutional interpretation; effective interpretation relies 
on the presence of responsible interpretive agents rather than the quality of the rules. 
Because he underplays this element, focusing instead on the idea that the existing rules 
establish a principle of effectiveness, Orakhelashvili struggles to square his account of 
interpretive practice with the broader purposive development of the law. This is because, as 
Gardiner argues, it is by no means clear that the VCLT establishes any such principle of 
effectiveness which, remember, is supposed to endow international law with, at least in 
part, its progressive, forward-looking, gap-filling character. As Isabelle Van Damme puts it, 
it remains ‘the prerogative of the interpreter to decide how context comes into play’.38  
 The effect of this reliance on the rules of interpretation is that this approach to 
preserving the integrity of an ethic of international legality ends up claiming too much for 
the rules themselves; what is crucial is the interpretive roles, and the constitutional 
responsibilities this generates.  
 
From interpretive rules to interpretive responsibilities 
 
Both of the above approaches have the same basic motivation. If we can detail a set of 
robust standards for determining which obligations are really, truly binding, determining 
where to nip and tuck international law’s obligations should not prompt any serious 
existential questions about the viability of international law. Both “integrity” and “fit” 
establish competing methods for establishing what counts as a valid interpretation, and, 
hence valid change, in international law. They establish competing frameworks for 
remedying indeterminacy in the constitutional rules, frameworks which overlay the 
pragmatic and constitutionalist perspectives of on the ethic of legality appropriate to 
international society. Fit and integrity are not, however, necessarily in tension. The tension 
is maintained because the interpretive remedy is seen as a matter of detailing the rules of 
interpretation – whether internal to international law or in the form of social scientific 
                                                          
 
38Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, p. 213; it is for this reason that Klabbers 
argues the best way to think of the VCLT rules is, not as rules or even principles, but as a ‘methodological 
device’ (Opinio Juris, March 2009).  
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methodological rules. In either case, the interpretive rules are seen to determine the 
interpretive art.  
 The “crucible approach”39 offers one alternative middle ground able to combine 
considerations of fit and integrity, in a way that broadly approximates the constitutionalist 
approach. It does this by refocusing the interpretive challenge from one of determining the 
appropriate rules, to one of determining who holds the appropriate roles. To put this 
another way, it relies on developing an understanding of who can be trusted to interpret 
international law in the right way, in accordance with the more general principles of legality. 
In this approach, both fit and integrity are considerations to go into the interpretive mix. 
Which will take precedence – and what the interpretive process will look like – depends on 
the specific interpretive context, as judged by the interpretive authority. This provides an 
interpretive method that foregrounds the artistic elements of interpretation and the 
personal judgement needed for good interpretation, using the rules to ring-fence rather 
than determine the nature of that art. Central to this approach is that there are both “best 
practice” standards of interpretation and a shared sense of the appropriate role of the 
interpreter in developing international law. It is in the interplay between the existing 
interpretive standards and roles that the meaning of core international obligations can be 
both discovered and, where necessary, advanced.  The result of adopting a crucible 
approach is to focus on how the different interpretive roles remedy the authority of 
constitutional obligations, rather than presuming that this authority must come from an 
analysis of either the existing rules or sovereign states. 
 In the final part of this chapter I argue that this focus on the interpretive 
responsibilities has helped to counter US claims to interpretive authority during the ‘torture 
debates’. These were claims based on a pragmatic ethic; responding to these attempts has 
required adopting a constitutionalist ethic.      
 
Constitutional Interpretation through the Torture Debates  
 
The torture debates attacked the constitutional status of the prohibition on torture, with 
states and their lawyers exploiting their interpretive rights as a way to establish an 
understanding of this prohibition that better squared with the policy objectives of the “war 
                                                          
 
39 Gardner, Treaty Interpretation, p. 9; see also Bardo Fassbender, ‘The UN Charter as Constitution’, p. 595-598 
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on terror”. However, the moments of genuinely constitutional interpretation leading to an 
evolution in the law were far more limited than pragmatists have believed, in large part 
because of the success of international lawyers in clarifying the scope of the interpretive 
responsibilities attached to the constitutional prohibition on torture.  
 Debate about the nature of the prohibition on torture after 11 September 2001 can 
be understood as having gone through two phases, and having now entered a third.40 In the 
first, instigated by the torture memos, the practice of interpretation was about discovering 
the meaning of the codified obligation. In the second phase, constitutional interpretation of 
the same core obligation became a much broader matter of establishing the legitimacy of 
exceptionalism or exemptionalism. Interpretation focused on the wider social and political 
context – uncertainty and crisis – as the determinant of the rules. The argument I want to 
draw out of this is that international lawyers have, to a degree, learned from these 
experiences in responding to the legacy of the torture debates, in debates on drones, on 
diplomatic assurances, and elsewhere, where the fundamental question is about the capacity 
of the existing constitutional rules to govern changed or changing circumstances. What 
emerges from these torture debates is the resilience of the core constitutional rules, when 
these rules are buttressed by a practical, professional knowledge of what a good – and 
appropriate – interpretation of international law looks like. Interpretive rules mattered, but 
the sense of responsibility to international law mattered more.   
 
Torture 1.0: Textual Indeterminacy and Interpretive Prerogative 
 
Jay Bybee’s torture memo starts well.41 There is no direct refutation of the prohibition on 
torture. There is an acknowledgement that the US is bound by both international and 
domestic law to refrain from any use of torture, although there is a not inconsequential 
decision to focus on its codification in US domestic law. Bybee suggests, ‘The key statutory 
phrase in the definition of torture is the statement that acts amount to torture if they cause 
“severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” In examining the meaning of a statute, its text 
must be the starting point.’ The problems begin when Bybee sets out to resolve the 
indeterminacy left by the non-definition of ‘severe’; how, he asks, can the law function to 
                                                          
 
40 On the issues more generally, see the excellent Sanford Levinson (ed.), Torture: a collection (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 2006); also Karen J. Greenberg (ed.), The Torture Debate in America (Cambridge University 
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41 For a detailed account of the torture memos, see Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Uncovering War Crimes in the 
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guide practitioners about the appropriate interrogation practices without having an 
authoritative interpretation of what sort of actions constitute ‘severe’ suffering? His implicit 
suggestion is that this provides an opening for the supremacy of states’ and, more 
specifically, the executive branch’s, interpretive judgement: lacking a determinate definition 
in either domestic or international law, ‘we construe a statute in accordance with its 
ordinary or natural meaning’.42 His reconstruction of the ordinary or natural meaning of 
severe mental and physical suffering defines a meaning for the statute, but through what 
Peter Brooks describes as ‘an ungoverned and unscrupulous reading that uses—very 
selectively—dictionary definitions to produce arcane and obfuscating interpretations.’43 
Brooks goes on to liken Bybee’s interpretation to ‘a parody of a deconstructive reading 
written by a hostile critic.’44 This inept legal reasoning, further supported by the views of 
Alberto Gonzales and John Yoo – which Harold Koh, the current State Department legal 
advisor, describes as ‘perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read’45 – 
functioned as the de facto legal guidance for interrogators at least until January 2003.46    
 As, in response to the hue and cry that greeted the revelations about US 
interrogation practices and treatment of detainees, the administration distanced itself from 
the interpretive positions taken in the torture memos, the justificatory narrative shifted 
significantly. Rather than looking to justify “enhanced” interrogation practices as falling 
outside of the prohibition on torture, the administration took the extraordinary step of 
implying that some of the practices used might amount to torture but that this was ‘torture 
lite’.47 At the base of this contention was that there were practices which straddled the 
                                                          
 
42 Note that a related problem here is Bybee’s implied suggestion that this is a previously unacknowledged 
obstacle to the application of IL. In fact, it is very well established, and in fact the entire regime of international 
interpretation can be seen to revolve around an exposition of how to elaborate the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a 
treaty provision. As G Schwarzenberger puts the difficulty ‘In accordance with the general rule on 
interpretation . . . the object of treaty interpretation is to give their ‘ordinary’ meaning to the terms of the treaty 
. . . The difficulty about this approach to the issue is that almost any word has more than one meaning. The 
word ‘meaning’ itself, has at least sixteen different meanings.’, quoted p. 161 Gardner.    
43 Peter Brooks, ‘the plain meaning of torture?’, Slate 2005; note that using a dictionary definition is not per se 
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definition is immediately contextualized, see Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate 
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45 Harold Koh, ‘A World Without Torture’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2005 p. 647 
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47 See Jessica Wolfendale, ‘The Myth of ‘Torture Lite’”, Ethics and International Affairs 23(1) 2009; this has been 
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indistinct grey-line between legality and illegality when interrogating terrorist suspects. The 
position in effect was that sometimes interrogators, through no fault of their own, fall foul 
of pesky, opaque international standards while doing their difficult job of preventing future 
attacks against the US. Interrogation becomes, as I suggested at the beginning of this 
chapter, a ‘dark art’ that shades the bright line between legality and illegality, and too 
important to national security to be constrained by an over-emphasis on the commitment 
to international legality.48 More than that the absolute prohibition on torture as too fixed, 
too rigorous to function as a guide for practitioners operating in a context where the 
consequences of failing to counter threats to security from terrorism could be so drastic. 
The range of contexts in which interrogators would be acting demanded a standard of 
greater complexity, precision and nuance than the absolute prohibition could give. 
 In the attempt to establish a broader justification for this argument, a justification 
based on more than simply policy concerns, it was the pragmatic idea that in order to be 
relevant, in order to govern in a determinate way, and in order to be able to continue to 
inspire a commitment to legality, the legal rules need to allow for some degree of flexibility, 
depending on the circumstances. This is a convoluted logic – on the one hand calling for 
greater precision in the international rules, on the other hand calling for more flexibility –  
so making sense of it is perhaps a fools game. But let me try. The argument was that (1) 
because the clear and absolute standard enshrined in international law was too 
indeterminate to fulfil its regulatory purpose in practice, (2) if the state was to meet its 
commitment to international legality, it should (3) interpret the standard in such a way that 
violations weren’t inevitable and this would (4) make the prohibition on torture more 
robust for the future. If we wanted to sum this position up, it’s that the absolute 
prohibition on torture doesn’t establish a sufficiently precise fit with the operational 
context, and so must be modified.  
                                                          
 
48 Supplementing this perspective was the related argument that the prohibition on Cruel, Inhuman and 
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 On one level it is easy to agree with critics of this legal reasoning, especially with the 
benefits of hindsight and the knowledge that this legal reasoning was part of a larger 
practice of creating a ‘legal black hole’ for US counter-terrorism operations.49 But if we put 
aside this post-hoc advantage of the critic, the problem we’re left with is that in order to 
dismiss the interpretation introduced by the so-called ‘torture team’ we’re first forced to 
challenge a state’s interpretive privileges. States have a protected rights to interpret how to 
implement their international obligations. And there was a case to be made that the raft of 
counter-terrorism and security related rights and obligations created after 11 September 
2001 needed to be integrated into the existing human rights framework. The challenge of 
avoiding fragmentation – of protecting international law’s integrity – posed at least a 
question about how to interpret the prohibition on torture in order to effectively apply it. 
When combined with the need for secrecy in counter-terrorism and intelligence gathering,50 
at a purely functional level the only interpretive authority in a position to determine the 
scope and nature of the relevant obligations were those states most closely engaged in the 
practices themselves.51 
 For the criticism of the US interpretation to stick it became necessary to show how, 
by engaging in these dubious interpretive practices, the administration and its lawyers had 
failed in their responsibilities to the law, both domestic and international. David Luban 
does just this, arguing that the torture memos were supported by a practice of ‘loophole 
lawyering’, which itself is a dereliction of the responsibility that a lawyer holds to interpret 
the law in good faith and give advice to the client based on sound legal reasoning.52 When 
the Bush lawyers gave us an esoteric, idiosyncratic reading of the rules that picked at the 
textual indeterminacy without regard for the larger object and purpose of the rules, their 
interpretive authority became void. As Joseph Raz puts the general principle, ‘some 
interpretations are so bad as to be interpretations no longer’.53 In this regard the 
                                                          
 
49 Philippe Sands, Lawless World; see also Margaret L. Satterthwaite, “Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary 
Rendition and the Rule of Law”, George Washington Law Review 75 (2007) [appealing to ‘human dignity’ and ‘the 
principle of humanity’ as providing the objective criteria for the practices’ lawlessness] 
50 See Simon Chesterman, ‘Secrets and Lies: Intelligence Activities and the Rule of Law’, Michigan Journal of 
International Law 28 (3) 2007  
51 In this sense it is a classic example of the author of international law also being its subject and enactor. These 
interpretive powers were even more pronounced in this case because domestically the US executive was also 
agglomerating the same type of extensive authority to act without legal oversight in the ‘war on terror’. When 
commentators speak of Guantanamo being a legal black hole, this is because the administration acted to 
remove it from both domestic constitutional jurisdiction and international legal jurisdiction, making the case 
that the only relevant authority resided with the executive.   
52 David Luban, ‘Lawfare and Legal ethics at Guantanamo’, Stanford Law Review 60 (6) 2009  
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interpretive failures of the Bush lawyers – their professional irresponsibility – led directly to 
a loss of interpretive authority. The constitutional rules didn’t lose their integrity; that fate 
was reserved for those involved in constructing a ‘legal black hole’.  
  
Torture 2.0: Situational Indeterminacy and Interpretive Exceptionalism 
 
But textual indeterminacy wasn’t the only basis for the US claim to interpretive authority. 
Another justificatory narrative played out around the claims of situational indeterminacy. 
Here the claim was that the meaning of an absolute prohibition needed clarifying, because no 
obligation can be truly absolute. This is a practical nonsense, inviting reinterpretation.  
The initial basis for this claim was the contention that legal obligations need to be 
forward-looking, in that they either explicitly anticipate the full range of circumstances in 
which they will apply, or they admit exceptions and changes should new circumstances or 
new regulatory challenges merit it. Law needs to be able to guide policy and practitioners, 
including in the provision of national and international security. Exceptions to legal 
absolutism are introduced here by provoking, in some guise or other, a reaction to what 
Waldron calls ‘ruat caelum absolutism’54, to the idea, as Richard Posner puts it, that ‘the 
constitution is not a suicide pact’.55 When the heavens are falling – as when struck by a 
natural disaster, or where there is a grave threat to national security, or an imminent danger 
of attack by foreign or domestic enemies, or a genocide about to be committed, or when a 
mob is trying to overthrow the executive – however absolute an obligation might be in 
ordinary circumstances, the gravity of the threat means exceptions must be admitted. 
Torture and other ill-treatment can, on this line of reasoning, be compatible with law and 
justice because, in certain circumstances, such actions are necessary to prevent greater 
disorder and chaos befalling the state. To the extent that the use of torture, ‘enhanced 
interrogation’, ill-treatment, or other ordinarily illegal practices facilitate intelligence 
gathering and serves national security, setting legal judgment aside can even be painted as a 
service to law; it becomes a form of exceptional action necessary to preserve the rule of law. 
In this formulation of the rule of law, the executive and government agencies are cast as 
the protectors of the rule of law ideal, rather than law’s subjects or potential corruptors. 
Even in the act of breaking the law, legality is served because, so the argument goes, 
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55 Richard Posner, Not a suicide pact: the constitution in times of national emergency (OUP: 2006) 
 
 
173 
necessary and valid exceptions get introduced to correct an otherwise overly rigid system of 
positive law obligations.   
 This kind of “prospectivism” is particularly evident where violations of the torture 
rules are justified as necessary to ‘forestall future evils like terrorist attacks’.56 On Alan 
Dershowitz’s insidious logic, if legal rules are to be appropriately forward-looking the 
starting point needs to be an assumption of the worst case scenario. Rather than wait until 
the moment of crisis to introduce the exception, the responsible lawmaker should start 
with a consideration of those situations requiring exceptions and work back to reconstruct 
a more robust, coherent and prospectively applicable obligation. The most notorious 
example of this kind of “exceptional” reasoning is the hypothetical ‘ticking time bomb’ 
scenario. Here you know a terrorist suspect in your custody to have information that would 
allow you to prevent a mass loss of life. What actions should be permissible? Is it 
responsible, as a matter of public policy formation, to take torture off the table if that’s 
what it takes to get the necessary life-saving information in a situation of such gravity?57 To 
move beyond the hypothetical, what if simply threatening to torture a kidnapper into telling 
you the location of his 11-year old victim could get the necessary information?58 Surely the 
rules should admit that kind of exception?  
 This limited basis for introducing exceptions to a constitutional obligation against 
torture quickly morphed into a much wider discussion about the general limits to 
constitutionalism in times of uncertainty and crisis – arguments which tracked the 
pragmatic approach to international legality. The core proposition was that in times of 
crisis, exceptionalism – suspending the constitutional rules – can becomes both the 
legitimate and responsible practice of legality.59 But the argument in these debates were 
                                                          
 
56 Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb’, Virginia Law Review 91, 2005, p. 1436  
57 It’s worth noting that Obama has expressed a similarly forward-looking thought in defending his decision 
not to open an investigation into the legality of Bush-era interrogation and detention practices, suggesting that 
‘it's important to look forward and not backwards, and to remind ourselves that we do have very real security 
threats out there’, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/16/obama-on-spanish-torture_n_187710.html. 
58 See the Daschner case in Germany.  
59 Michael Ignatieff also talks about exemptionalism as distinct from exceptionalism. On his analysis this refers 
to the more specific practice of introducing reservations to treaties, of exempting American citizens from the 
jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, of failing to comply, of negotiating treaties and then refusing 
to ratify or ratifying them after an extended delay. Essentially under his analysis exemptionalism with respect of 
international law is a process of general legal isolationism. But, and this links up with Agamben’s far more 
general position, it is something that occurs within the sphere of international law, rather than standing in direct 
opposition to the rule of international law; see also Tim Dunne, ‘“The rules of the game are changing”: 
Fundamental Human Rights in Crisis after 9/11’, International Politics 44 (2007) 269–286 [arguing that 
exemptionalism creates a two-tier standard of international legitimacy, on the basis of US claim to have 
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broader than this, seeing the exceptional practice as something which decisively changed 
the terms of international law’s prohibition on torture. Fleur Johns has recently used 
Agamben’s concept of ‘the event’ to suggest that the torture debates provided, in effect, a 
constitutional shock, changing and narrowing the existing understanding of the torture 
prohibition in a way that continues to reverberate in state practice, in effect developing the 
law in a regressive direction.60 This reflects Bruce Ackerman’s argument that the problem 
with defining change, particularly constitutional change, in reaction to these exceptional 
moments is that ‘a downward spiral threatens’, and the overarching project becomes one of 
constitutional erasure.61 The problem that needs to be confronted here is that the narrative 
of crisis comes to define the public, constitutional conversation, including the perception 
about the responsibilities owed under the existing constitutional rules.   
 Whether derogation from a constitutional rule is located within the terms of the 
constitution or as a species of extra-constitutional exceptionalism, the end result is to 
challenge the absolute and non-derogable nature of the obligation in question. And this is a 
possibility that judges, international law and international lawyers have, time and again, 
rejected with respect to torture. It is part of the nature of a jus cogens norm to be immune 
from the push and pull that the debate about exceptionalism attributes to the process of 
constitutional interpretation.  As Dahlia Lithwick puts it:  
‘The rule of law requires that there be a floor. For decades most of us believed that 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was such a floor. Its bar against 
"[o]outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
treatment," was clearly meant to apply not just to POWs or battlefield soldiers in 
uniform but to all captives. Common Article 3 was intended to be the lowest we 
went . . . But then along came the Bush lawyers, and they managed to saw into the 
floorboards. A sub-basement for prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo opened 
beneath us, and our dignity and honour disappeared into it.’62 
 
 And yet, international law – and international lawyers – have been able to respond 
to these pressures by re-asserting the absolute nature of the prohibition. Article 2(2) of the 
Convention Against Torture doesn’t leave any obvious room for interpretive doubt about 
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the legality of exceptionalism: ‘No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state 
of war or a threat or war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
invoked as a justification of torture’.63 Whatever the pull or conceptual elegance attaching 
to claims of situational indeterminacy and emergency constitutionalism, the absolute nature 
of the provision has shown an underlying resilience. Where someone alleges to have found 
an obligation of this type ‘in regression’ and less absolute than previously thought, or 
subject to a new-found calculus of necessity, or in need of balancing against diplomatic 
responsibilities in the form of the control principle or extradition cooperation, a red flag 
should be raised. Not because an analysis of state practice suggests otherwise, but because 
the authority of these obligations does not rely in any way on state practice. No matter how good 
the analysis of state practice or how many pages are spent detailing the shifts in public 
attitudes; where these type of absolute constitutional rules are concerned, there are no 
inferences to be drawn from how the obligation functions in state practice. This protected 
status of the constitutional rules means that the interpretive practice in the end results in a 
one-way process of strengthening and progressively developing the constitutional rule. If 
the interpreter is acting from a commitment to legality, no other options are possible. As 
Juan Mendez, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment has expressed this:  
‘all human rights standards are subject to the norm of “progressive development,” 
in that they evolve in accordance with new repressive actions and features. In this 
regard, it is important to consolidate current interpretations of what constitutes 
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and to insist on 
effective implementation of States’ obligations to prevent and to punish violations. 
In keeping with the progressive development of international jurisprudence, the 
Special Rapporteur believes that expansive interpretations of norms are possible as 
long as they better protect individuals from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. At the same time, such expansive interpretations should 
evolve from agreements among all stakeholders reached after frank and open 
debate. It is the role of the Special Rapporteur to generate such discussion as 
appropriate.’64 
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Torture 3.0: Evolutionary Indeterminacy and Interpretive Expansivism 
 
What legacy have these debates left behind? Has Obama ended this narrative of 
exceptionalism? On the surface at least, the effect of Obama’s executive order 13491 
(“Ensuring Lawful Interrogations”) has been to publicly mark the return to normality, 
signalling US re-engagement with its international obligations. We might wonder how far 
or how deep this commitment goes – especially in light of continuing detention practices 
and human rights abuses in the name of counter-terrorism, and the failure to investigate or 
punish those responsible for authorising torture. Nevertheless, what seems clear is that 
Obama has succeeded in drawing a line between his administration’s good faith reading of 
international law and the combative approach of the Bush administration. He has 
succeeded in this in large part by repositioning counter-terrorism practice as something to 
be addressed within the language of international law, rather than some necessarily outside 
and in tension with international law. The nature of US responsibilities have been 
increasingly tightly defined and regulated.65 Counter-terrorism practice has been 
increasingly normalized, as part of and governed by international law.  
 As the narrative has evolved and the strain on the constitutionally binding nature of 
the torture prohibition has receded, however, another set of issues has begun to emerge, 
making it more difficult to bracket off the legacy of these debates. This is in large part 
because Obama and his administration espouse the same basic pragmatic mindset that 
drove the torture debates. Obama, as one commentator puts it, ‘embraces uncertainty, 
provisionality and the continuous testing of hypothesis through experimentation’.66 What is 
problematic for international law’s claim to constitutional authority is that international 
law’s rules are treated as a set of hypotheses about how to act, and tested and re-tested not 
against the requirements of legality, but against based on prior policy considerations.  
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 Debate about the prohibition against torture has now shifted to a concern about 
how the appropriate approach to interpreting the range of obligations the core prohibition 
gives rise to. In these debates, the pragmatic attitude resolves into a challenge to the 
evolutionary indeterminacy of international law. This focuses directly on the scope of 
responsibility for torture and the non-absolute obligations that are attached to protecting 
and advancing the core obligation. This debate accepts, as a starting point, that torture is 
wrong in all circumstances – it accepts the absolute, constitutional nature of the obligation. 
But it contests the scope of state responsibility for complicity in acts of torture, for 
preventing acts of torture and responsibility to provide redress for past acts of torture. In 
other words, this is a debate that contests the ramifications of a constitutional, peremptory 
prohibition on torture.  
 This comes out in a number of areas. For example, there is a question at the 
moment about the legality of the use of “diplomatic assurances” as a way to avoid 
triggering the prohibition on non-refoulement. This prohibition protects an individual from 
being returned to a country where there is a clear risk that they will be tortured on return. A 
diplomatic assurance is essentially a promise made by the receiving state not to torture an 
individual who might otherwise be considered at risk if and when they are returned. The 
argument that some states have made – and look to be winning – is that this has to be a 
legitimate under international law because there are security considerations governing the 
decision to expel an individual which can trump the risk of torture, that the level of the risk 
to the individual is a matter for states to judge for themselves, and that safeguards set up to 
monitor the individual will ensure that the assurance not to torture is being kept. What 
activists have pointed out, however, is that the very practice of seeking a diplomatic 
assurance hollows out the commitment to an absolute prohibition on torture. This is 
because the way the principle of non-refoulement has traditionally given states quite a wide 
interpretive license: if a state decides that an individual is not at risk of torture on return, 
then they are free to return that individual. With this wide interpretive authority, diplomatic 
assurances simply aren’t necessary, they’re redundant. Given this, what function do 
diplomatic assurances serve? The charge is that they are a way to water down states’ 
responsibilities to oppose torture, a way to avoid the hard conversations about the 
systematic torture of individuals in detention in places like Jordan.67   
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Conclusion 
 
As Rosalyn Higgins points out, ‘We delude ourselves if we think that the role of norms is 
to remove the possibility of abusive claims ever being made’.68 Similarly, rules or 
conventions on legal interpretation will not stop abusive interpretations. But developing an 
sense of the appropriate, professional attitude – of what it means to responsibly interpret the 
constitutional rules – can prevent these abusive interpretations from having a detrimental 
impact on the constitutional order, from constituting international society in an illegitimate 
way. Interpretation has more than simply a defensive function in a legal order, however. It 
helps to define the scope of legitimate change, and it prevents sweeping constitutional 
changes from being effected by any one actor, in thrall to the god of crisis. 
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Chapter 7 
Aggression and the Profession of Faith 
 
If international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more 
conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law. 
Hersch Lauterpacht1  
 
 
Perhaps the greatest threat to international law’s constitutional authority is from the 
‘fuzziness’ of the constitutional rules.2 I am not talking about the “penumbral uncertainty” 
that comes with any rule of law, nor about the abusive efforts to manipulate the rules so 
they appear uncertain. I mean the genuine uncertainty that comes from a rule which, 
although seeming to demand absolute obedience, seems also to need a degree of situational, 
prudential, political judgement in order to function as promised. Pragmatic arguments pick 
at the uncertainty surrounding the content and application of a rule claiming a constitutional 
type of authority. Their scepticism gets its form in detailing the political will needed to make 
sense of this authority in practice, whether as the driver of compliance, as a reflection of 
states’ commitment to the rule, or as a signifier of the functional suitability of rule to rule.3 
Having drawn you in with the fear of uncertainty, the pragmatist killer blow is to expose the 
hollow commitment to the constitutional rules. These conceptual arguments, when pressed 
onto service, become a battle cry for the supremacy of political judgement and the 
irresponsibility of professing faith in the rule of international law.  
If fuzziness is a general worry, the rules on the use of force generate a distinctive 
haze. The rules prohibiting the use of force bundle uncertainty on top of uncertainty – in 
the definition of aggression, in the triggers for legitimate self-defence, in the possibility of 
pre-emptive war, in the judgement of proportionality, in the responsibility to prevent or 
punish, in the permissibility of humanitarian intervention, in the pre-eminence of the UN 
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Security Council, in the nature of armed conflict, in the governance of new technology 
(drones, cyberwar), and so on. The traditional source of uncertainty about the rules, as 
Oscar Schachter puts it in his inimitable style, is the ‘widespread cynicism about their effect. 
Reality seems to mock them.’4 That states seem able to find a legal justification for whatever 
action they choose to take undermines any claim law has to rule in this area. Connected to 
this is the lack of any straightforward argumentative or interpretive remedy to the rules. 
These rules are essentially contested, because there are coherent reasons in favour of both a 
conservative and progressive application of the rules. As Ian Hurd puts it with respect to the 
rules on humanitarian intervention: ‘Since these questions cannot be answered definitively, 
the uncertainty remains fundamental, and the legality of humanitarian intervention is 
essentially indeterminate. No amount of debate over the law or recent cases will resolve its 
status; it is both legal and illegal at the same time.’5 The ambiguity in the rules here implicate 
the entire constitutional order because, combined with the lack of an objectively empowered 
authority and the need for action, the incoherence in the rules creates a hard case for 
international society. The final source of ambiguity is in the role of the exception. As Jutta 
Brunnée and Stephen Toope argue, ‘the wider and more uncertain the exceptions, the less 
robust the rule’.6 The domain governed by the rules on the use of force seem to demand a 
more nuanced, selective application of the rules; this is a domain where “exceptionalism” – 
for example, in responding to mass atrocity, or waging a pre-emptive war – seems intuitively 
justified.7  
Scepticism about the constitutional authority of these rules is not only the result of 
the ambiguous effect or application of the rules. It also attaches to the uncertain 
constitutional status of the rules. First, the ‘outlawing of acts of aggression’ is an obligation 
erga omnes, which as I have argued is a crucial marker for international law’s constitutional 
rule. The fuzziness in the law of war is part of the more general difficulty with pinning down 
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the constitutional effects which follow from the existence of constitutional rules in 
international society. Second, the nature of the rules on the use of force provide a 
touchstone for arguments that the UN Charter represents the constitution for international 
society. These arguments are important because they suggest that the UN Charter – and the 
organizational architecture it has spawned – has the capacity to address the incoherence that 
comes with fragmentation. Part of understanding the UN Charter as a constitutional 
framework for international society is that it establishes remedial responsibilities to develop 
the rules in such a way that they can be consistently applied, that they can weather the 
uncertainty charge.  
The purpose of this chapter is to flesh out the constitutional politics surrounding the 
rules on the use of force. I argue that despite the focus on the ambiguity in the rules on the 
use of force, the critical issue is the normative status of this ambiguity. Does this ambiguity 
authorize exceptionalism? Does it grant constitutional priority to political judgement; is the 
ambiguity a sign for the limits of legality? From the pragmatist’s perspective, the answer in 
each case is yes. But I use the debates on the use of force against Iraq – and since, in Libya 
and Syria – to argue that this is not how international lawyers have tended to express their 
commitment to legality. From their perspective, the uncertainty and ambiguity in the rules 
occasioned greater responsibilities of legality. Rather than justifying exceptionalism, the 
uncertainty in the rules embedded a call for constitutionalism. Rather than foreshadowing 
defeat, the ‘fog of law’ is a call to arms. 
 
Outlawing War 
 
International law does not make any claims to prohibit the use of force, simply to restrict 
the use of force to clearly defined circumstances where resorting to force is deemed 
appropriate. Under the customary law of nations these circumstances were self-defence, to 
assert property rights, and to punish a breach of the natural law. Under the auspices of the 
UN Charter, these circumstances are restricted to self-defence or, when presided over by the 
UN Security Council, in order to protect international peace and security.8 Because of this, 
in Lauterpacht’s view, the cumulative legal effect of the UN Charter was that war ‘ceased to 
be a right which sovereign States are entitled to exercise at their unfettered discretion’.9 Or, 
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as Oscar Schachter puts it, ‘When the United Nations Charter was adopted, it was generally 
considered to have outlawed war.’10 In this sense the UN Charter was imagined to be a kind 
of constitution, with states giving up their rights of war in exchange for obligations of peace, 
and the UN Charter functioning, as Inis Claude’s phrase, to turn ‘swords into plowshares’.  
The project to deepen and enforce the rule of international law had a special 
resonance in an international society still bearing the scars of aggressive war. The years of 
war provided the necessary political motivation, and consensus, on the need to regulate the 
use of force and ensure respect for the rule of international law. Behind this belief that 
international law could better ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ if 
institutionalized in the UN Charter was an implicit acknowledgment that politics had failed 
to do so.11 The failure of the political powers to avoid war helped to justify the turn to 
international law and international institutions. But participants at San Francisco were also 
conscious of the need to avoid the hyperbole – and subsequent failures – of earlier 
“utopian” attempts to establish a world order ruled by law. The League of Nations failed 
because it couldn’t generate a genuine political consensus to back up its claim to authority. 
As a result, the aspirations for the UN Charter were parsimonious to begin with, judged 
against both historical and contemporary standards. Most notably, there was a far less 
evolved role for the human rights standards enshrined in the Charter and Declaration. As a 
result, although the formal architecture for this ‘last utopia’, as Samuel Moyn has 
characterised it, would be established alongside the regulation of the use of force, the 
practical authority attached to human rights standards was weak and would only become a 
real force well into the 1970s, as a global civil society began to emerge, and as the concepts 
of jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes gave institutional teeth to dead-letter rights.12 
Even more crucially, however, there was no positive obligation to resist acts of aggression; 
this was a decision to be judged on a case-by-case by the UN Security Council. As Thomas 
Franck characterizes it, the result of this is that ‘To the extent that we have had collective 
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security it has been both ad hoc and voluntary’.13 This also had the effect of making the 
political judgement of the Security Council members central to the operation of the Charter, 
even as the architects of the Charter were heralding a new world ruled by law.  In a similar 
vein, Mark Mazower argues that despite the collective, community values seemingly codified 
in the Charter were, for some of those involved, the hope was that the structures of the UN 
would preserve the fraying imperial order, rather than challenge it.14     
The terms of this political rule became increasingly evident as the Cold War 
rubbered in, and as the UN became a sideshow to the main event. Even the parsimonious 
call to outlaw war was difficult to sustain as nuclear weapons technology rehabilitated the 
policymakers faith in the balance of power as the guarantor of international order. Mutually 
assured destruction provided its own elegant solution to avoiding the battlefield, and 
without the need to rely on promises made at the conference table. More than that, the 
rehabilitation of the balance of power logic as the best hope for international stability also 
undermined the UN’s ability to function as an effective protection mechanism. For all 
practical purposes, the UN institutional framework appeared to lack the necessary functional 
authority to protect international peace and security. It may have established the normative 
framework for a new world order, but the rift between states charged with enacting this 
legalized, civilized world order undermined the promise and prospects of world peace 
through world law. Great power politics captured the Charter vision of a world ruled by law, 
and the UN Security Council failed to exercise the enforcement responsibilities attributed to 
it under the Charter.   
This meant that the UN Charter although theoretically promising a ‘watertight 
scheme for the contemporary reality on the use of force’, could not realistically function as 
such.15 This wasn’t necessarily a cause for concern. As Eisenhower would put it: ‘With all its 
defects, with all the failures that we can check up against it, the UN still represents man’s 
best-organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield.’16 But, as Oscar 
Schachter argues, the institutional limitations imposed on the UN because of the Cold War 
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made it crucial that the rules on the use of force were clear and unambiguous, and not 
pushed beyond the prevailing legal interpretations.17 Because the UN Security Council 
wasn’t functioning for the international community – and in defence of the UN Charter 
values – but as a venue for negotiations between competing ideologues, in order for the 
rules on the use of force to retain their authority there needed to be very few occasions for 
debates about their application to end up deadlocked in the UN Security Council. In other 
words, because the collective security regime couldn’t be trusted to remedy uncertainty in 
the rules, this created all the more reason to avoid those “hard cases” which admitted 
uncertainty about the rules.18  
One of the paradoxical effects of a deadlocked conference table, however, was to 
generate alternative avenues through which to exercise responsibility for international peace 
and security. In November 1950, for example, faced with the USSR’s decision to block all 
measures to respond to North Korean aggression, the UN General Assembly (at the 
prompting of US Secretary of State Dean Acheson), adopted resolution 377 A (V) ‘Uniting 
for Peace’.19 This allows that when the UN Security Council fails to exercise its 
responsibilities for international peace and security because of a deadlock between 
permanent members, the General Assembly has a subsidiary power to act. Later attempts by 
the General Assembly to define aggression as a ‘crime against international peace’ can also 
be understood as rooted in a frustration with the failures of the UNSC to develop the 
collective security regime, although tellingly these attempts to strengthen the prohibition on 
aggression weren’t widely taken up.20 Alternative security communities were also formed, as 
a way to escape the constraints of the UN conference table. The formation of NATO in 
particular would have an impact well beyond the Cold War, both in terms of establishing 
peace and diplomacy as ‘the common-sense way to act’ among its members21  and, 
eventually, in terms of proving a “subsidiary” form of collective institutional legitimacy that 
could be appealed to where the UNSC had failed to act, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo.  As 
far as the constitutional status of the UN Charter is concerned, however, the most 
significant impact was in the expansion of the authority of the UN’s administrative branches, 
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namely the Secretariat. This was presided over by Dag Hammarskjöld whose innovation, as 
Anne Orford argues, was to ‘re-imagine the role of “chief-administrative-officer” in political 
terms’, claiming an executive agency far beyond that envisioned in UN Charter Chapter 
XV.22 Hammarskjöld’s re-imagination is an important step in developing the constitutional 
authority of the Charter rules – but not a sufficient development. In practice the nature of 
this role – and the degree of authority those holding it could claim in practice – as much 
reflected the changing political context as the judgement or mindset of those filling the 
role.23 And much like the Security Council, the Charter provides ‘a discretionary mandate to 
undertake executive action’, rather than subjecting the Secretary-General to obligations to 
exercise his authority in a particular way.24  
These were in theory important shifts in the location of remedial responsibilities for 
international peace and security. But none had any very great immediate impact on the rules 
on the use of force. These were largely procedural fixes, of only limited application. Indeed, 
in the case of the UN General Assembly’s powers to ‘unite for peace’, Korea remains the 
only time that these were actually used to circumvent the Security Council’s authority. Any 
deeper uncertainty about the application of the rules was managed and contained by re-
emphasising the pre-eminence of sovereign rights. Crucially, the development of communal, 
constitutional responsibilities to protect international peace and security were frozen by 
Cold War politics. In these circumstances, where uncertainty about the rules on the use of 
force could have resulted in a nuclear war, non-intervention became the height of sovereign 
responsibility.25 There wasn’t any great incoherence or uncertainty in the rules here, but 
neither could the international order be characterised by the rule of law.  
This provides evidence for seeing the rules on the use of force as subject to what 
Brunnée and Toope term ‘normative ebb and flow’.26 The limited scope of the rules reflects 
a shared understanding – at least among the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council – that the rules privileged state’s subjective right to self-defence and territorial 
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integrity rather than requiring a state to exercise or engage with their collective 
responsibilities in protecting international peace and security. It was this understanding of 
the constitutional rules as of limited application that had the capacity to ‘generate a sense of 
legal obligation’ among states.27 There is scope for this to change, for example if the concept 
of a responsibility to protect is more widely accepted. But any claim to constitutional 
authority is conditioned, and ultimately weakened, when the rule is subject to normative ebb 
and flow.  This conclusion is similarly reflected in Page Wilson’s argument that the debate 
over the legality of aggression should be treated as evidence of an underlying division 
between cosmopolitan and communitarian visions of international politics. The 
communitarian logic, she argues, acts as a brake on the realisation of the cosmopolitan 
project and illustrates ‘the folly of seeking to push the evolution of international law beyond 
prevailing political constraints’.28 In either case, a formal commitment to outlaw war was not 
the same as a commitment to give effect to the constitutional rule.  
 
Criminalizing Aggression  
 
Quite apart from the political obstacles to institutionalizing an outright prohibition on 
aggression, there was also the problem that the Charter struggled to communicate the 
gravity of an act of aggression. Despite the condemnation of aggression, as a legal matter a 
violation of Article 2(4) attracted the same level of responsibility as a violation of any other 
rule of law. There was no ‘normative relativity’ in international law – and this was a good 
thing too, as Prosper Weil argued.29 It gave certainty, predictability to the legal international 
order. As Bull argued, this feature of international law – prioritising a procedural rather than 
substantive justice – was wholly suited to the pluralistic nature of international society. But 
the concept of a ‘crime of aggression’ or ‘crimes against peace’ provides a sign that, even as 
the UN was resisting attempts to develop the constitutional status of the rules on the use of 
force, the language of international criminal law was providing an alternative avenue for the 
progressive impulse.30 The idea motivating efforts to establish a criminal sanction for 
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aggression was that this is a key mechanisms for clarifying the normative force of a legal 
rule. Establishing aggression as a crime – including elaborating on the elements of the crime 
– is one way to avoid uncertainty creeping into the rules on the use of force, without 
sacrificing the constitutional status of the rule.    
In a famous exchange at Nuremberg, the US chief prosecutor Robert Jackson 
attempted to pin Goering down on his responsibility for German aggression or crimes 
against peace, the crime that up until that point had been the central pillar in the prosecution 
case. The crime was defined by the Tribunal’s charter as involvement in ‘the planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements and assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing’. But there had been unease from the start about 
using a criminal trial to punish what many regarded as essentially political crimes. The US 
Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., for example, favoured summary executions at 
the discretion of field commanders; the Russians favoured a trial but only if it proceeded on 
the presumption of guilt, didn’t raise too many difficult questions and produced the right 
end result. Indeed, there was an awareness long before Goering had his day in court that 
much of the legal basis for aggression with the IMT Charter comes from the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact treaty obligations – where parties agreed to ‘renounce [war] as an instrument of 
national policy’. This meant that the architects of aggressive war were being charged with a 
breach of the customary principle of pacta sunt servanda, rather than because a criminal 
prohibition against aggressive war formed part of customary international law.31  
In any event, as Jackson found out to his chagrin, these were the difficulties that 
Goering was able to pick at. At every turn Goering was able to reverse the question, 
pointing out that the historical record of the allies was hardly unblemished when it came to 
waging war in violation of international law, or reneging on treaty obligations. Goering’s 
conclusion – the conclusion that Jackson, in making the case for aggression, found so 
difficult to counter in cross-examination – was that the decision to go to war must be part of 
a responsible statesman’s arsenal, and not subject to post-hoc criminal sanctions. From 
Goering’s perspective, for all the procedural niceties protected at the IMT, when you 
scratched the veneer away, the allies might just as well have adopted the Russian proposal. 
In ignoring the political nature of the decision to go to war, the tribunal was showing itself 
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up pas a sham, nothing more than victor’s justice, because history dictates that ‘the victor 
will always be the judge, the vanquished the accused’.32  
Of course, the success that Goering and his fellow accused felt after this exchange 
disappeared once the prosecution shifted its focus to proving responsibility for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, presenting for the first time the full horror of the Holocaust. 
These were crimes that did have a basis in customary international law. Neither does the 
final judgement reflect the trouble Jackson had, instead finding Goering guilty and 
reaffirming aggression as ‘the supreme international crime differing only from other war 
crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole’, an evil which ‘is 
not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affects the whole world’. And yet, in spite of 
this statement, when it came to punishing the accused for their involvement in aggression 
the judges were rather more circumspect. As Page Wilson argues, although convinced about 
the superior political wrong attached to aggression33, the relatively weak sentences given by 
the tribunal for aggression versus crimes against humanity and war crimes was a reflection 
of the much less firm precedent in customary international law for the crime of aggression.34  
The unease surrounding the application of a criminal sanction for aggression is even 
more evident in the deliberations of the Tokyo IMT, or at least debated more intelligently.35 
As Judge Pal – who presented himself, not entirely accurately, as the only judge on the 
Tribunal with any experience of international law – explains in his dissenting opinion, there 
was simply no treaty, statute or customary law basis for the crime of aggression. To conjure 
it up and applied it retroactively to justify individual punishments, including the death 
penalty, ‘obliterates the centuries of civilization which stretch between us and the summary 
slaying of the defeated in war. A trial with law thus prescribed will only be a sham 
employment of legal process for a satisfaction of a thirst for revenge. It does not correspond 
to any idea of justice’.36 Following the trial and the execution of the guilty, Joseph Kennan, 
the chief prosecutor, made the extraordinary claim that the process was indeed political, but 
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that this was of no consequence: ‘had there been an actual miscarriage of justice with regard 
to some of the defendants, there would have been no wrong . . . the lives of morally and 
legally innocent men may be sacrificed in the achievement of the common purpose.’37 The 
common purpose in his view was ‘to advance the cause of peace and right notions of 
international law’, to create a new world order based on the criminalization of war.38 A 
worthy sentiment, but a sentiment that exposes an problematic pragmatic understanding of 
legality, a willingness to act illegally – in this case ignoring fair trial standards – in order to 
expand rule of international law.  
Reflecting these broader concerns with the subjectivity inherent in the prosecution 
of aggression, the rising tide of human rights concern in the 1970s offered rationale for 
avoiding the definitional politics surround the use of force. Human rights offered a way to 
circumvent what was, by that point, a moribund dream with limited political consensus. It is 
noteworthy that Amnesty International, the actor that did most to develop international 
human rights into a viable political project, has actively avoided taking a policy stance on 
which circumstances might constitute a legitimate use of force. The reason behind this is 
that, for them, the crucial consideration is whether human rights and humanitarian law 
standards are respected and civilians and non-combatants protected.39 To dwell on the 
background legitimacy of the conflict is potentially damaging in that it distracts attention 
from the more fundamental obligation to comply with human rights and humanitarian law. 
Even where an intervention is ostensibly justified in defence of human rights, to take a 
position on the legitimacy of the intervention creates myriad problems down the road, 
inviting charges of selectivity and inconsistency. Behind this policy, in other words, is an 
attempt to avoid having to elaborate on the normative hierarchy within the constitutional 
rules, and a recognition that there needs to be some space for situation judgement if the 
tensions between the rules of international law are to be managed. What is key, however, is 
that the situational judgement takes place in defence of the constitutional rules.   
It was for similar reasons that the International Law Commission would dismiss the 
concept of a state crime of aggression after a decades long process of attempting to articulate 
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the rules on state responsibility. There is a long history here, with efforts to codify the law of 
state responsibility beginning in 1953, presided over by five different special rapporteurs, 
with an agreement only reached in 2001. The question of how to characterise the “crime” of 
aggression was a major point of contention throughout this process. Indeed, the difficulty 
surrounding this was one of the reasons the process too so long.40 At the end of it all James 
Crawford dropped the category of state crime, reasoning that in order for this category of 
‘higher’ liability to make sense, there had to be some institutional form which could give the 
category meaning. In place of state crime, Crawford substituted the ambiguous concept of 
‘serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of international law’.41  
The inclusion of aggression as one of the core crimes in the Rome Statute, and the 
Kampala review conference which detailed both the elements of the crime and the 
circumstances under which a prosecution for the crime of aggression could be initiate has 
changed this picture, but only slightly. Yoram Dinstein captures the rationale behind the 
inclusion of aggression in arguing that the capacity to hold an individual accountable for the 
crime of aggression establishes a back-door means of giving effect to the constitutional rules 
on international peace and security. As he puts it: ‘Only if it dawns on the actual decision 
makers that where they carry their country along the path to war in contravention of 
international law they expose themselves to individual criminal liability, are they likely to 
hesitate before taking that fateful step.’42 Given the weakness of UN organs at providing this 
framework for international peace and security, there is a need for measures able to sidestep 
or “contract around” international political intransigence.43 There is a recognition of its 
status as a constitutional rule, but an uncertainty about what this means in practice. Kampala 
can be read as an attempt – not altogether successful it should be said – to institutionalise 
the authority needed to bypass the UN Security Council on matters of peace and security.   
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The uncertainty that attaches to the “crime of aggression” is not to do with political 
nature of the act, but with fragmentation. Claims of victor’s justice do not, ultimately, 
discount the possibility of their being a criminal sanction attached to aggression. The reason 
these cries have caused such worry is that show up the contradictions that have been 
allowed to persist in the constitutional rules of international law between a protection of fair 
trial standards and the preservation of international peace and security. The problem here is 
not that the rules are ‘fuzzy’ but the uncertainty surrounding the responsibilities attaching to 
their application.   
 
Constitutionalizing Intervention: institutionalising the exception? 
 
The end of the Cold War brought new uncertainties, new disorders. Academics proclaimed 
“the end of major war”, and called for a new security discourse to fit this new reality.44 This 
was matched by a consensus of sorts which emerged from the smaller interventions and 
insurgencies which peppered the Cold War landscape, that the prohibition on the use of 
force was not so absolute as it had seemed in San Francisco or at Nuremberg. The use of 
force to counter insurgencies, civil wars and ‘small wars’ had a place in the policy makers 
toolbox not reflected in the blunt attempts to define and prohibit aggression. The need for a 
new way of thinking about the use of force was further heightened by the growing 
interconnectedness of states which introduced new transnational threats and simultaneously 
made concerns about great power conflict seem quaint, old-fashioned. Beyond this, 
however, the rules on the use of force came under pressure from the need to respond to 
mass atrocity.  
The failure of the UN collective security regime to prevent atrocities in Bosnia, 
closely followed by the failure in Rwanda, set the stage for the debate on Kosovo. Following 
violence against Albanians in Kosovo, and the failure of a diplomatic solution, NATO made 
the decision to intervene without UN authorisation. The reason no UN authorisation was 
sought was that had it been taken to a vote at the UNSC, Russia and China would have used 
their veto. So it was a relatively clear-cut violation of the rule on the use of force which, had 
it been left at that, wouldn’t have had any major constitutional effect. Where uncertainty 
begins to creep into the rules is in the post-hoc characterisation of the violation of the rules 
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as ‘illegal but legitimate’. Nicholas Wheeler’s attempts to justify this violation of the Charter 
rules are indicative of how this event allowed the existing rules to shade into uncertainty. 
Wheeler has two arguments, which are sometimes in tension. On the one hand, he argues 
that the nature of the crimes justifies intervention under customary international law. Even 
if states have not explicitly recognized a right of humanitarian intervention, their practice 
suggests they understand such a right to exist. Humanitarian intervention is not a challenge 
to the rules on the use of force, but an implicit and important part of the rules on the use of 
force. The second claim he makes is that even if humanitarian intervention is thought to be 
illegal, this doesn’t matter because in the circumstances we’re talking about the normal rules 
of international law are suspended. This should be thought of as a ‘supreme emergency’, and 
hence as triggering a permissive ethic of illegality.45 Humanitarian intervention is something 
done to stop the emergency, to bring the sovereign system back to an even kilter. The 
creates confusion: is humanitarian intervention an application of the rules, or an exception 
to the rules?  
The casualty of this humanitarian sentiment and practice, Thomas Franck argues, 
was Article 2(4). This was a legacy of the framing, of the fact that the UN Charter was a 
compromise framework. This didn’t only mean limitations on the scope of the obligations 
created: in places – important places – the UN Charter fudged a political consensus in order 
to get a general agreement, enshrining the normative conflict for another day, another set of 
political actors. Most important, because those at San Francisco had left the site of authority 
ambiguous, the old problem of state subjectivity (in interpretation, in legal compliance) were 
allowed to remain. No one actor had supreme authority to remedy the Charter rules, in a way 
that presumed the integrity of the Charter itself. Franck argues on this basis that the UN 
Charter should be thought of as a “quasi-constitutional” instrument, because the remedial 
power still rests with the political organs of the UN. By attempting to ground a rationale for 
humanitarian intervention in these existing rules, the effect was to highlight the ambiguous, 
uncertain, and ultimately inadequate nature of the rules on the use of force. As Franck 
writes: ‘To admit exceptions may undermine law’s claim to legitimacy, which depends at 
least in part on its consistent application. On the other hand, the law’s legitimacy is surely 
also undermined if, by its slavish implementation, it produces terrible consequences. The 
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paradox arises from the seemingly irreconcilable choice, in such hard cases, between 
consistency and justice.’46  
Law can provide an institutional remedy to this – ‘to develop ways to bridge the gap 
between what is requisite in strict legality and what is generally regarded as just and moral’47 
– but the answer for Franck is not more rules but more reasonableness. By this he means 
that there needs to be more acceptance that in certain circumstances morality will trump 
legality. Rather than attempting to rationalise an action as within the rules, it is better to 
accept that this is a violation of the rules: under question ‘What, eat the cabin boy?’, he 
argued that ‘in extraordinary circumstances, condoning a carefully calibrated and justifiable 
violation may do more to rescue the law’s legitimacy than would its rigorous 
implementation’.48 To institutionalize the exception – and this, he thinks, applies equally to 
cannibalism as to humanitarian intervention – has the potential to weaken the legal order. 
Kosovo provided the immediate conceptual context for the debates surrounding the 
decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. Debates about the responsibilities triggered by the 
incoherence, fragmentation or ambiguity of international law had a far more public airing in 
these debates than in the decision to act outside of strict considerations of legality had done 
in Kosovo. The lines of disagreement can be seen in Michael Wood’s testimony to the at the 
Chilcot Inquiry, in response to the way that Jack Straw, then Foreign Secretary, had 
approached the question of legality. Straw had suggested that the need to get the second 
resolution from the UN was open to debate ‘à la Kosovo’; there were other factors with the 
potential to legitimate the intervention. The effect was that in intervening it seemed to 
follow Franck’s injunction to break the rules as necessary but to do so honestly and openly. 
One reason that Kosovo didn’t provide the appropriate analogy here was that there was no 
concerted attempt to justify the legality of the intervention. Commentators at the time took 
that to mean both that the US couldn’t offer a legal justification and that it wasn’t trying to 
hide this fact.  
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But Straw drew a more fundamental lesson from the Kosovo exception too, 
regarding the indeterminacy of the rule. The fact that there were legitimate differences on 
the authority of the UNSC meant that, in his eyes, the legal requirement to seek a second 
resolution was far from certain. As he put it to Michael Wood, the principle legal advisor to 
the Foreign Office:  
‘I note your advice [on the legality of the Iraq intervention] but I do not accept it . . . 
I am as committed as anyone to international law and its obligations, but it is an 
uncertain field. There is no international court for resolving such questions in the 
manner of a domestic court. Moreover, in this case, the issue is an arguable one 
capable of honestly and reasonably-held differences of view.’49  
 
In his testimony, Sir Michael Wood responds:  
‘I think, because there is no court, the legal advisor and those taking decisions based 
on legal advice, have to be all the more scrupulous in adhering to the law, because it 
is one thing . . . for a lawyer to say, ‘Well, there is an argument here. Have a go. A 
court, a judge will decide in the end’. It is quite different in the international system, 
where that’s usually not the case. You have a duty to obey the law, a duty to the system. You 
are setting precedents by the very fact of saying things and doing things. So I would draw the 
opposite conclusion to the drawn by the Foreign Secretary from the absence of a 
general court.’50 
 
The key consideration and point of contention within the FCO was the thought of what 
their responsibility was in the absence of courts, the absence of enforcement. At no point 
was the absence of courts (and the impossibility of a sanction from the UN Security 
Council) seen to lead to an absence of responsibility towards the law. The ambiguous and 
amorphous rules signalled, for the FCO legal advisors, the need to double-down on their 
commitment to and respect for the international rule of law. As Elizabeth Wilmshurst – 
who resigned her post in protest over these issues – observed, this had been the big change 
wrought by the Suez crisis. Collective security, and a commitment to international legality, 
were part of Britain’s fundamental interests. In her experience the British attitude had been 
                                                          
 
49 Michael Wood, Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 26 January 2010, p. 32-33, lines 22-1 
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one of both seeing international legality as a benefit in particular instances, and also as a 
general approach:  
“We want to get the world to comply with international law in particular instances, 
but, also, that it is in our interests that we should go about international peace and 
security in a collective way.”51  
 
It was the UK’s reputation as a believer in the rule of law that was at stake. For her 
and the other FCO lawyers the attitude of Jack Straw and the Attorney General expressed a 
disdain for the value of legality, and a sweeping scepticism about its authority. Other 
international lawyers and academics supported this analysis.52 In much the same way as at 
Suez, the question  of legality became “fuzzy” only once subjective political considerations 
were grafted onto the legal advisory process, against the established conventions. For the 
FCO lawyers arguing against the intervention in Iraq, there was a clear sense that acting 
from a commitment to legality was the responsible and prudential practice. This is what had 
been lost in Straw’s decision to disregard the advice of his legal advisors, individuals who 
could draw on their experience of practicing international law in order to arrive at a 
judgement about the requirements of legality. Elizabeth Wilmshurst sums this up nicely: 
asked whether Jack Straw’s opinion that international law was an ‘uncertain field’ and 
subsequent rejection of his legal advisors advice had a degree of legitimacy given his training 
as a barrister, Wilmshurst replied: ‘With all due respect, he is not an international lawyer!’  
  But for better or worse, this sense of a constitutional commitment to advance 
international legality did not shape the outcome of these debates. And what the practice 
showed, for Michael Glennon, was a different order of exceptionalism to that governing the 
intervention in Kosovo. This shapes the character of his arguments for pragmatism. He 
agrees with Franck that exceptionalism represents a danger to the rule of international law. 
But he regards exceptionalism as having far more profound and far-reaching consequences 
for the international legal order. His worry isn’t only that Article 2(4) has been killed off in 
the cauldron of humanitarian sentiment and practice, but that the process of killing it off has 
                                                          
 
51 Ibid, p. 10, lines 7-11 
52 See for example, Phillip Sands, submission to the Chilcot Inquiry, 10 September 2010, available at 
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opened up questions about the obligatory standing of all international law. The uncertainty it 
creates allows people like John Bolton, for example, to argue that ‘International Law is not 
law; it is a series of political and moral arrangements that stand or fall on their own merits, 
and anything else is simply theology and superstition masquerading as law’.53 Glennon’s 
worry is that attempt to legally justify violations of the rules on the use of force as instances 
of “humanitarian intervention” amount to an institutionalization of exceptionalism. In 
effect, the legalisation of humanitarian intervention hollows out international law’s claim to 
regulate the use of force. It creates a legal gap, which requires a filler. And since international 
law has served as such an ineffective, messy, incoherent system for regulating the use of 
force, there is a good case to be made for accepting that peace and security is an inherently 
political domain not suited to regulation through law. States use international law and its 
institutions to enhance their security. When this functional rationale falls away, so too does a 
commitment to international legality. This justifies a range of remedial responsibilities, but 
international law is the patient,  not the cure. This means that the remedy can’t be located 
within the institution of international law, but must be located with states that authored and, 
ultimately, own international law.  
These weaknesses are compounded by the uncertainty created by over-promising, 
for example in creating an expectation that the criminalization of aggression could have any 
determinate effect on the regulation of the use of force. These are, Glennon argues, rules ‘in 
blank prose’; they don’t have the capacity to function in an objective way; states won’t allow 
these rules to function as legal rules ought to be able to function. Even those who are in 
other respects fully committed to the ICC’s constitutional role in international society share 
these worries that prosecuting aggression could jeopardise the Court’s hard-fought authority 
to prosecution genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.54 And this analysis seems 
to have been borne out in the agreement reached at the Kampala review conference, in 
which the UNSC has the final word on a prosecution for the crime of aggression.  
                                                          
 
53 John Bolton, ‘Is there really “law” in international affairs?’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 10 
(2000), p. 1 
54 Andreas Paulus, ‘Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression’, European Journal of International Law 20 (4) 
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In the final analysis, these worries bubble out in scepticism about all of the major 
institutional developments intended to remedy the rules on the use of force. Crucially, this 
relates to the institutional practices designed to give effect to the concept of “sovereignty as 
responsibility”. Although in its earliest incarnation the R2P framework seemed to resituate 
authority away from the UN Security Council, the process of formalizing it neutered much 
of this early promise. The World Summit document both restricted the circumstances in 
which force could be used to the core international crimes (meaning that in the wake of 
Cyclone Nargis, for example, R2P offered no basis for intervention), and it located the 
power to use R2P in order to justify intervention squarely within the hands of the UNSC. 
Most importantly, it avoided creating legal obligations to intervene, leading many to argue 
that the impact of R2P on the legal regime surrounding the use of force is at best limited, at 
most, non-existent. If R2P doesn’t change the underlying rules on the use of force, if, 
instead, it seems to further privilege the role of powerful states in deciding when and where 
to intervene, how can it be regarded as improving international law’s claim to constitutional 
authority? As Brunnée and Toope argue, the best that can be said about R2P is that it 
represents a ‘candidate norm’, a norm with the potential to shift state practice and in the 
future claim a binding type of legal authority.55 As for the present, however, we are far better 
focusing on the clear legal obligations restricting the use of force to self-defence and 
collective security.  
These pragmatic concerns are persuasive. They embed a scepticism about regarding 
R2P as part of a broader constitutional shift in international society. But the focus on 
obligations is also a red-herring in understanding the terms of international law’s claim to 
constitutional authority. Taking her lead from H.L.A. Hart, Anne Orford argues that the 
responsibility to protect should be understood as ‘a form of law that confers powers “of a 
public or official nature” and that allocates jurisdiction . . . The vocabulary of 
“responsibility” works here as a language for conferring authority and allocating powers 
rather than as a language for imposing binding obligations and commanding obedience.’56 
She goes on to argue that ‘the responsibility to protect concept develops the idea that while 
states are responsible for their own citizens or populations the UN is responsible for the 
international community as a whole.’ Edward Luck has similarly argued that R2P was never 
intended to be legally binding. The whole point was to create an institutional foothold 
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through which various actors could work to generate the political will, the motivation, 
needed to intervene. This is not a thought to get carried away on; there is too much 
hypocrisy surrounding the application of the rules for that, too many occasions on which 
the necessary motivation will fail to materialise. In spite of this, however, these rules 
represent more than a ‘candidate norm’. Reflecting the themes developed in this this, Alex 
Bellamy characterizes the institutionalisation of the responsibility to protect as shifting the 
debate from whether to act to how to act. There will be occasions where, for good reason, 
states will not intervene militarily to prevent mass atrocity. But where previously this might 
have been taken as evidence of the incoherence of the rules on the use of force, R2P 
provides a framework through which to acknowledge and manage the practical judgement 
required in responding to mass atrocity, with all the complex ethical and political 
considerations this raises. It institutionalises a commitment to humanitarian action, and this 
has works to shift the underlying ethic or culture of legality surrounding the rules on the use 
of force.  
To give one example of this, debates on intervention in Syria have been complicated 
by the complex local and regional politics, a fragmented opposition force, the geo-strategic 
importance of Syria to Russia, and worries about intervention feeding greater instability in 
both the short and long terms. For these reasons the early stages of the debate on how to 
react to the atrocities being committed were dominated by the belief that a diplomatic 
solution was far preferable to military intervention. Some took this as evidence that the 
Libyan intervention represented R2P’s “moment”, and that now, in the debates on how to 
react to Syria, normal service had been resumed.57 Politics was driving the agenda, not the 
humanitarian sentiments embedded in R2P. But this scepticism, and the pragmatic attitude 
to rule-following it feeds, misses the crucial point. Where, historically, the failure to reach a 
resolution over Syria might have been taken as evidence of the institutional weakness of 
international law, or the fact that international law was in a state of flux, the debate was 
driven for the most part not by questions about the legitimacy of the underlying value – 
responding to mass atrocity – but about how the commitment to protecting fundamental 
human rights and humanitarian values should be implemented in practice. Even the 
language of Russia’s foreign minister, for all the bellicose claims about absolute sovereign 
privilege, shifted as al-Assad’s ramped up the scale of his attacks on his citizens. This reflects 
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Bellamy’s idea that, ‘Once states accept that international society has a responsibility to 
protect and that the proper question should be how rather than whether to fulfil that 
responsibility, they have limited political room for manoeuvre in the face of compelling 
evidence of an imminent threat of mass atrocities.’58  
The idea of the responsibility to protect – and the institutionalisation of the 
underlying commitment to sovereign as responsibility – helps to generate a sense of the 
ethic required where there has been a violation of fundamental rules of international law. 
This is not about formal adherence to the rules, but about establishing the applicable ethic 
of legality. R2P helps to embed a constitutionalist ethic in international society by 
developing the principles by which political actors ought to structure their strategic decision-
making. In this sense it is wrong to talk about R2P as a mere candidate norm. It is much 
more than that; it serves to institutionalise a practice of constitutional responsibility.  
 
Conclusion 
 
What lessons should we draw from the politics surrounding the rules on the use of force? 
Should we accept Michael Doyle’s conclusion that ‘The UN Charter, like so many 
constitutions before it, is an invitation to struggle’ – that these are not rules intended to rule, 
merely to structure constitutional politics?59 Is this sufficient cause to accept the pragmatist 
approach to legality, evaluating the authority of the constitutional rules sui generis? There 
remains a great deal of uncertainty. The UN Security Council’s contradictory applications of 
this new norm of responsible sovereignty in Libya and Syria have only heightened the 
uncertainty, and highlighted the problems that remain. But there are promising signs too. In 
Libya, and in Syria, the ICC has been a player from the start. This was not necessarily a good 
thing, but in connecting the dots between R2P, the UN Security Council and the ICC for 
the first time it highlighted the scope for a constitutionalist practice to be regarded as a 
responsible practice. In Syria, perhaps the most lasting lesson has been that the promotion 
of R2P as a governing norm does not commit states to intervention if they can find a 
diplomatic resolution to the problem. But the main lesson is that despite the pragmatic 
warnings, the use of legality – of the principles established in and through the respect for 
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international law – provides an avenue for managing the uncertainty surrounding the rules 
on the use of force.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this conclusion I want to revisit, very briefly, three themes to emerge from this thesis. 
The first theme is that the battle between pragmatism and constitutionalism shapes 
international law’s constitutional politics. What I have tried to show is that better 
understanding the nature of this battle highlights the scale of the difficulties facing the 
constitutionalist attempts to establish international law’s constitutional authority. I have 
argued that constitutionalism is at base an attempt to establish a determinate and superior 
claim to the authority of international law, but that the success of this enterprise is heavily 
conditioned by the perception that international legality is a fundamentally ambiguous 
practice attempting to govern a  fundamentally ambiguous world. In these circumstances, 
the appropriate ethic to adopt is not one that acts on an image of international law’s 
constitutional authority, but a pragmatic ethic that locates law’s constitutional authority as 
part a broader conversation between political and moral judgements about the best course 
of action.  
 
The second theme is that the perception that these two ethics are irreconcilable further 
undermines the scope for constitutionalism, because constitutionalism requires a degree of 
confidence in the legal order’s authority that is in tension with the well-established and well-
protected sense of faith that sovereigns have in the superior virtue of their political 
judgement. This is to say that constitutionalism needs to be able to justify a form of faith in 
international law that doesn’t collapse in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity about the 
terms of its rule. I argued that the republican tradition – in particular Augustine’s insightful 
understanding of faith as revealed through hope and the exercise of responsibility – provide 
a particularly strong justification for adopting a constitutionalist mindset.   
 
The third final theme builds on this, arguing that exercising constitutional responsibility 
provides a way for actors to generate a claim to constitutional authority, building on their 
sense of trusteeship over the rules. This is not to say that constitutionalism will necessarily 
or inevitably win out against the pragmatic mindset, but it does put these two ethics on a 
more equal footing when it comes to defining the constitutional rules of international 
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society, rules such as those governing the global commons, legitimating peacebuilding, 
prohibiting torture and outlawing war.   
 
I started with a quote from Hammarskjöld, and it seems appropriate to finish with a quote 
from him as well. The faith that he calls for in order to justify the spread of liberal 
international institutions, in order to justify the continued pursuit of the rule of international 
law ‘is not the facile faith of generations before us, who thought that everything was 
arranged for the best in the best of worlds or that physical and psychological development 
necessarily worked out toward something they called progress. It is in a sense a much harder 
belief—the belief and the faith that the future will be all right because there will always be 
enough people to fight for a decent future.’1 International law’s claim to constitutional 
authority, it seems to me, is premised on this same basic idea, that it can motivate those 
fighting to shape international society’s constitutional order to have and to keep faith with 
international law.  
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